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Showing posts with the label sentencing

Another botched attempt to impose consecutive sentences.

  State v. Bunag (HSC April 26, 2026). Alden Bunag was a substitute teacher for thirteen months. In that time, he sexually assaulted a child, recorded it, and shared it in an online chatroom. FBI agents investigated. The victim confirmed three instances of penetration. Agents also found child pornography on his phone and evidence of distribution. Bunag was prosecuted by the United States and ultimately was sentenced to a federal prison for 210 months. The State also prosecuted Bunag. The State indicted Bunag with one count of continuous sexual assault of a minor, promoting child abuse in the first degree, promoting child abuse in the second degree, and promoting child abuse in the third degree. Prosecutors dismissed count 2 and Bunag pleaded guilty to the other three without a plea agreement.   At sentencing, the prosecution orally moved for consecutive terms of imprisonment. The motion was granted. Count one was 20 years and was consecutive with count 2, which is a ten-...

HSC holds a sentencing enhancement is not an element under a state statute even thought it is an element under the Sixth Amendment.

  State v. Smith (HSC September 12, 2025). Brian Smith was indicted for murder and attempted murder arising from a shooting in Kona. Both counts alleged that he was subject to a sentencing enhancement under HRS § 706-660.1 alleging that he possessed, used, or threatened to use a firearm while committing the offense. The prosecution did not allege a state of mind for the enhancement.   Smith went to trial. The circuit court instructed the jury that if it found him guilty of either count, it must answer a special interrogatory:   Has the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally used and/or threatened to use a firearm, whether the firearm was loaded or unloaded, operable or inoperable, while engaged in the commission of the offense of Murder in the Second Degree or Manslaughter (Extreme Mental or Emotional Disturbance)?   The jury returned a guilty verdict and answered “yes” to the interrogatory. The circuit court sentenc...

HSC cuts the bill for an expert, upholds consecutive sentence on remand because it is not “more severe” than original sentence.

  State v. Lavoie (HSC August 13, 2025). Marlin Lavoie was charged, tried, and convicted of murder and firearms-related offenses. The circuit court (Hon. Judge Joseph E. Cardoza) sentenced him to life with the possibility of parole and the firearms charges consecutively. Lavoie appealed. The HSC vacated the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.   On remand, the parties reached a plea agreement. Lavoie pleaded guilty to manslaughter, using a firearm in a separate felony, and being a felon in possession. The parties used the presentence report from the first trial, which included reports on his mental health and social history. Before sentencing, Lavoie’s court-appointed attorney filed a motion to hire an expert to assess him for dangerousness. The assessment would be used to assist him at sentencing and before the parole board. The bill came to $8,767.   The circuit court (Hon. Judge Peter T. Cahill) found the request exorbitant and unnecessary but auth...

The Internet Crimes Against Children Fee is Limited to Internet Crimes Against Children

State v. Nagamine (ICA February 26, 2025). Bryson Nagamine pleaded no contest to habitually operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant. HRS § 291E-61.5. The circuit court—the Honorable Judge Kathleen Watanabe presiding—sentenced him to five years probation and imposed the Internet Crimes Against Children fee in the amount of $100.00 over his objection. Nagamine appealed. Limiting the ICAC fee to ICAC. The sentencing court “shall order every defendant to pay an internet crimes against children fee of up to $100 for each felony or misdemeanor conviction[.]” HRS § 846F-3. The ICA rejected the prosecution’s argument that this plain language requires a fee for every felony and misdemeanor conviction regardless of the crime.   The ICAC fee statute must be read with the definition of an ICAC. The ICAC is part of HRS Chapter 846F, entitled “Internet Crimes Against Children.” There is a special fund created to help law enforcement investigate and prosecute internet crim...

ICA determines when a “modification” to probation terms is also an “enlargement” invoking the tolling statute

  State v. Wilbur-Delima (ICA July 29, 2024) Background. Kamalei Wilbur-Delima was charged with multiple offenses in three different felony cases. He was sentenced to probation but it was revoked. He also picked up another felony case. He eventually pleaded guilty and was sentenced and resentenced to probation. The judgment of conviction and the resentencing orders with conditions was entered on April 26, 2017. Two months later, Wilbur-Delima entered the Hawai'i’s Opportunity Probation with Enforcement (HOPE) Probation Program, a program on Oahu designed to give “swift, predictable, and immediate sanctions” for violations.   From 2017 through 2020, the prosecution filed motions when Wilbur-Delima violated the terms of his probation. The prosecution called these motions for “Modification” of the terms and conditions. Wilbur-Delima did not contest the violations and was sanctioned with a jail ranging from 3 to 41 days jail. It later changed the title to a motion to modify...

HSC strikes down proof-of-compliance hearings for defendants who aren’t on probation and haven’t defaulted

  State v. Fay (HSC June 17, 2024) Background. Melissa Fay crashed her car into a tree and was charged with traffic offenses in the district court. She pleaded no contest to driving under the influence of an intoxicant, driving without insurance, and the amended charge of criminal property damage in the fourth degree. She also agreed to pay restitution. Kahului Auto Sales, Inc., owned the car and made a restitution claim. The Judiciary’s Monetary Restitution Program recommended that Fay pay $6,504. The parties agreed to the amount and the district court issued an order for restitution in that amount at a rate of $50.00 per month.   The district court with the Hon. Judge Lauren Akitake presiding ordered Fay to return to court in six months if the amount was not paid off. The court told Fay that the hearings would be ongoing until it was paid off. Fay objected, but the hearing was set. Fay appealed. The ICA affirmed. Fay petitioned for further review.   The statu...

Probation doesn't toll when the motion to revoke probation is never heard on the merits and is dismissed

  State v. Banares (ICA October 16, 2023) Background. Joven Joseph Banares was charged with promoting a dangerous drug in the third degree, pleaded no contest, and was sentenced to four years of probation. Probation started in May 2016. A little more than a year into his probationary term, the prosecution filed a motion to revoke probation and to resentence him to imprisonment based on alleged violations of the terms and conditions of probation. To bring Banares into court, the court issued a warrant for his arrest on February 7, 2017. The warrant was not served until January 17, 2022.   Banares moved to dismiss on the grounds that the delay in serving the warrant violated Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure Rule 9. Banares also argued that upon dismissal, his time on probation would have run because it has not been tolled. The prosecution agreed that there was no effort to serve the warrant and agreed that there was a Rule 9 violation. It did object to tolling the time. T...

Courts don’t need a charging document for jurisdiction, but do need a pretty good reason to impose consecutive terms

  State v. Bautista (HSC September 13, 2023) Background. The prosecution filed a complaint in the district court alleging seven crimes of violence against Rommel Bautista, including attempted murder in the second degree. All of the charges stemmed from an incident that occurred between Bautista and his wife in their home in Kahului. The district court held a preliminary hearing and found probable cause supported every count. The district court confirmed bail and committed the case to the circuit court.   The prosecution did not file a complaint in the circuit court. At the arraignment, Bautista pleaded not guilty. Five months later, the parties reached an agreement. Bautista pleaded no contest to three class C felonies: assault in the second degree, terroristic threatening in the first degree, and abuse of a family or household member in the presence of a minor. All other counts—including the attempted murder and assault in the first degree—were dismissed. There were no...