Showing posts from September, 2010

Remanding for Conviction on the Lesser-Included Offense not Always so

State v. Bullard (ICA September 27, 2010) Background. Bullard was prosecuted for excessive speeding. HRS § 291C-105(a)(1) and (a)(2). At trial, Officer Corinne Rivera testified that she paced Bullard's vehicle in her own "subsidized" police vehicle--a Toyta 4Runner. Officer Rivera testified that her Toyota gets an annual speed check at a place called "Roy's." Over Bullard's objection, the district court admitted Officer Rivera's speed check card from Roy's Kalihi Automotive Center & Towing. Officer Rivera testified that Bullard was going 91 m.p.h. The district court took judicial notice that that stretch of highway had a speed limit of 55 m.p.h. Bullard testified in his own defense. He admitted to speeding, but not excessive speeding. The district court found Bullard guilty of excessive speeding. The Error Conceded. Bullard and the prosecution agreed that the district court erred in admitting the speed card check be

Agency Hears Claims First, Constitutional Claims come Later

HGEA v. Lingle (HSC September 8, 2010) Background. Governor Lingle issued Executive Order 09-02, which ordered certain State employees to be furloughed for 72 days over a two-year period; their pay would be automatically adjusted. Their union, the Hawai'i Government Employees Association, filed a complaint in the circuit court seeking declaratory relief. HGEA argued that the governor could not unilaterally impose furloughs because it impinges on their right to collective bargaining, which is protected by the Hawai'i Constitution. Haw. Const. Art. XIII, sec. 2 as well as their rights under HRS chapter 89. HGEA also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. The circuit court granted the motion in part and concluded that the Order did infringe upon the worker's right to collective bargaining. The circuit court also concluded that the Order unilaterally--and therefore, unlawfully--alters the workers' wages. The circuit court rejected Lingle's argum

Attorneys can Collect Attorneys' Fees in Action for Collection of Attorneys' Fees

David Hall, LLC v. Laroya (ICA September 2, 2010) Background. The David Hall law firm is a law corporation with a single employee: David Hall. Hall agreed to represent James Laroya in exchange for fees. Laroya made no payments. The Hall firm initiated a complaint in the district court seeking $8,601.92 in fees, costs, and taxes for the services rendered to Laroya. The Hall firm then filed a proposed default judgment requesting a total $14,611.55, which included $2,632.50 for attorneys fees in litigating the instant case. The district court denied the motion and noted that the Hall firm could not collect fees "as you are essentially representing yourself." Eventually, however, default judgment was entered, which awarded $12,438.73 ($8,601.92 in fees, $2,821.84 for interest, $120 for costs, and $894.97 in other costs). It did not include the fees for the collection lawsuit. The Hall firm appealed. The Assumpsit Statute. "Generally, under the '