When you say it's in the discovery, attach the discovery

 In re: JB (ICA June 6, 2025). The prosecution filed a petition against a minor alleging that the minor committed assault in the third degree. It alleged that the minor “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause[d] bodily injury” to the complainant in violation of HRS § 707-712(1)(a). But the petition did not identify or define the “bodily injury.”

 

The minor moved to dismiss the petition because it did not specify and violated the rule in State v. Jadine, 151 Hawai'i 96, 99, 508 P.3d 1182, 1185 (2022). In response to the motion, the prosecution alleged that “all of the information supplied to the accused prior to the filing of their motion must be considered” and argued that it gave the minor “discovery” that specified the injury supporting the charge. The family court denied the motion to dismiss.

 

At trial the complainant testified that the minor was one of three boys who had hit and physically hurt him. The family court adjudicated the minor as a law violator. The minor appealed.

 

“Bodily injury” for assault in the third degree is too generic to be left on its own in the pleading. The Hawai'i Supreme Court requires the prosecution to be more specific when charging offenses that include “generic terms”:

 

[W]here the definition of an offense includes generic terms, it is not sufficient that [the charging document] shall charge the offense in the same generic terms as in the definition; but it must state the specifics and descend into particulars.

 

State v. Jardine, 151 Hawai'i at 100, 508 P.3d at 1186 (cleaned up). And a term is “generic” when it “relates to or is characteristic of a whole group or class.” Id.

 

The HSC in Jardine examined the term “substantial bodily injury” for purposes of assault in the second degree, a term that was deemed “generic” because it covered five different “classes” of injuries. Id.

 

The ICA held that the term “bodily injury” is also generic. That term covers three classes of injuries: “physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.” HRS § 707-700. And so it was on the prosecution “to state the species” and “descend to particulars” in the petition. State v. Jardine, 151 Hawai'i at 101, 508 P.3d at 1187. According to the ICA, this was “all the more important” because the minor was one of three boys who attacked the complainant. Including the specific kind of injury “would apprise [the minor] of what [he] must be prepared to meet” at trial. Id. The family court erred in ruling that the term “bodily injury” is not a generic one requiring specifics.

 

The prosecution’s response to a Jardine challenge required attaching the discovery. The prosecution argued to the ICA that even if it was generic, the record showed adequate notice. Indeed, the HSC recognized that this can avoid vacating and remanding on appeal:

 

[I]n determining whether a defendant has been adequately informed of the charges against them, the appellate court can consider other information in addition to the charge that may have been provided to the defendant until the time defendant objected to the sufficiency of the charges.

 

State v. Van Blyenburg, 152 Hawai'i 66, 70 n. 3, 520 P.3d 264, 26 n. 3 (2022). The HSC noted that this kind of review is limited to challenges for failing to inform the accused “of the nature and cause of the charge against them[.]” Id.

 

The ICA ruled that that is the case here. The elements for assault in the third degree are pleaded in the petition, but the challenge is about the specifics of the “bodily injury.” That made it a Jardine challenge. And the objection came right before trial in the form of a motion to dismiss.

 

The prosecution argued that the minor “was provided the discovery” and that the “discovery contained the specific injury that formed the basis of the bodily injury supporting the charge.” The prosecution, however, did not make that discovery part of the record. And in its answering brief the prosecution referred to the minor’s witness list and exhibits describing written statements, photographs, and other materials to show that the minor was aware of the specifics of the injury.

 

That did not work with the ICA:

 

[N]one of these materials, or any description of them, appear to be part of the pre-Motion to Dismiss record. In short, the record does not establish that the Minor was fully informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him before he filed the Motion to Dismiss.

 

And so, the family court erred in denying the motion and the judgment had to be vacated.

 

A new trial because there was sufficient evidence adduced below. The ICA reviewed the evidence adduced at trial, determined it was sufficient, and, therefore, remanded the case for a new trial instead of reversing it on Double Jeopardy grounds. State v. Davis, 133 Hawai'i 102, 120, 324 P.3d 912, 930 (2014).

  

Seems like the constitutional right to fair notice applies to children. The accused “in all criminal prosecutions shall enjoy the right . . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation[.]” Haw. Const. Art. I, Sec. 14. That is where the Jardine rule came from. And while not every constitutional right for criminal defendants automatically carries over into juvenile proceedings, See, e.g., State v. English, 61 Haw. 12, 594 P.2d 1069 (1978), it seems that the ICA has made it clear enough that this one does.