HRE Governs Motions in Limine about Evidence, No Explanation Required
State v. Marroquin (HSC March 17, 2021)
Background. Benito Marroquin III was
charged with assault. He claimed self-defense and filed motions in limine seeking
admission of statements made by eyewitnesses to the police. These statements were
evidence that Marroquin punched the complainant because the complainant was
choking him. Marroquin argued that the statement to the police was a statement
of recent perception and, therefore, an exception to the hearsay rule pursuant
to HRE Rule 804(b)(8). Marroquin also proffered in another motion in limine evidence
from a defense investigator who interviewed another co-worker. This co-worker
told the investigator that the complainant announced he “wasn’t going to take
that from a punk like [Marroquin].” Marroquin also argued this statement was
admissible pursuant to HRE Rule 804(b)(8). The circuit court, with the Hon.
Judge Ronald Ibarra presiding, denied both motions. On the proffered evidence
from the police officer, the circuit court stated it was “akin to State v. Juhn,”
83 Hawai'i 472, 927 P.2d 1355 (1996), which pertained to the public records exception
pursuant to HRE Rule 803(b)(8). The circuit court gave no other explanation
for the denial.
At trial, the complainant testified that he was
assaulted by Marroquin without provocation. He admitted that he thought “if I
could just grab him and hold onto him in a bear hug I could stop the madness.
But I never accomplished that. Next thing I remember, I was on the ground.” On
cross-examination, the complainant denied grabbing Marroquin’s neck. On redirect
he testified that he had “no memory of laying my hands” on Marroquin’s neck. After
the prosecution rested, the defense renewed its request to admit the evidence
proffered in the motions in limine. The circuit court still denied the motion
and added “there’s still nothing new . . . for the Court to consider.”
Marroquin testified in his defense. He testified
that the complainant was choking him and he hit him to get him to stop. The jury
found him guilty of assault in the second degree. He was sentenced and appealed.
The ICA affirmed.
Motions in Limine Regarding Evidence Governed by HRE,
not HRPP.
The HSC addressed the inconsistency between the Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure
and the Hawai'i Rules of Evidence. Pretrial motions generally must be
determined before trial “unless the court orders that it be deferred for determination
at trial of the general issue[.]” HRPP Rule 12(e). “Where factual issues are
involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its essential findings
on the record.” Id. On the other hand, when ruling on the admissibility of
evidence, the trial court “may add any other or further statement which shows
the character of the evidence, the form in which it was offered, the objection
made, and the ruling thereon.” HRE Rule 103(b). The HSC noted that if HRPP
controlled, the trial court was required to explain why it denied the admission
of the proffered evidence on the record. If the rules of evidence applied, it
was at the court’s discretion.
A motion in limine, while a pretrial motion, “serves
the useful purpose of raising an pointing out before trial certain evidentiary
ruligns the court may be called upon to make during the course of the trial.” Kobashigawa
v. Silva, 129 Hawai'i 313, 321, 300 P.3d 579, 587 (2013). HRE Rule 103(b) is
designed to “provide the appellate court with a record adequate for final
disposition of an evidentiary point. The provision is discretionary rather than
mandatory, leaving determination of adequacy of record to the judgment of the
trial court.” HRE Rule 103 commentary.
In resolving which rule applied, the HSC turned to
HRS § 626-3:
If any other provision of
law, including any rule promulgated by the supreme court, is inconsistent with
[the HRE], [the HRE] shall govern unless [the HRE] or such inconsistent
provision of law specifically provides otherwise.
The HRE clearly applied to this case. HRE Rule
1101(b). The HSC held that motions in limine about the admission of evidence
are governed by the HRE. The factual finding requirement in HRPP Rule 12(e) did
not apply. Therefore, it’s at the discretion of the trial court to explain why
evidence is admissible or excluded.
Justice Wilson’s Dissent. Justice Wilson disagreed
in upholding the conviction. According to Justice Wilson, Marroquin proffered
evidence would have been used to impeach the complainant and show that he was
acting in self-defense. “A trial court’s denial of a defendant’s constitutional
right to impeach a witness . . . . is subject to the harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt standard.” State v. Brown, 145 Hawai'i 56, 62, 446 P.3d
973, 979 (2019). When “there is a reasonable possibility that the error
complained of might have contributed to the conviction,” the error is not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
Justice Wilson explained that this case came down
to credibility. The complainant denied choking Marroquin. Marroquin testified
otherwise. The proffered evidence corroborated Marroquin’s version of events.
Justice Wilson wrote that the circuit court erred in denying the proffered
evidence. The trial court was required to determine if the proffered hearsay
statements were statements of recent perception pursuant to HRE Rule 804(b)(5).
That did not happen. This failure to analyze the evidence as requested
constituted the error. The error was raised again at trial. For Justice Wilson
that was enough to vacate the conviction and remand for new trial.
Is Everybody Right? This case is strange. The
majority held that motions in limine pertaining to the admission of evidence
invoke the Hawai'i Rules of Evidence. Therefore, HRE Rule 103(b) applies rather
than the more generalized HRPP Rule 12(e) for pretrial motions. It means that
the trial court is not required to explain its rulings or issue findings to
support the ruling. What’s missing is the analysis on the merits.
Justice Wilson does not address the majority’s
holding at all. His "dissent" goes straight to the issue of whether the trial court erred
in denying the motion or even examining whether the proffered evidence should
be admitted under the hearsay rules. Seems like everyone’s right.
Sure, HRE applies to these motions in limine and the lower court was not required to explain its ruling. But was that the right call in the first place? The majority has nothing to say about that. Only Justice Wilson. Can the HRE apply and can the conviction be vacated because the evidence should have been admitted at trial and it’s not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt? Apparently not.
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