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Showing posts with the label mandatory min.

HSC holds a sentencing enhancement is not an element under a state statute even thought it is an element under the Sixth Amendment.

  State v. Smith (HSC September 12, 2025). Brian Smith was indicted for murder and attempted murder arising from a shooting in Kona. Both counts alleged that he was subject to a sentencing enhancement under HRS § 706-660.1 alleging that he possessed, used, or threatened to use a firearm while committing the offense. The prosecution did not allege a state of mind for the enhancement.   Smith went to trial. The circuit court instructed the jury that if it found him guilty of either count, it must answer a special interrogatory:   Has the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally used and/or threatened to use a firearm, whether the firearm was loaded or unloaded, operable or inoperable, while engaged in the commission of the offense of Murder in the Second Degree or Manslaughter (Extreme Mental or Emotional Disturbance)?   The jury returned a guilty verdict and answered “yes” to the interrogatory. The circuit court sentenc...

The Prior-Convictions Exception has been Apprendied

State v. Auld (HSC November 24, 2015) Background. Jayson Auld was convicted of one count of robbery in the second degree. After the verdict but before sentencing the prosecution moved to impose mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment based on a prior conviction. This was the first official notice of the State’s intention to seek the mandatory minimum. It was never pleaded in the indictment, presented to the grand jury, and presented after the verdict before the petit jury. The circuit court granted the motion and sentenced Auld to prison for a period of ten years with a mandatory minimum of 6 years and 8 months. He appealed. On appeal, Auld argued that the imposition of the mandatory minimum was in violation of his right to have each and every element proven before a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The ICA affirmed. The HSC accepted his petition for writ of certiorari. The Wild, Weird World of Sentencing Laws. Defendants have the constitutional right to have each and every el...

The Maximum Term of Imprisonment is the Statutory Maximum (not the Maximum Range under Federal Sentencing Guidelines)

State v. Andres (ICA October 20, 2011) Background. Ray Andres was charged with promoting a dangerous drug in the second degree. HRS § 712-1242. The date of the alleged offense occurred on November 6, 2006. The prosecution moved for a mandatory minimum term of three years and four months of imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Over Andres' objection, the circuit court determined that Andres was eligible for a mandatory minimum based on a conviction for a federal drug offense in 1991. In that case, Andres pleaded guilty to attempting to possess over 100 grams of crystal methamphetamine on July 3, 1991 and was sentenced on July 8, 1991. The federal court determined that Andres was subject to a range of 121 to 151 months. The circuit court imposed a mandatory minimum on Andres. Andres appealed. The Repeat-Offender Statute. Andres was found guilty of a class B felony and sentenced pursuant to the repeat-offender statute. "[A]ny person convicted of...

For Mandatory Min., Priors Presumed Valid Unless Challenged.

State v. Heggland (ICA Nov. 8, 2007) Discussed and Partly Overruled. Background. Heggland pleaded guilty to Promoting a Dangerous Drug in the 3d Degree, HRS § 712-1243(1), and committing Prohibited Acts relating to Drug Paraphernalia, HRS § 329-43.5. The State sought a mandatory minimum term under HRS § 706-606.5 on the grounds that Heggland committed his promoting offense while on parole from a Colorado felony conviction. Thus, he was a "repeat offender" who committed the drug offense within the "max. term of imprisonment possible after a prior felony conviction." The State offered documents showing Heggland's prior conviction. Heggland even stipulated to having committed the drug offense in Hawai'i while he was on parole for the Colorado conviction. The circuit court denied the motion, however, because the State failed to show that Heggland had been represented by counsel or waived his right to counsel at the time of his Colorado conviction. The State ap...