Pre-Arrest Silence Requires Miranda Warnings
State v. Tsujimura
(HSC May 31, 2017)
Background. Lester Tsujimura was charged with
operating a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant. At trial,
Officer Thomas Billins testified that he stopped Tsujimura on the Moanalua
Freeway a little after midnight. He approached Tsujimura’s vehicle and asked
him to get out of the car. Tsujimura complied. Officer Billins testified that
he did not notice him having a hard time getting out of the vehicle. Before
performing the field sobriety tests, Tsujimura told the officer that he had an
old knee injury. According to Officer Billins, Tsujimura did not “pass” the
tests. During trial, the prosecutor asked if Tsujimura told him anything about
his knee as he got out of the vehicle. Tsujimura objected on the grounds that
that was a comment on his right to remain silent. The trial court overruled the
objection and allowed Officer Billins to testify that he said nothing about it.
Tsujimura was found guilty as charged and the ICA affirmed.
Pre-Arrest Silence Cannot be
Used by the Prosecution at Trial.
No person shall “be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
oneself.” Haw. Const. Art. I, Sec. 10. The HSC held that the plain language of
the constitutional provision protects “any person”—regardless of being arrested
or accused—from being a witness against oneself. And so the HSC held that the
right to remain silent attached here “at least the point when Tsujimura was
detained as a result of the investigatory stop.” That meant that the
prosecution could not use Tsujimura’s silence against him as he got out of the
car.
The Open Question:
Pre-Detained? The HSC held
that in this case—where the defendant was stopped and seized by the police, but
not arrested—the right to remain silent attached. In other words, a person may
have the right to remain silent throughout the course of a traffic stop. But
what if there was no seizure? What if there was no traffic stop and the officer
simply asked a person to stop, and the person said nothing and kept walking?
Could that be used against the person at trial? A refusal to comply with an
order to stop? A refusal to answer questions from the officer? No one knows.
The HSC pointed this out in a footnote that it was not dealing with such an
issue because Tsujimura had been seized by the police and asked to get out of his
car.
Justice Nakayama’s Concurrence
and Dissent. Justice
Nakayama agreed with the majority that the right to remain silent “inures at
least at the point at which a person has been seized” and that the prosecution
cannot elicit evidence from that silence as evidence of the defendant’s guilt.
Her disagreement lies in the application of these principles. The prosecutor at
trial asked the investigating and later arresting officer if Tsujimura told him
that he had trouble getting out of the car. This was not, in her view, an
improper comment on the right to remain silent. Chief Judge Recktenwald joined.
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