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Showing posts with the label notice

HSC continues to clarify when the State has to include statutory definitions in the charging document.

  State v. Kaakimaka (HSC August 28, 2025). The prosecution charged Koa Kaakimaka with invasion of privacy in the first degree in violation of HRS § 711-1110.9(1)(a). A person commits that offense when:   [T]he person intentionally or knowingly installs or uses, or both, in any private place, without consent of the person or persons entitled to privacy therein, any device for observing, recording, amplifying, or broadcasting another person in a stage of undress or sexual activity in that place[.]   Id. A “private place” is “a place where one may reasonably expect to be safe from casual or hostile intrusion or surveillance, but does not include a place to which the public or substantial group thereof has access.” HRS § 711-1100.   The indictment against Kaakimaka did not include the statutory definition so he moved to dismiss it. He argued that the term “private place” could mean many different things. He also moved to suppress evidence. The circuit court...

Highlighting the difference between inadequate notice and a defective complaint

  State v. Aquino (HSC June 28, 2024) Background. Alexander Aquino was charged with unlawful imprisonment in the first degree. HRS § 707-721(1)(a). Here is the charge:   On or about the August 1, 2020 through August 21, 2021, in Kona, County and State of Hawai‘i, ALEXANDER AQUINO, as a principle [sic] or accomplice, knowingly restrained another person, L.R., a minor born in June of 2007, under circumstances which exposed L.R. to the risk of serious bodily injury, thereby committing the offense of Unlawful Imprisonment in the First Degree, in violation of Section 707-721(1)(a), Hawai‘i Revised Statutes, as amended.   Aquino filed a motion to dismiss. The statutory term “restrain” means “to restrict a person’s movement in such a manner as to interfere substantially with the person’s liberty” either through force, threat, or deception or “[i]f the person is under the age of eighteen or incompetent, without the consent of the relative, person, or institution h...

Remedy for Deficient Charging Instrument is Dismissal Without Prejudice, For Real.

State v. Walker (HSC March 28, 2012) Background. Samuel Walker was charged with Habitually Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence of an Intoxicant. HRS §291E-61.5(a)(1) and (a)(2)(A). Walker had been charged by felony information. The charging instrument failed to allege that Walker had been operating a vehicle on a public road, way, street, or highway. The instrument also merely referred to Walker as a "habitual operator of a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant." He was convicted and sentenced to five years imprisonment. Walker appealed. The ICA held that the charge did not allege an essential element--the attendant circumstances of a "habitual operator"--and vacated the judgment with instructions to dismiss without prejudice. Chief Judge Nakamura dissented. Walker's Complaint. Walker's argument to the HSC had nothing to do with the ICA's analysis of the Wheeler issue. Rather, he took issue with the remedy: vacating the judgmen...

Calling Defendant "Habitual" OUI Offender won't cut it

AFFIRMED! State v. Walker (ICA September 30, 2011) Background. Samuel Walker was charged with habitually operating a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant. HRS § 291E-61.5. The charge simply alleged that Walker was "a habitual operator of a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant[.]" Walker objected to the sufficiency of the charge prior to verdict, but was found guilty of the offense. He appealed. Liberal Construction does not apply. The ICA held that because Walker objected to the sufficiency of the charge prior to the verdict, the liberal construction did not apply. The "liberal construction standard is limited to construing indictments, when the issue is only raised after trial." State v. Motta , 66 Haw. 89, 94, 657 P.2d 1019, 1022 (1983). Charging Instruments must Apprise Defendant of the Offense AND Establish Jurisdiction. The accused has the right "to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation....

HSC Distinguishes Wheeler for the dogs

State v. Mita (HSC December 21, 2010) Background. Wanda Mita was charged with animal nuisance (Revised Ordinances of Honolulu § 7-2.3. She was first issued a citation stating that Mita "did own, harbor or keep" two brown boxers , Roxy and Obie, at her home "and did commit the offense of . . . animal nuisance-Sec.: 7-2.3 Barking Dog[.]" The citation also indicated that this was Mita's third nuisance citation. When Mita appeared in court, the prosecutor gave this oral charge: On or about June 3rd, 2008, in the city and county of Honolulu, state of Hawaii, you as the owner of an animal, farm animal, or poultry engaged in animal nuisance as defined in section 7-2.2, thereby violating section 7-2.3 of the Revised Ordinances of Honolulu. Mita objected on the grounds that the charge was insufficient. The district court overruled the objection, and Mita pleaded not guilty. At trial, Mita renewed her objection in a motion for acquittal. The district ...

The Hidden Element in OUI

State v. Wheeler (HSC November 17, 2009) Background. Wheeler was charged with operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (HRS § 291E-61(a)(1)). The State's charges went like this: "on or about May 31st, 2001, in the City and County of Honolulu, State of Hawaii, [Wheeler] did operate or assume actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in amounts sufficient to impair [his] normal mental faculties and [his] ability to care for [him]self and guard against casualty[.]" Wheeler indicated that he did not understand the charge because the term "operate" was a term of art. The State refused to clarify the charge. Wheeler moved to dismiss on the grounds that the charge failed to state an offense. The motion was denied. Wheeler lost at trial. The ICA vacated and remanded. The State appealed. The Elements of the DUI Statute Include Where the Conduct took Place. The elements of an offense include conduct,...

First Challenge to new Extended Term Sentencing leaves Statutes Intact.

State v. Cutsinger (ICA January 30, 2008) Background. Cutsinger was charged with burglary in the 2d (HRS § 708-811) and possession of burglar's tools (HRS § 708-822(1)(a)). He pleaded guilty to both counts. The State filed a motion for extended sentencing on the grounds that he was a "persistent offender". HRS §§ 706-661 and 706-662(1). The motion was granted. Cutsinger then filed a motion to reduce his sentence based on, inter alia, Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and progeny. That part of the motion was denied, and Cutsinger was sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment on Sept. 9, 2006. Cutsinger filed his notice of appeal on Sept. 27, 2006. Pending the appellate disposition, Cunningham v. California , 549 U.S. ___ (2007) and State v. Maugaotega , 115 Hawai'i 432, 168 P.3d 562 (2004) came down from the US and Hawai'i supreme courts respectively. The cases held that the statutes used to extend Cutsinger's sentence were unconstitutional because the...