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Showing posts with the label statutory interpretation

Anytime the State wants to use the defendant's statements against them, there has to be a pretrial voluntariness hearing.

  State v. Tolentino (HSC June 30, 2026). Henry Tolentino was pulled over for speeding. He was ordered out of the car. An officer drew his gun and ordered him to get on the ground. Tolentino ran away. An officer chased him, caught up to him, and there was a struggle. The officer said that Tolentino kicked and punched him. And then the officer punched Tolentino three but “no more than five” times in the face. As they were fighting a second officer ran into them and all three fell to the ground. They cuffed Tolentino and as they were raising him to his feet he said, “I’m sorry. I was just trying to get a Zip Pac .” The prosecution charged Tolentino with assault of a law enforcement officer in the first degree. Before trial, Tolentino moved as a motion in limine to exclude his statement about the Zip Pac. The defense did not move to suppress and the prosecution did not ask for a voluntariness hearing. The motion in limine was denied. The defense asked for an evidentiary hearing, whi...

HSC holds a sentencing enhancement is not an element under a state statute even thought it is an element under the Sixth Amendment.

  State v. Smith (HSC September 12, 2025). Brian Smith was indicted for murder and attempted murder arising from a shooting in Kona. Both counts alleged that he was subject to a sentencing enhancement under HRS § 706-660.1 alleging that he possessed, used, or threatened to use a firearm while committing the offense. The prosecution did not allege a state of mind for the enhancement.   Smith went to trial. The circuit court instructed the jury that if it found him guilty of either count, it must answer a special interrogatory:   Has the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally used and/or threatened to use a firearm, whether the firearm was loaded or unloaded, operable or inoperable, while engaged in the commission of the offense of Murder in the Second Degree or Manslaughter (Extreme Mental or Emotional Disturbance)?   The jury returned a guilty verdict and answered “yes” to the interrogatory. The circuit court sentenc...

HSC cuts the bill for an expert, upholds consecutive sentence on remand because it is not “more severe” than original sentence.

  State v. Lavoie (HSC August 13, 2025). Marlin Lavoie was charged, tried, and convicted of murder and firearms-related offenses. The circuit court (Hon. Judge Joseph E. Cardoza) sentenced him to life with the possibility of parole and the firearms charges consecutively. Lavoie appealed. The HSC vacated the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.   On remand, the parties reached a plea agreement. Lavoie pleaded guilty to manslaughter, using a firearm in a separate felony, and being a felon in possession. The parties used the presentence report from the first trial, which included reports on his mental health and social history. Before sentencing, Lavoie’s court-appointed attorney filed a motion to hire an expert to assess him for dangerousness. The assessment would be used to assist him at sentencing and before the parole board. The bill came to $8,767.   The circuit court (Hon. Judge Peter T. Cahill) found the request exorbitant and unnecessary but auth...

The use of deadly force must be necessary—not immediately necessary.

  State v. Reis (ICA February 27, 2025) Background. Brandon Reis was on trial for attempted murder in the second degree. At trial, he argued he acted in self-defense. The trial court instructed the jury about the use of lethal force in self-defense by tracking the pattern jury instruction:   The use of deadly force upon or toward another person is justified if the defendant reasonably believes that deadly force is immediately necessary to protect himself on the present occasion against death or serious bodily injury or kidnapping. The reasonableness of the defendants’ belief that the use of deadly force was immediately necessary shall be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person in the defendant’s position under the circumstances of which the defendant was aware or as the defendant reasonably believed them to be when the deadly force was used.   The jury found Reis guilty as charged. He appealed.   The jury was incorrectly instructed that t...

The Internet Crimes Against Children Fee is Limited to Internet Crimes Against Children

State v. Nagamine (ICA February 26, 2025). Bryson Nagamine pleaded no contest to habitually operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant. HRS § 291E-61.5. The circuit court—the Honorable Judge Kathleen Watanabe presiding—sentenced him to five years probation and imposed the Internet Crimes Against Children fee in the amount of $100.00 over his objection. Nagamine appealed. Limiting the ICAC fee to ICAC. The sentencing court “shall order every defendant to pay an internet crimes against children fee of up to $100 for each felony or misdemeanor conviction[.]” HRS § 846F-3. The ICA rejected the prosecution’s argument that this plain language requires a fee for every felony and misdemeanor conviction regardless of the crime.   The ICAC fee statute must be read with the definition of an ICAC. The ICAC is part of HRS Chapter 846F, entitled “Internet Crimes Against Children.” There is a special fund created to help law enforcement investigate and prosecute internet crim...

Highlighting the difference between inadequate notice and a defective complaint

  State v. Aquino (HSC June 28, 2024) Background. Alexander Aquino was charged with unlawful imprisonment in the first degree. HRS § 707-721(1)(a). Here is the charge:   On or about the August 1, 2020 through August 21, 2021, in Kona, County and State of Hawai‘i, ALEXANDER AQUINO, as a principle [sic] or accomplice, knowingly restrained another person, L.R., a minor born in June of 2007, under circumstances which exposed L.R. to the risk of serious bodily injury, thereby committing the offense of Unlawful Imprisonment in the First Degree, in violation of Section 707-721(1)(a), Hawai‘i Revised Statutes, as amended.   Aquino filed a motion to dismiss. The statutory term “restrain” means “to restrict a person’s movement in such a manner as to interfere substantially with the person’s liberty” either through force, threat, or deception or “[i]f the person is under the age of eighteen or incompetent, without the consent of the relative, person, or institution h...

ICA: poor people outside the circuit of their trial either appear in chains and in custody or pay their own way

  State v. Campbell (ICA September 19, 2024) Background. Corey Campbell was charged with assaulting a police officer in the first degree and two petty misdemeanors while she was on vacation from Massachusetts. She was arrested and detained because she could not afford to bail out. The court let her out on conditions of release and allowed her to “fly back home to Massachusetts and live in Massachusetts.” She went home. She made eleven appearances in court by zoom. Trial was not set for more than a year after the charges were brought.   In advance of her trial date, her court-appointed counsel (the public defender withdrew based on irreconcilable differences), filed a motion for the court to pay the expenses of returning to Hawai'i to attend her trial. The requested costs included airfare, lodging, and transportation. The court—with the Honorable Judge Kirstin M. Hamman—granted the motion and approved the order. Weeks later, it rescinded the order on the grounds that it ...

ICA determines when a “modification” to probation terms is also an “enlargement” invoking the tolling statute

  State v. Wilbur-Delima (ICA July 29, 2024) Background. Kamalei Wilbur-Delima was charged with multiple offenses in three different felony cases. He was sentenced to probation but it was revoked. He also picked up another felony case. He eventually pleaded guilty and was sentenced and resentenced to probation. The judgment of conviction and the resentencing orders with conditions was entered on April 26, 2017. Two months later, Wilbur-Delima entered the Hawai'i’s Opportunity Probation with Enforcement (HOPE) Probation Program, a program on Oahu designed to give “swift, predictable, and immediate sanctions” for violations.   From 2017 through 2020, the prosecution filed motions when Wilbur-Delima violated the terms of his probation. The prosecution called these motions for “Modification” of the terms and conditions. Wilbur-Delima did not contest the violations and was sanctioned with a jail ranging from 3 to 41 days jail. It later changed the title to a motion to modify...