Trial Court’s Refusal to Instruct Jury on Negligence was not Erroneous in Assault Trial
State v. Valoroso (ICA February 26, 2021)
Background. Randal Valoroso was
charged with assault in the first degree; that is, intentionally or knowingly
causing serious bodily injury. At trial, the prosecution called Christopher
Gray, who testified that Valoroso parked his parked his pickup truck and
trailer about ten feet away from his the door to his house in Makawao on Maui.
Gray was staying with his mother, Tracy Taylor, at the time. He told Valoroso
he needed to move the truck. Valoroso challenged him. Gray started arguing with
Valoroso and Taylor tried to intervene. Gray testified that Valoroso shoved
Taylor, who slid down to the ground, and Valoroso jabbed a metal object into
Taylor’s leg. Taylor also testified about the altercation with Gray and Valoroso
and Valoroso pushing her back into the house, falling down, and getting
injured.
The defense called the one of the officers who came
to the scene and testified about inconsistent statements with Gray and Taylor. The
defense also called a neighbor who saw part of the incident and testified that
she never saw “the local boy” touch the “old lady.”
Valoroso submitted proposed jury instructions and
included the HAWJIC Inst. No. 6.05, the definition of “negligently.” At the
conference for the settling of jury instructions, however, the definition was
not included or discussed. The circuit court, with the Hon. Judge Richard T.
Bissen, Jr. presiding, agreed to give definitions for intentional, knowing, and
reckless because of the included offense of assault in the second degree.
During his closing argument, counsel told the jury
that Valoroso committed no crime.
He did not charge at Ms.
Taylor. He did not slam her against the wall. He did not drag her underneath
him, drag her against the ground. He did not stab her. And most importantly, he
did not cause this injury to her, this horrific injury.
During jury deliberations, Valoroso raised the
issue about the proposed jury instruction that was never discussed earlier. Counsel
said he “did not catch it during the settling of jury instructions” but asked
to include it now. The circuit court refused. Valoroso moved for mistrial and
that was denied. The jury found Valoroso guilty of assault in the second degree.
He was sentenced to probation and jail for one year. Valoroso appealed
The Circuit Court Didn’t need to Instruct the Jury
about Negligence. The
ICA held that it was not error to refuse the negligence instruction. Assault in
the first degree and the included offense of assault in the second degree and
third degree require an intentional, knowing, or reckless state of mind. A negligent
state of mind is not enough to convict. The ICA held that there was no
authority requiring the inclusion of this instruction and found no error in
refusing to give it. See State v. Fuqua, 13 P.3d 34, 35 (Mont. 2000); State
v. Fetterly, 886 P.2d 780, 781-782 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994).
What if the Defense was State of Mind? Here the defense was that
Valoroso didn’t do it. The ICA held that for that defense and on these facts it
was not error to omit the negligence definition. But what if the defense wanted
to attack evidence of a reckless state of mind? What then? Can’t the defense use
the negligence show that the prosecution must prove something more egregious?
This case don’t say so.
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