Your Right to Record Cops on Duty and in Public
State v. Russo (HSC December 14, 2017)
Background. Maui Police Department officers were conducting
traffic surveillance on the side of Haleakala Highway. Thomas Russo stopped his
vehicle on the road shoulder and started to record the officers on his phone. Russo
first approached Officer John Fairchild. Officer Fairchild asked Russo to turn
his hazard lights on. Russo says he can do that and starts walking back to his
vehicle and turns his hazard lights on. Russo briefly talked to Officer
Fairchild about slowing down traffic “all the way up to Haliimaile.” Officer
Fairchild told him that they were pulling cars off the roadway into an area on
the shoulder so Russo would have to “step off to the side.” Officer Fairchild
said “I don’t want you to get run over.” Russo replied, “Okay.”
Russo next again
approached the officers and walked past Officer Fairchild. He approached
Officer Rusty Lawson, who was standing near a vehicle that had been stopped. As
Russo neared him, Officer Lawson leaves his position near the vehicle and
approaches Russo. He told Russo to “stand back there” and points in the general
direction toward Officer Fairchild. He told Russo that he was obstructing a
government operation. Russo walked backward but kept recording. Officer Lawson
kept telling Russo he needed “to stand back there.” Russo asked where could he
stand? At one point Russo stood near the vehicle on a field near the road
shoulder, but Officer Lawson said to stand “back there, you’re on private
property.” Russo stepped back and asked if he could stand on public property.
By then Officer Lawson moves toward Russo, grabbed him, and arrested him as
Russo started walking backward away from the officers.
Russo was charged by way
of complaint of failing to comply with a lawful order in violation of HRS §
291C-13. Russo filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that there was no
probable cause underlying the charge and on the grounds that the prosecution
violated his right to free speech and press. The motion was granted on
non-constitutional grounds. The prosecution appealed and the ICA vacated the
dismissal order without examining the constitutional issue. Chief Judge
Nakamura dissented. Russo petitioned for certiorari.
Your First Amendment Right to Record Police Officers in
Public. A
person commits the offense in HRS § 291C-13 when the person willingly fails or
refuses to comply with “any lawful order or direction” of a police officer. The
issue in this case is whether Officer Lawson’s direction to “stand over there”
and “get back” were lawful in light of Russo’s constitutional rights.
“Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” U.S. Const. Am. I.
Similarly, “[n]o law shall be enacted . . . abridging the freedom of speech or
of the press.” Haw. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 4. These freedoms encompass the right
to gather news. Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972); Houchins v.
KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11 (1978); First
Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978).
And based on these cases,
there are numerous courts that have recognized that individuals have the
constitutional right to photograph and film police officers in public places. Gilk v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st
Cir. 2011) (“filing of government officials engaging in their duties in a
public place, including police officers performing their responsibilities”
protected); Turner v. Lt. Driver, 848
F.3d 678, 690 (5th Cir. 2017) (“We agree with every circuit that has ruled on
this question: Each has concluded that the First Amendment protects the right
to record the police.”); Smith v. City of
Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000); Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995); ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595 (7th
Cir. 2012).
The HSC adopted the
federal cases and agreed that under both constitutions, an individual has the
right to record public officials engaged in their duties in a public place,
including the police.
But it’s not an Unlimited Right . . .
This right to record the
police “may be subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.” Gilk, 655 F.3d at 84. A time, place, and
manner restriction can be imposed by the officer “only if the officer can
reasonably conclude that the filming itself is interfering, or is about to
interfere with [the officer’s] duties.” Gericke
v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2014).
The HSC also adopted this
limitation and added that once issued, “police orders pertaining to the time,
place, and manner of filming must be narrowly tailored to mitigate the actual
damage or risk posed by the recording and leave open ample alternative channels
to engage in the protected activity, consistent with established principle of
First Amendment jurisprudence.” It must also be clearly and unambiguously
communicated by the officer so that “ordinary individuals exercising their
constitutional rights to free speech can readily identify the conduct that the
order prohibits.” See LeMay v. Leander,
92 Hawaii 614, 625, 994 P.2d 546, 557 (2000).
Despite establishing these
standards, the HSC did not apply it to the case here because it resolved the
case on other, more pedestrian grounds.
The Ol’ Probable Cause Problem. The HSC held that there
was insufficient probable cause to support the charge. Probable cause is “established
by a state of facts as would lead a person of ordinary caution or prudence to
believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the
accused.” State v. Atwood, 129 Hawaii
414, 419, 301 P.3d 1255, 1260 (2013). Here, the HSC examined the recording,
which was stipulated into evidence at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, and
concluded that—even if the officers’ commands were unconstitutional—Russo was
complying with them. Compliance with the officer’s order rendered the charge
against Russo fatal for the prosecution.
An Interesting Point . . . This case has a lot of pronouncements: a
newly-fashioned constitutional right under the Hawaii Constitution, limitations
of that right, and standards for police departments across the State to
consider for the new year.
But it also finally,
without expressly stating it, stands for the very simple and basic notion that
like the indictment issued by the grand jury and as with a complaint after a
preliminary hearing, a complaint alleging a criminal offense must still be
backed by probable cause.
Mahalo and Disclosure. I worked on this case. First, Sam MacRoberts represented Russo in the district court and filed and argued the motion to dismiss. I represented Russo on appeal in the ICA and in applying to the HSC. Jacob Lowenthal represented Russo at oral argument in Hilo. Mahalo everyone!
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