ICA: poor people outside the circuit of their trial either appear in chains and in custody or pay their own way

 State v. Campbell (ICA September 19, 2024)

Background. Corey Campbell was charged with assaulting a police officer in the first degree and two petty misdemeanors while she was on vacation from Massachusetts. She was arrested and detained because she could not afford to bail out. The court let her out on conditions of release and allowed her to “fly back home to Massachusetts and live in Massachusetts.” She went home. She made eleven appearances in court by zoom. Trial was not set for more than a year after the charges were brought.

 

In advance of her trial date, her court-appointed counsel (the public defender withdrew based on irreconcilable differences), filed a motion for the court to pay the expenses of returning to Hawai'i to attend her trial. The requested costs included airfare, lodging, and transportation. The court—with the Honorable Judge Kirstin M. Hamman—granted the motion and approved the order. Weeks later, it rescinded the order on the grounds that it “inadvertently” granted the motion.

 

Campbell filed another motion and presented uncontested evidence of her indigency. The circuit court found that she was indigent, but denied the request for costs. The circuit court noted that the Judiciary would not pay because she chose to leave Hawai'i and go home. The circuit court concluded that it would only pay for costs if it issued a bench warrant and she submit to the interstate extradition process and return in custody. This interlocutory appeal followed.

 

HRS § 621-9 does not authorize the court to reimburse out-of-state defendants to attend their trial. The issue turned on the interpretation of HRS § 621-9(b):

 

Whenever the presence of a defendant in a criminal case or in a proceeding under chapter 704 or a petitioner in a post conviction proceeding who is outside the judicial circuit is mandated by court order or bench warrant to appear, the cost of airfare, ground transportation, any per diem for both the defendant or petitioner and sufficient law enforcement officers to effect the defendant's or petitioner's return, shall be borne by the State. All such expenses shall be certified by the court or public prosecutor or the attorney general. Duly certified claims for payment shall be paid upon vouchers approved by the state director of finance and warrants drawn by the state comptroller. The court may order the nonindigent defendant or petitioner who was returned to the State of Hawaii to reimburse the State for the costs of such extradition or return as specifically described above.

 

Courts must “ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature” through “the language contained in the statute itself.” Kanahele v. State, 154 Hawai'i 190, 201, 549 P.3d 275, 286 (2024). The ICA also cautioned that even when a statute is clear, the “legislative history of a statute remains relevant[.]” State v. Alangcas, 134 Hawai'i 515, 526, 345 P.3d 181, 192 (2015).

 

According to the ICA, the statute is ambiguous. The last sentence authorizes the court to order the nonindigent to reimburse the State for the “extradition or return” to Hawai'i. HRS § 621-9(b). The ICA concluded that this “strongly suggests” the entire statute applies only to extradition proceedings. And so it turned to legislative history. The committee reports cited by the ICA focused on extradition proceedings only.

 

It also rejected the plain-language argument on the grounds that if the first sentence was followed any out-of-state defendant—indigent or nonindigent—ordered to come to court would have their costs covered by the State. That was just too unreasonable. See Keliipuleole v. Wilson, 85 Hawai'i 217, 221-22, 941 P.2d 300, 304-05 (1997). It also noted that it was an absurdity that must be rejected. And so the ICA upheld the denial of the motion.

 

The constitutional arguments were waived (for now). The ICA did not examine Campbell’s arguments that the ruling was discriminatory against the poor in violation of the equal protection clause, her right to be present at trial, her right to due process, and her right to interstate travel. The ICA noted that because it was not raised before the interlocutory appeal, it was waived. The ICA noted, however, that Campbell has not been tried yet and the issue may not be ripe.

And what happened to the plain language controlling? The ICA took pains to read the language in the “context of the entire statute” and construe it consistently with the purpose of the statute. It even resorted to legislative history.

 

But what about the plain language of HRS § 621-9? The first line states when the presence of a defendant in their criminal case living outside the circuit is “mandated” to come to court, airfare, ground transportation, and per diem for the defendant and any law enforcement officers “shall be borne by the State.” And “[t]he court may order the nonindigent defendant . . . to reimburse the State for the costs of such extradition or return[.]”

 

The ICA does not even cite the oft-quoted plain-language rule: “when a statute’s language is plain and unmistakable, the court is bound by the plain, clear and unambiguous language of the statute.” State v. Mortensen-Young, 152 Hawai'i 385, 396, 526 P.3d 362, 373 (2023). In fact, because it is clear, should the ICA even delve into legislative history? Isn’t it “barred from rejecting otherwise unambiguous statutory language[?]” State v. Demello, 136 Hawai'i 193, 195, 361 P.3d 420, 423 (2015).

 

Is it really so strange? The ICA rejected the plain language of the statute because it was absurd to conclude that any defendant ordered to return to the circuit in which they are tried did not have to pay for the travel costs. A court order to return for a trial or other proceeding implicates the right to be present at trial. Is it absurd to have the State pay for the costs of ensuring that a defendant can attend their own trial? Apparently so.

 

Bottom line is that if you’re poor, the only way to get to trial is in custody. The ramifications here are disturbing. If a defendant cannot afford to come back to Hawai'i or even the circuit they are being tried, they have to wait for a warrant, turn themselves in, and come to court in chains. They incur the costs of an extradition are high. Sheriffs, police, court staff, and the jail all have to coordinate to bring someone in custody to court. That cost is far, far greater than airfare. More importantly, the ICA has adopted a construction that will result in more people going into custody just to have their day in court even when the language of the statute allows a less costly and carceral way of exercising the right to be present at one’s own trial.

 

Disclaimer: The Office of the Public Defender filed a brief as amicus curiae on behalf of Campbell.