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Showing posts with the label DAG

Court Cannot base Sentence on Uncharged, Dismissed, or Unadjudicated Conduct

  State  v. Satoafaiga (HSC February 7, 2022) Background. Victoria Satoafaiga was indicted with sexual assault in the third degree, sexual assault in the first degree by way of penetration, attempted sexual assault in the 3d degree, and custodial interference. She reached a plea agreement. Satoafaiga pleaded no contest to the amended charge of sexual assault in the fourth degree and custodial interference as charged. All other counts were dismissed. The circuit court—the Hon. Judge Rhonda I. L. Loo presiding—ordered a presentence investigation and report. Satoafaiga moved to defer her no contest plea.   At the hearing, the circuit court denied the motion. The circuit court reviewed the PSI report and made several comments about the case on the record. The circuit court noted that Satoafaiga was in a position of trust when she committed the offenses. She was a counselor at the Boys and Girls Club and was twice the age of the complainant. The circuit court commented,...

HSC Expands Deferrals to Offenses Outside the Penal Code

State v. Medeiros (HSC December 20, 2019) Background. Kaohulani Medeiros was charged with place to keep unloaded firearms, place to keep ammunition, a hunting hours violation, and prohibited use of an artificial light—the latter two were violations of HAR § 13-123-6 and 7. Medeiros pleaded not guilty and moved to suppress the evidence. At the hearing, DLNR officers testified that they were on patrol between Kaupo and Ulupalakua at night on the leeward side of Haleakala. They stopped at a vista and saw a gray Toyota pickup truck pass by and started to see the “panning of a light.” The light was coming from the driver’s side and slowly moved down the highway. This, the officers testified, was commonly used to track and hunt animals like deer on the side of the road. The officers tried to pursue the truck, but lost sight of it. Minutes later a truck similar to the one they observed drove past them in the opposite direction. The officers stopped the truck. Medeiros was in the vehi...

The Intricacies of the Felon-In-Possession Statute

State v. Frazer (ICA May 13, 2016) Background. Michael Frazer was indicted with one count of promoting a dangerous drug in the first degree and violation of a protective order. He pleaded guilty to both counts and moved for a conditional discharge pursuant to HRS § 712-1255. The circuit court granted the motion and placed him on probation for five years in count one and two years on count two. Four years later, Frazer gets charged with one count of first-degree terroristic threatening with use of a dangerous weapon—a semi-automatic firearm and one count of possession of a firearm while “under indictment” for a felony pursuant to HRS § 134-7(b). Frazer moved to dismiss count two on the grounds that he was not “under indictment” and the circuit court agreed. In its order granting the motion, the circuit court concluded that a person who has been granted a conditional discharge is neither “under indictment” nor convicted. The circuit court limited the language of “under indictmen...

Pesky Plain Error Problems

State v. Miller (HSC January 25, 2010) Background. Miller was charged with abuse of family/household member. The parties came to a plea agreement and entered it on the record. Miller would plead no contest to an amended charge of assault in the 3d degree (HRS § 707-712), write a letter of apology, serve 1 year probation with 48 hours jail, undergo a substance abuse treatment, pay restitution, and attend domestic violence classes. Miller would also move for a deferred acceptance of no contest plea (DANC) pursuant to HRS § 853-1. The State agreed that it would "take no position" on the DANC motion. The family court reserved a guilty finding pending the DANC motion. The family court then heard the State's argument for sentencing. The prosecutor argued that this was a brutal incident and went into graphic detail about it. Miller argued that his motion for DANC should be granted based on the findings necessary under HRS § 853-1. The family court denied the motio...

Can we get that in writing!?

State v. Shannon (HSC May 29, 2008) Background. Shannon pleaded guilty to criminal trespass in the second degree and moved for a deferred acceptance of a guilty plea on February 11, 2005. The district court granted the motion and deferred for a period of one year. After entering the DAG, Shannon was arrested in an unrelated incident in violation of one of the many conditions imposed during the deferral period. The State orally moved to revoke the acceptance of the DAG plea on January 27, 2006. After continuing the hearing twice, the district court rejected all of Shannon's arguments--including the argument that he successfully completed the deferral period as of February 11, 2006 because the State failed to toll the period by filing a written motion to revoke--and revoked Shannon's motion to defer. The ICA reversed because the State was required to give Shannon written notice of the terms and conditions of the DAG. Judge Nakamura dissented and would have adopted the federal c...

For Plain/Unambig. Laws, Leave the Legislative History for Historians.

State v. Klie (HSC December 27, 2007) Background. Klie was charged with soliciting $ex in the Waikiki area in violation of HRS § 712-1207(1) in the district court. Klie pleaded no contest. The district court accepted his plea. Klie then moved for a deferred acceptance of a no-contest plea (DANC) purs. to HRS § 853-1. The court agreed with the State that the statute did not afford the court any discretion in giving a DANC and denied Klie’s motion. DAG-nabbit!! Generally, courts can grant a DANC or DAG when (1) the defendant pleads no contest or guilty and (2) when the ct. concludes either that the defendant isn’t likely to engage in further criminal conduct and the “ends of justice and welfare of society do not require that the defendant presently suffer the penalty[.]” State v. Sakamoto , 101 Hawai’i 409, 412, 70 P.3d 635, 638 (2003). HRS § 853-4 provides that offenses that are not subject to probation are an exception to the general rule. HRS § 712-1207 provides specific se...

ICA finds error in failing to provide written notice of conditions for DAG plea

State v. Shannon (ICA Sept. 28, 2007) Background. Shannon pleaded guilty to Criminal Trespass in the Second Degree and made an oral motion for a deferred acceptance of guilty (DAG) plea, which was granted by the district court over the State's objection. The district court then imposed special conditions that he remain arrest-and-conviction free, perform 40 hours of community service, and pay a $25 fee. At a proof-of-compliance hearing, the State asserted that Shannon had violated the conditions of his DAG plea based on incidents occurring at least six months after the DAG plea was granted, and made a motion to set aside the DAG plea. The district court granted the State's motion, and filed judgment. Failure to receive written copy of DAG plea conditions amounts to reversible error. The DAG statute, HRS §853-1, incorporates the enumerated conditions in HRS § 706-624, which allows the courts to attach certain conditions to probation sentences or the suspension of a sentence. H...