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ICA Examines Cumulative Evidence and Expert Testimony

Udac v. Takata Corp. (ICA August 19, 2009) Background. Udac was driving a 1981 Nissan Pathfinder on the Big Island. The Pathfinder went off the road at around 55 mph, hit lava rocks, and rolled. Udac and his passenger were ejected. Udac was rendered a paraplegic. Udac sued Takata Corp. and Hawaii Motors alleging negligence, product liability, breach of warranties, negligent/intentional infliction of emotional distress, loss of consortium, and punitive damages. Udac contended that the Pathfinder's driver-side seatbelt designed by Takata failed to restrain Udac. At trial, Udac called Dr. Renfroe, who testified that he examined the seatbelt in the Pathfinder and opined that Udac was wearing it at the time of the accident. He also opined that the marks showed a defect in the seatbelt. Takata called its own expert, Dr. Banks, who did a separate study on seatbelts in Pathfinders. Udac objected on the grounds that it was cumulative of testimony given by Takata...

Hindering-Prosecution Prosecution not Hindered by Unlawful Police Conduct

State v. Line (HSC August 11, 2009) Background. The police caught Dean Line with a crystal methamphetamine pipe and tiny plastic bags. Dean told the police that he would arrange a buy with his dealer. They agreed. Dean went to his house and never came out. The police went to the house to get him, but a woman's voice from the house indicated that he was not home. The police went away. The next day Officer Perreira and Sergeant Kikuchi went back to the house to arrest Dean. Again, a woman's voice told them that he was not home. The police left again. Two days later, the police returned. They had no warrant for the house. When they pulled up they saw Dean, who ran back into the house. The police chased him to the house in the back. Officer Perreira and Sergeant Kikuchi were not in uniform, but they announced that they were the police, ordered Dean to stop, and flashed their guns, badges, and taser guns. Dean ran into the house through a sliding glass door. ...

Redefining "Original Judgment"

Roxas v. Marcos (HSC August 10, 2009) Background. In 1971, Roxas found the famed "Yamashita Treasure," a gold bullion buried by Japanese soldiers in the Philippines during World War Two. Ferdinand Marcos' men stole the treasure, arrested Roxas, and tortured him. Roxas transferred his interest in the treasure to the Golden Budha Corporation. In 1988, Roxas and Golden Budha sued Ferdinand for false imprisonment and battery. After Ferdinand died, the parties stipulated to substitute Imelda Marcos, his wife. The jury found against Ferdinand on all counts, but not against Imelda in her personal capacity. The circuit court entered judgment on August 28, 1996. The judgment was amended on October 21, 1996 and both parties appealed. The HSC reversed and vacated part of the amended judgment in 1998, but "[i]n all other respects, the circuit court's amended judgment is affirmed." Roxas v. Marcos , 89 Hawai'i 91, 157, 969 P.2d 1209, 1275 (1998)....

HSC Splinters on when to Guide Lower Courts or Tribunals.

Kapuwai v. City and County of Honolulu (HSC July 16, 2009) Background. Kapuwai was injured on the job and brought a worker's compensation claim against his employer, the City. The City accepted responsibility. Later a doctor determined that Kapuwai suffered permanent disfigurement. After a hearing, a hearings officer concluded that the City had to pay additional amounts for the permanent disfigurement. The City appealed to the Labor and Industrial Relations Board (LIRAB), which modified the decision. Kapuwai appealed to the ICA. The ICA held that Kapuwai was entitled to relief that was not provided by the LIRAB if he would be able to prevail in proving certain findings before the LIRAB. The ICA, therefore, vacated the LIRAB's decision and remanded. The ICA also addressed the issue of attorney's fees. Kapuwai argued that the LIRAB erred in concluding that he was not entitled to attorney's fees. The ICA recognized that it could not decide the issue because...

Restitution is a Collateral Consequence; Insured Losses play no part in Ordering Restitution.

OVERULLED!!! State v. Tuialii (ICA June 30, 2009) Background. Tuialii was charged with theft in the first degree (HRS § 708-839.5(1)(a)) based on an alleged transfer of about $76,000 from his employer's account to his personal account. Tuialii pleaded no contest. The no-contest plea form stated that various penalties, including restitution, could be imposed by the court. The circuit court, however, did not mention restitution during his change-of-plea colloquy. At his sentencing, the circuit court, upon the State's recommendation, ordered that Tuialii pay full restitution. The circuit court entered a free-standing order of restitution. Tuialii filed a motion pursuant to Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 35 on the grounds that he did not change his plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. The motion was denied and Tuialii appealed. No Rule 40 Petition, no Remand for Withdrawal. Tuialii argued that because the circuit court failed to mention...

Excessive Speeding Statute's Sentencing Provision Leaves Nothing to Discretion of Sentencing Courts.

State v. Nakamura (ICA June 29, 2009) Background. Nakamura pleaded guilty to a single count of excessive speeding (HRS § 291C-105). Nakamura agreed to, pursuant to the district court's "suggestion," a six-month license suspension among other things like a fine and community service. The district court sentenced him pursuant to the suggested agreement. Nakamura later filed a motion to correct his illegal sentence on the grounds that the suspension period was improper. Nakamura maintained that the suspension period should have been 30 days. The motion was granted in part. The district court imposed a 30-day suspension running concurrently with the original six-month suspension. Nakamura appealed. Discretionary Authority to Suspend License Superseded by Specific Excessive Speeding Statute. Nakamura pleaded guilty to excessive speeding. A person violating the excessive speeding statute for the first time "shall be sentenced as follows . . . [t]hirty-day ...

Limitations on Campaign Contributions Depend on who gets it, not who Gives it.

Charmaine Tavares Campaign v. Wong (ICA June 25, 2009) Background. Charmaine Tavares ran for mayor of Maui County, a non-statewide office with a four-year term. Tavares' campaign committee was called the Charmaine Tavares Campaign (CTC) and was organized to spend money on behalf of and accept contributions for her mayoral campaign. The CTC told the public it could accept contributions up to $4,000. Quong Enterprises, a real-estate development corporation from California, gave $2,000 to the CTC. Talboy Construction also gave $2,000. Cheeseburger in Paradise and its partner, Cheeseburger in Paradise-Waikiki, each gave $1,000. Barbara Wong, the Executive Director of the Campaign Spending Commission, informed the contributors that they violated the campaign spending laws and were subject to penalties and fines. The CTC filed a complaint seeking injunctive and declarative relief against Wong and the Campaign Spending Commission. Quong intervened. The circuit court granted ...