Youthful Offender Statute Trumps Sentencing Under Meth Trafficking
State v. Casugay-Badiang
(HSC June 19, 2013)
Background. Rubin Ikoa Casugay-Badiang pleaded guilty
to two counts of methamphetamine trafficking in the second degree, class B
felonies. HRS § 712-1240.8. Each count carried a penalty of an indeterminate
term of ten years prison, a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of one to
four years, and a fine up to $10,000. At sentencing, the parties agreed that
because he had no prior arrests or convictions and because he was a young adult
defendant pursuant to HRS § 706-667, Casugay-Badiang should face only the
one-year mandatory minimum term. The circuit court disagreed and raised the
issue as to whether it had the discretion to sentence without a mandatory
minimum based on language in the young-adult-defendant statute. Under the
young-adult defender statute, the circuit court reduced the ten years to five
and imposed the one year of a mandatory minimum. The prosecution filed a motion
to correct the illegal sentence on the grounds that the circuit court
misinterpreted the statutes. At a hearing on the motion, Casugay-Badiang argued
that the legislature intended the young-adult statute to “override” the meth
trafficking statute and that the sentence was a legal one. The circuit court
agreed and denied the motion.
The
prosecution appealed and the ICA agreed with the prosecution. In short, the ICAheld that the plain language of the meth trafficking statute “precludes theapplicability of sentencing as a young adult defendant[.]” The ICA further heldthat the legislature intended the meth trafficking to control the sentencing,not the young-adult statute. Casugay-Badiang petitioned for cert.
Young Adults v. Meth Trafficking. “Notwithstanding sections 706-620,
706-640, 706-641, 706-660, 706-669, and any other law to the contrary, a person
convicted of methamphetamine trafficking in the second degree shall be
sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of ten years[.]” HRS §
712-1240.8. The question for the HSC was whether the young adult defendant
statute, which affords discretion to the sentencing court in reducing the
severity and term of the sentence, was among a “law to the contrary.”
The Ground Rules of Statutory
Interpretation. The
foremost obligation in interpreting statutes is “to ascertain and give effect
to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the
language contained in the statute itself.” State v. Valdivia, 95 Hawai'i
465, 472, 24 P.3d 661, 668 (2003). “Where the statutory language is
unambiguous, the court’s sole duty is to give effect to its plain and obvious
meaning.” State v. Sakamoto, 101 Hawai'i 409, 412, 70 P.3d 635, 638
(2003).
Two Different “Plain Meaning” Readings of
the Same Statute!? The
HSC focused on this key phrase in the meth trafficking statute and noted that
it has interpreted this phrase found throughout the HRS. Generally, the HSC has
held that that phrase meant that removed the sentencing court’s discretion from
applying any other law other than the one contained in that statute. See
State v. Rice, 66 Haw. 101, 657 P.2d 1026 (1983); State v. Dannenberg,
74 Haw. 75, 837 P.2d 776 (1992); State v. Smith, 103 Hawai'i 228, 234,
81 P.3d 408, 414 (2003); State v. Kamano, 118 Hawai'i 210, 218, 188 P.3d
724, 732 (2008). Specifically, the word “contrary” means the “opposite to or in
conflict with each other[.]” State v. Schnabel, 127 Hawai'i 432, 448,
279 P.3d 1237, 1253 (2012). And so a plain-language reading of the statute
would signify that any statute that was the opposite of the statute with the NAOLTTC
phrase would be inapplicable. And so, it would seem that a plain-reading analysis
alone would mean that the circuit court erred in denying the prosecution’s
motion.
. . . On the Other Hand. Then again, there was an argument that
an equally plain reading of the trafficking statute would allow the circuit
court to apply the young adult defendant statute. The trafficking offense
enumerates five distinct statutes and a catchall in the notwithstanding phrase.
That, according to the HSC, was evidence that the legislature did not intend to
exclude the young-adult statute as a sentencing alternative.
And of
course there was State v. Lau, 73 Haw. 259, 831 P.2d 523 (1992). There,
the HSC examined the sentence to a twenty-year prison term for cocaine
trafficking. Lau argued that because the sentencing court failed to explain why he got the deuce; in support of his
argument, Lau noted that there was no way to show that the sentencing court even
considered the young adult statute. Id. at 260-61, 831 P.2d at 523-24.
The HSC disposed of the argument by noting that there was a presentence
investigation report and arguments of counsel, which referred to the ordinary
twenty-year term as well as the reduced one. Id. at 260, 831 P.2d at
523.
From Lau,
the HSC noted that the cocaine trafficking statute had a similar “notwithstanding”
clause. That implied that the sentencing court was still free to consider the
reduced term under the young-adult statute. In fact, the HSC held that “[o]nce
the court determines that imprisonment is necessary, the court is free to . . .
choose between the ordinary term or the special indeterminate sentence under
the young adult defendants statute.” Id. at 263, 831 P.2d at 525. That,
according to the HSC, created “tension” between the competing interpretations
and case law.
Resolving the Dueling Interpretations in
Favor of the Defendant.
The HSC did a similar analysis with the young adult defendant statute. In the
end, the HSC conceded that there were strong arguments for both sides. But “where
a criminal statute is ambiguous, it is to be interpreted according to the rule
of lenity. Under the rule of lenity, the statute must be strictly construed
against the government and in favor of the accused.” State v. Bayly, 118
Hawaii 1, 15, 185 P.3d 186, 200 (2008). And so, the HSC held that the young
adult statute trumped the meth trafficking statute thereby affording the
sentencing court the discretion to drop the ten-year term to five.
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