Courts can hold defendants in jail and without bail after dismissing the case

 Deangelo v. Souza (HSC November 17, 2022)

Background. Scott Deangelo arrested without a warrant for second-degree murder. The district court made a judicial determination of probable cause the next day. The prosecution filed a complaint alleging murder and held a preliminary hearing. At the hearing, the district court found probable cause based on the evidence presented and committed the case to the circuit court. The prosecution did not present evidence before a grand jury and no true bill of indictment issued.

 

Instead, the prosecution filed a complaint in the circuit court. Deangelo pleaded not guilty and filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that because he was not indicted, the prosecution violated HRS § 801-1. While that motion was pending, the HSC issued its decision in State v. Obrero, 151 Hawai'i 472, 517 P.3d 755 (2022). The prosecution conceded the violation and requested that Deangelo remain in custody without bail so it could indict him. The circuit court, with the Hon. Judge Kevin A. Souza presiding, granted the motion to dismiss, dismissed the case without prejudice and held Deangelo in jail without bail for 90 days. The prosecution indicted Deangelo 11 days after the dismissal. Deangelo petitioned to the HSC for immediate review to consider the circuit court’s power to hold him without bail after dismissing the case.

 

HRPP Rule 12(g) allows the court to hold defendants in custody after granting their motions to dismiss. The HSC examined HRPP Rule 12(g):

 

If the court grants a motion based on a defect in the institution of the prosecution or in the charge, it may also order that the defendant be held in custody or that the defendant’s bail be continued for a specified time ending the filing of a new charge. Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to affect provisions of any statute relating to periods of limitations.

 

Deangelo raised two challenges. First, he argued that the rule is unconstitutional because it empowered the circuit court to hold him without bail after dismissing the case and terminating the prior finding of probable cause. Second, even if the rule was constitutional, post-dismissal custody must be limited to 48 hours.

The rule is constitutional here . . . Deangelo argued that defendants once arrested without a warrant have a constitutional right to have a court determine probable cause within 48 hours of the arrest. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 126 (1975); County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991). When the court dismissed the case, it terminated the judicial determination of probable cause. See State v. Kalani, 87 Hawai'i 260, 261, 953 P.2d 1358, 1359 (1998). That, according to Deangelo, meant the rule cannot empower courts to hold defendants in custody after the case has been dismissed.

 

The HSC disagreed. HRPP Rule 12(g) “creates a limited exception to the procedure that a dismissal completely terminates the original case.” According to the HSC, the rule “resets the proceedings to where they were before the defective charge or indictment was made.” For Deangelo, that meant after the preliminary hearing. The preliminary hearing “determin[es] whether there is probable cause to warrant holding the accused for action by the grand jury.” Engstrom v. Naauao, 51 Haw. 318, 320, 459 P.2d 376, 377 (1969). The HSC noted that it takes time for grand juries to convene and the preliminary hearing ensures that “a defendant is not unreasonably held before indictment.”

 

. . . because the “defect” was a procedural one. The HSC stressed that HRPP Rule 12(g) is “limited to defects in the charging process. The rule cannot abridge a substantive right.” For example, if the dismissal was based on falsely sworn statements by the police in the judicial determination of probable cause, the post-dismissal seizure would be unreasonable. See e.g. Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill, 137 S.Ct. 911, 918-919 (2017). That is not the case here. The defect prompting dismissal was unlawful under HRS § 801-1.

 

Does HRPP Rule 12(g) apply to dismissals based on defective pleadings? The HSC noted that HRPP Rule 12(g) is limited to defects in the charging process and it cannot abridge substantive rights. It was also clear that a violation of HRS § 801-1 and Obrero are not violations of substantive rights but procedural defects.

 

What about a dismissal based on the failure to plead essential elements? That violates due process. State v. Nesmith, 127 Hawai'i 48, 276 P.3d 617 (2012). And due process is a substantive right, right? And what about a violation of Article I, Section 14? See State v. Jardine, 151 Hawai'i 96, 508 P.3d 1182 (2022). It is unclear if HRPP Rule 12(g) applies to a dismissal based on constitutional violations.

 

How long can the court hold the defendant after dismissal? The HSC also rejected Deangelo’s argument that post-dismissal custody must be limited to 48 hours. HRPP Rule 12(g) requires the court to provide a “specified” time, but does not limit the number of days. The federal courts and courts in other states have a similar rule. Some have specific time limitations ranging from one to 60 days. See Ky. R. Cirm. P. RCr. 8.24(2) (60 days). The HSC held that the rule does not contemplate a universal time limit and “setting one would undermine the trial court’s ability to tailor its order to the circumstances.”

 

The HSC interpreted the rule to require a “reasonable” time frame:

 

We hold only that the time specified must be reasonable in light of all the circumstances. Relevant circumstances may include the status of the case (is the case at the discovery and pretrial motions stage or is trial imminent?), the unprecedented exigencies of the Covid-19 pandemic, the inability of the State to convene grand juries during a particular time, the nature and seriousness of the defendant’s alleged crime(s), the extent to which the defendant poses a flight risk and a danger to the community, and the defendant’s ability to afford bail.

 

The HSC held that the circuit court in this case adequately examined these factors and since Deangelo was indicted before the dismissal order expired, it did not examine if 90 days was an abuse of discretion.

 

A 60-day pass? Having adopted a rule of reasonableness based on the relevant circumstances, the HSC “emphasize[d]” that no state rule allows custody to go beyond 60 days. It also did “not foresee any circumstances that will justify custody longer than 60 days under a 12(g) order.” It also expected that once grand juries are convening more frequently, “this time will continue to decrease as defendants are lawfully charged.”