The Internet Crimes Against Children Fee is Limited to Internet Crimes Against Children

By Benjamin Lowenthal -

State v. Nagamine (ICA February 26, 2025). Bryson Nagamine pleaded no contest to habitually operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant. HRS § 291E-61.5. The circuit court—the Honorable Judge Kathleen Watanabe presiding—sentenced him to five years probation and imposed the Internet Crimes Against Children fee in the amount of $100.00 over his objection. Nagamine appealed.

Limiting the ICAC fee to ICAC. The sentencing court “shall order every defendant to pay an internet crimes against children fee of up to $100 for each felony or misdemeanor conviction[.]” HRS § 846F-3. The ICA rejected the prosecution’s argument that this plain language requires a fee for every felony and misdemeanor conviction regardless of the crime.

 

The ICAC fee statute must be read with the definition of an ICAC. The ICAC is part of HRS Chapter 846F, entitled “Internet Crimes Against Children.” There is a special fund created to help law enforcement investigate and prosecute internet crimes against children. HRS § 846F-3. And under HRS Chapter 846F, the term “internet crimes against children” are limited to specific offenses: promoting child abuse, electronic enticement of a child, indecent electronic display to a child, and promoting pornography for minors. HRS § 846F-2.

 

The ICA read HRS § 846F-3(a) together with the statutory term for internet crimes against children and held that the fee can only be imposed for felony and misdemeanor convictions of the enumerated offenses in HRS § 846F-2. The ICA noted that petty misdemeanors are not covered by the statute and that makes it “logically consistent with the grades of ICAC offenses[.]” See Moranz v. Harbor Mall, LLC, 150 Hawai‘i 387, 398, 502 P.3d 488, 499 (2022) (courts avoid “inconsistent, contradictory, and illogical” interpretations of statute).

 

Legislative history supports this reading too. The ICA found support in the legislative history. Turning to committee reports when the chapter was enacted, the ICA noted that the fee was meant to be imposed on “every defendant convicted of a felony or misdemeanor for internet crimes against children” and fund “the investigation and prosecution of such crimes and protect Hawaii’s children.”

 

The “clear link” requirement. The ICAC fee goes into a special fund. And a special fund must “[r]eflect[] a clear nexus between the benefits sought and charges made upon the program users or beneficiaries or a clear link between the program and the sources of revenue[.]” HRS § 37-52.3(2).

The term “clear link” is not defined so the ICA determined “its meaning by looking to its ordinary and familiar signification and general and popular use” including legal and other dictionaries. State v. Kaeo, 151 Hawai‘i 329, 334, 512 P.3d 154, 159 (2021). Relying on an online dictionary, the ICA defined the word “clear” as “free from obscurity or ambiguity, easily understood, and unmistakable.” And “link” means “a connecting element or factor.”

And in this case, the ICAC fee was imposed for a conviction of habitual drunk driving. The offense does not involve the harm to children via electronic means and is not a “clear link” to the fee as required by HRS § 37-52.3(2).

The Crime Victim Compensation Fee and Victimless Crimes. That last part about a “clear link” raises questions about another fee imposed at sentencing. The crime victim compensation fee goes into a special fund too. HRS § 351-62.5. The fund pays for compensation payments to crime victims, salaries at the crime victim compensation commission, operating expenses, and collection efforts. HRS § 351-62.5(d).

And yet, it must be imposed in every conviction—even for offenses that do not have any victims. See HRS § 351-62.6. Can this withstand a “clear link” challenge? A drug offense is considered victimless. How can there be a clear link for compensating crime victims when there is no victim of that particular crime?

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