The "New" Emergency-Aid Exception to the Warrant Requirement
State v. Wilson (ICA December 26, 2017)
Background. Kevin Wilson was charged with terroristic
threatening in the first degree through the use of a dangerous instrument. It stemmed
from a 911 call by a third party reporting that a couple was having an argument
in Kahaluu. After the call, officers were informed that the female was afraid
and that the male had a knife.
When the police got to the
house, two officers approached the front door and one officer, Jason Akiona, went
to the back. At the front door, they saw Wilson inside and told announced their
presence. Wilson told them to “get the #$%! away from my house.” The officers didn’t
listen and opened the screen door and ordered Wilson to come out. Wilson
complied, was patted down by the police, and no weapons were found.
As Officer Akiona went to the
back door he heard a female crying. He called out to her, but there was no
response. Upon learning that Wilson was out of the house, Officer Akiona went
inside through the back door and called out. He still received no response. He went
to a locked door in the hallway and announced his presence. The complainant
emerged from the bathroom holding a baby. Officer Akiona later testified at a
hearing that he believed “exigent circumstances” justified his intrusion
through the back door. The officers searched the house and found a knife and
tire iron in the garage on the freezer.
Wilson went to trial
without filing a motion to suppress. He was found guilty and was sentenced to
five years prison. He appealed.
No Motion to Suppress, No Objection, No Issue on Appeal . . . The ICA first noted that
Wilson waived his right to challenge the admission of the evidence seized
within his house. No motion to suppress was filed. Failing to file a pretrial
motion to suppress is a waiver of evidence. HRPP Rule 12(f). Moreover, Wilson
didn’t object to the admission of this evidence at his trial either. The issue
was not raised until closing argument to the judge. All Wilson said at closing was
that “there’s no probable cause for the arrest or the search that there should
have been an arrest warrant obtained or a search warrant obtained. And I’ll incorporate
that in my arguments.” For the ICA, this was not enough to preserve the issue
on appeal. State v. Hoglund, 71 Haw.
147, 150, 785 P.2d 1311, 1313 (1990); State
v. Ildefonso, 72 Haw. 573, 584, 827 P.2d 648, 655 (1992); State v. Moses, 102 Hawaii 449, 456, 77
P.3d 940, 947 (2003). The ICA, however, felt the issue merited review and
analyzed the issue anyways.
The Warrant Requirement and its Exceptions. There is no denying that Officer Akiona’s entry into the house and the subsequent entries to recover the evidence were made without a warrant. Wilson contended that no exception to the warrant requirement justified the entry into his house. Wilson argued that the only conceivable exception would be the exigent-circumstances exception and that these facts did not justify it.
“Exigent circumstances
exist when an immediate police response is reasonably required to prevent
imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the
likely escape of a suspect or the threatened removal or destruction of
evidence.” State v. Lloyd, 61 Haw.
505, 512, 606 P.2d 912, 918 (1980). The prosecution did not rely on exigency
and instead urged the ICA to adopt a new exception to the warrant requirement.
The “Emergency Aid Exception”? The prosecution turned to
federal courts interpreting the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and proposed the emergency-aid exception. Under this exception, “law
enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency
assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent
injury.” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547
U.S. 398, 403 (2006). Put differently, there must be “an objectively reasonable
basis for believing that medical assistance was needed, or persons were in
danger.” Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S.
45, 49 (2009).
In this case, the police
received a 911 call, that there was a scared female and a knife was involved. When
the officers called out to the crying female, there was no response. According to
the ICA, if the complainant had been stabbed, injured, or restrained, the
failure to enter the house to assure the complainant’s safety could have
resulted in dire consequences.
The Hawaii Constitution too? The ICA had already noted that Article I,
Section 7 of the Hawaii Constitution has not recognized this exception to the warrant
requirement. State v. Ramos-Sanders,135 Hawaii 299, 306, 349 P.3d 406, 413 (App. 2015). But these facts justified its
introduction to Hawaii jurisprudence. The ICA adopted the exception so that
officers could enter a home “to protect or preserve life or avoid serious
injury.” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547
U.S. at 403. The exception is not necessarily a new category of the warrant
exception, but instead expands the scope of exigency. Id.
Is this Really a new Exception? Under the old exigency
exception, the police could enter a private space without a warrant to “prevent
imminent danger to life or serious damage to property.” State v. Lloyd, supra.
How is this different than the emergency-aid exception? Wouldn’t this really be
an expansive interpretation of the exception instead of the ushering in of a
new exception?
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