HSC examines when county ordinances are (and aren't) preempted by state statutes

 State v. Pickell (HSC December 26, 2023)

Background. Michael Pickell was charged with operating a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant. He filed a motion to suppress evidence challenging the basis for the traffic stop.

 

At the hearing, Officer Raul Mehra testified that he was on duty in Kihei one night when he saw Pickell in the left-turn-only lane with his left-turn signal on at the intersection of Pi‘ilani Highway and Ohukai Road. In Pickell’s lane was a left-turn-only sign and a left directional arrow. Next to the traffic light there was a gin that indicated left-turn only. When Pickell’s light turned green, he made a U-turn instead of turning left onto Ohukai Road. The turn required Pickell to drive across double solid yellow lines and a dashed white line. Officer Mehra initiated a traffic stop. Pickell said he was going home but later said he was going to Safeway. He also said he thought he could make a lawful U-turn because he was from California and did not know if U-turns were legal in Hawai'i. No signs near the intersection permitted U-turns.

 

The district court—with the Hon. Blaine J. Kobayashi presiding—denied the motion to suppress. Pickell entered a conditional plea and appealed. The ICA affirmed and the HSC took certiorari.

 

The preemption problem. Pickell argued that HRS § 291C-82(c) requires a sign expressly prohibiting him from making U-turns:

 

The director of transportation and the counties by ordinance with respect to the highways under their respective jurisdictions prohibit the turning of any vehicle so as to proceed in the opposite direction on the highway at any location where such turning would be dangerous to those using the highway or would unduly interfere with the free movement of traffic.

 

The prosecution countered with Maui County Code § 10.24.100(E):

 

In all cases where official marks, buttons, sings or directional arrows painted on the pavement are placed within or adjacent to intersections, no operator of a vehicle shall execute a movement at such intersections, otherwise than as directed and required by such marks, buttons, signs or arrows.

 

When a county ordinance is preempted by state statutes, the county must yield. The HSC characterized the issue as one of preemption and whether HRS § 291C-82(c) preempts the county code. “The legislature shall create counties, and may create other political subdivisions within the State, and provide the government thereof. Each political subdivision shall have and exercise such powers as shall be conferred under general laws.” Haw. Const. Art. VIII, Sec. 1.

 

In other words, “a county’s powers are limited to those conferred by the legislature under general laws.” Ruggles v. Yagong, 135 Hawai'i 411, 422, 353 P.3d 953, 964 (2015). The Legislature empowered counties to enact laws that are not “inconsistent with, or tending to defeat, the intent of any state statute where the statute does not disclose an express or implied intent that the statute shall be exclusive or uniform throughout the State.” HRS § 46.-1.5(13).

 

The two paths to preemption. The statute preempts “any ordinance that either conflicted with the intent of a state statute or legislated in an area already staked out by the legislature for exclusive and statewide statutory treatment.” Richardson v. City and Cnty of Honolulu, 76 Hawai'i 46, 60, 868 P.2d 1193, 1207 (1994). The HSC broke the Richardson test down into two alternatives.

 

A municipal ordinance may be preempted by state law if “(1) it covers the same subject matter embraced within a comprehensive state statutory scheme disclosing an express or implied intent to be exclusive and uniform throughout the state or (2) it conflicts with state law.” Id. at 62, 868 P.2d at 1209.

 

The state’s traffic code is not a “comprehensive state statutory scheme” preempting counties from regulating traffic. The HSC examined the first alternative. When determining if the ordinance covers the same subject matter as a state statutory scheme, the HSC looked to the “comprehensive statutory scheme.” See In re: Application of Anamizu, 52 Haw. 550, 554, 481 P.2d 116, 119 (1971); Citizens Utilities Co. v. County of Kauai, 72 Haw. 285, 814 P.2d 398 (1991).

 

The HSC surveyed the State Traffic Code enacted in 1971. According to the HSC, the legislative history “evinces clear legislative intent to allow counites to enact their own traffic ordnances.” Moreover, the traffic code applies throughout the State “and in all political subdivisions therein provided that any matter not covered in this chapter relating to rules of the road may be subject to appropriate county ordinances in any county.” HRS § 291C-162. The Code also “shall not be deemed to prevent counties with respect to streets and highways under their jurisdiction” from regulating traffic. HRS § 291C-163(a)(2).

 

The HSC also examined HRS § 291C-82, its legislative history, and various amendments. Although the statute no longer states it, the history shows that it was intended to apply to dangerous locations at highways and did not address intersections. That was enough for the HSC to conclude that it does not indicate a comprehensive state statutory scheme. The ordinance is not preempted under the first alternative of the Richardson test.

 

The ordinance does not conflict with state law. A county ordinance is preempted when it conflicts with state law. Richardson, 76 Hawai'i at 62, 868 P.2d at 1209. A conflict arises when the ordinance “prohibits what the statute permits or permits what the statute prohibits.” Waikiki Resort Hotel, Inc. v. City and Cnty of Honolulu, 63 Haw. 222, 241, 624 P.2d 1353, 1366 (1981).

 

The HSC held that MCC § 10.24.100(E) does not conflict with HRS § 291C-82. The statute requires signs prohibiting U-turns in areas deemed dangerous. It was intended to apply to highway locations and does not refer to intersections. The ordinance, however, requires a driver follow directional movements on markings and signs at intersections. The HSC noted that abiding by signs, pavement markings, and signals under the county ordinance would not cause a driver to violate HRS § 291C-82(c). “Drivers executing left turns as required by the signs satisfy MCC § 10.24.100(E); they do not violate HRS § 291C-82(c) because they are not executing U-turns against prohibitive signage. Alternative, if an intersection has a sign prohibiting a U-turn as well as a sign and markings indicating left turn only, a driver could adhere to both by making a left turn.” The statute and ordinance co-exist and “neither permits what the other prohibits.” The HSC held there was no conflict.

 

Without preemption, the county ordinance applies and was violated by Pickell. Having upheld the county ordinance, the HSC held that Officer Mehra had reasonable suspicion to stop Pickell. He saw him make a U-turn at an intersection that only allowed a left turn. That was reasonable suspicion to believe Pickell violated MCC § 10.24.100(E).