tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8449554186359811502024-03-13T21:02:54.844-10:00Hawai'i Legal NewsA no-frills Hawai'i digest. Updated frequently, but without regularity. Follow us @HawaiiLegalNewsB. Lowenthalhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13293689883439389796noreply@blogger.comBlogger488125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-844955418635981150.post-69035816294046577392024-03-07T10:09:00.003-10:002024-03-07T10:29:43.399-10:00If you're going to set bail, it has to be reasonable and can't be excessive so $3.3 million won't work<p> <b style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">State
v. Carter </span></i></b><b style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">(ICA
March 6, 2024)</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Background.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> Samuel Carter was indicted for attempted murder
in the second degree and firearms offenses. He was held in jail without bail. About
four months later, Carter filed a motion for supervised release or, in the alternative,
a motion to set bail. Carter argued that there had been no findings supporting
the decision to hold him without bail. The prosecution opposed and attached a
letter to the Circuit Court noting that there had been no bail report because of
the no-bail determination. According to the pretrial services intake center, it
would not assess Carter’s eligibility for supervised release unless and until
the court sets bail first.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">At the hearing on the motion, Carter asked that
bail be set at $100,000. The prosecution objected and argued that there was a
rebuttable presumption of detention, Carter posed a danger to the community,
and there was a flight risk. The prosecution did maintain that even though he
could be held without bail, bail should be set so that a bail study could be
made by pretrial services. The circuit court—with the Honorable Judge Ronald G.
Johnson presiding—set $3.3 million bail.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Carter filed another motion for supervised release
or, in the alternative, a reduction of bail to $100,000. This time, pretrial
services had a report that did not recommend supervised release because Carter
did not have a stable residence, no verifiable employment, had a criminal
record, and scored a “high risk.” A second report was file a month later
stating that “supervised release sponsors” did not agree to take on Carter.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">At the hearing on Carter’s motion, Carter
testified and submitted exhibits. The circuit court denied the motion. Carter
appealed <i>pro se</i>.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">A note for appellate lawyers. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The ICA treated Carter’s
appeal from the orders denying his motions as an exception to the final
judgment or order rule. First, Carter filed his notice of appeal before the
actual orders denying his motions were issued. This makes it a premature notice
of appeal and has the effect of being timely once the actual orders are issued.
Hawai'i Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 4(b)(4). Second, while the order was
not a final order or judgment, the ICA found that the order met the collateral
order exception. <i>State v. Johnson</i>, 96 Hawai'i 462, 470 n. 12, 32 P.3d
106, 114 n. 12 (App. 2001) (orders denying pretrial motions to reduce bail are
appealable under collateral order exception). And so the ICA had jurisdiction
to hear Carter’s appeal.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Hawai'i’s bail statutes and the Constitution. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Criminal defendants are usually
entitled to pretrial bail. “Any person charged with a criminal offense shall be
bailable by sufficient sureties; provided that bail may be denied where the
charge is for a serious crime.” HRS § 804-3(b). Pretrial bail for defendants who
are not charged with a serious crime is “a matter of right and under the least
restrictive conditions required to ensure the defendant’s appearance and to
protect the public[.]” HRS § 804-4(a). Bail means a “security such as cash, a
bond, or property[.]” <i>Black’s Law Dictionary</i>, 167 (10th ed. 2014).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">When the court can set no-bail status. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">A court can hold a person
in jail without bail for a “serious crime” if the court finds one of “serious
risks” enumerated in HRS § 804-3(b):<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><br /></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 94.5pt; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: -22.5pt;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">(1)
There is a serious risk that the person will flee;<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 94.5pt; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: -22.5pt;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">(2)
There is a serious risk that the person will obstruct or attempt to obstruct
justice, or thereafter, injure, or intimidate, a prospective witness or juror;<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 94.5pt; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: -22.5pt;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">(3)
There is a serious risk that the person poses a danger to any person or the
community; or<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 94.5pt; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: -22.5pt;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">(4)
There is a serious risk that the person will engage in illegal activity.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 94.5pt; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: -22.5pt;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><br /></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">A crime is a “serious crime” means murder or
attempted murder, any class A or B felony other than forgery in the first degree
and failing to render aid under section 291C-12. HRS § 804-3(a).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The statute also has a series of rebuttable
presumptions that determine when a person poses one of the “serious risks.” HRS
§ 804-3(b). Finally, the court, after a hearing, may hold a person without bail
when it “finds that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably
assure the appearance of the person when required or the safety of any other
person or community[.]” HRS § 804-3(d).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The circuit court’s findings supported the no-bail
status. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">First,
the ICA upheld the circuit court’s analysis supporting its no-bail status
order. The circuit court found that Carter was charged with “serious crimes,”
posed a serious flight risk and posed a serious risk of danger to persons and
the community, and applied the rebuttable presumptions in HRS § 804-3(c). The
circuit court then conducted the risk-mitigating analysis in HRS § 804-3(d). The
ICA upheld the circuit court’s analysis and agreed that it had the discretion
to hold Carter without bail.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Once the court exercised its discretion to set
bail, the amount must be “reasonable” under HRS § 804-9 and not “excessive”
pursuant to the Constitution.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted.” Haw.
Const. Art. I, Sec. 12. When the court sets bail in a monetary amount, it must
be “reasonable” and based on “all available information, including the offense
alleged, the possible punishment upon conviction, and the defendant’s financial
ability to afford bail.” HRS § 804-9. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The amount itself “should be so determined as not to
suffer the wealthy to escape by payment of a pecuniary penalty, nor to render the
privilege useless to the poor.” HRS § 804-9. According to the ICA, this meant
that the statute ensures that courts do not “discriminate against indigent
defendants and advantage defendants with financial means” when setting bail.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The ICA held that once the circuit court opted to
set bail, it had to follow HRS § 804-9 and the excessive bail clause. The
amount must be “reasonable” under the statute and not “excessive” under the
Constitution. According to the ICA, it abused its discretion when it set bail
at $3.3 million.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Carter was indigent and could not afford a lawyer.
He had an income of $861 a month through Social Security benefits and owed
$543.35 in unpaid rent. The circuit court did not analyze Carter’s financial
abilities and failed to explain how $3.3 was “reasonable” and “based upon all
available information” required by HRS § 804-9.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The ICA held that the circuit court erred by
assessing the risks posed by Carter’s release when setting the bail amount. The
risk analysis goes toward the question of whether to hold Carter without bail.
It is “distinct and different from the financial circumstances analysis
required under HRS § 804-9.” This amounted to an abuse of discretion. The ICA
vacated the orders denying Carter’s motions and remanded the case for further
hearings.<o:p></o:p></span></p>B. Lowenthalhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13293689883439389796noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-844955418635981150.post-66323723515736010802024-01-04T09:35:00.005-10:002024-01-04T09:35:39.871-10:00Exchanging text messages did not require Miranda warnings because nobody was “in custody.”<p> <b style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">State
v. James </span></i></b><b style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">(HSC
January 3, 2024)</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Background.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> After interviewing a complaining witness, detectives
at the Kauai Police Department suspected Dylan James committed sexual assault. The
police had the CW contact James to talk about it. The CW tried calling twice
and James did not pick up. Then the CW texted him. In the text messages, James admitted
to having “rough” sex and texted that “when you were screaming and crawling
away from the lifeguard tower . . . couldn[‘]t tell if you were serious[.]”
James was indicted with five counts of sexual assault in the first degree.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">James filed a motion to suppress his statements in
the text messages on the grounds that the police used the CW as an agent and
failed to apprise James of his constitutional right to remain silent and his
right to counsel. The circuit court, with the Hon. Judge Randal Valenciano presiding,
granted the motion. The circuit court found that James was “in custody” for <i>Miranda
</i>purposes because probable cause had developed by the time the CW called and
texted James. Alternatively, the circuit court ruled that the right to counsel
had attached when the texting took place.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The circuit court granted the motion orally. Four
days later, the prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration. That was
denied. The circuit court later issued its written order granting the motion to
suppress and a month after that a written order denying the motion for
reconsideration.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The prosecution appealed. The ICA affirmed the
suppression order and ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to review the
order denying the motion for reconsideration. The prosecution petitioned for a
writ of certiorari to the HSC.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Miranda </span></i></b><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">warnings require the suspect to be “in
custody.”<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Hawai'i Constitution
protect the right against self-incrimination. Law enforcement is required to
warn suspects about their rights when they are subject to a custodial
interrogation:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The <i>Miranda </i>rule
is, at core, a constitutionally prescribed rule of evidence that requires the
prosecution to lay a sufficient foundation—i.e., that the requisite warnings
were administered and validly waived before the accused gave the statement
sought to be adduced at trial—before it may adduce evidence of a defendant’s
custodial statements that stem from interrogation during [their] criminal
trial.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The prosecution’s burden of establishing that the requisite
warnings were given, however, is not triggered unless the totality of the
circumstances reflect that the statement it seeks to adduce at trial was
obtained as a result of “custodial interrogation,” which, as the United States Supreme
court defined it in <i>Miranda</i>, consists of “questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of their freedom of action in any significant way.” In other words,
the defendant, objecting to the admissibility of their statement and, thus, seeking
to suppress it, must establish that their statement was the result of (1) “interrogation”
that occurred while they were (2) “in custody.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">State v. Hewitt</span></i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">, 153 Hawai'i 33, 43, 526 P.3d 558, 568
(2023).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC began with the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. James was not “in custody” because he had not been detained
and he was not “deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way” when
the CW was texting him. <i>See United States v. Eide</i>, 875 F.2d 1429, 1433 (9th
Cir. 1989).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Clarifying a bright-line rule: detention is
required before determining “custody.” </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Article I, Section 10 in the Hawai'i Constitution
also requires that the suspect be “in custody.” The Hawai'i Constitution
defines “custody” with a bright-line rule:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">[I]f an objective
assessment of the totality of the circumstances reflects either (1) that the person
has become impliedly accused of committing a crime because the questions of the
police have become sustained and coercive, such that they are no longer
reasonably designed briefly to confirm or dispel their reasonable suspicion or (2)
that the point of arrest has arrived because either (a) probable cause to
arrest has developed or (b) the police have subjected the person to an unlawful
“de facto” arrest without probable cause to do so.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">State v. Hewitt</span></i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">, 153 Hawai'i at 43, 526 P.3d at 568
(quoting <i><span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">State v. Ketchum</span></i><span style="mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">, 97 Hawai'i 107, 34 P.3d 1006 (2001)).<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">According to the HSC,
the circuit court and the ICA did not apply this test correctly. The lower
courts read the <i>Hewitt-Ketchum </i>test to any situation in which probable
cause arises—even “when a defendant is nowhere near a law enforcement official.”
The HSC clarified that <i>Hewitt</i> centered on whether the defendant, who had
been in a hospital bed surrounded by the police, was “in custody.” <i>Id.</i>
at 43-46, 526 P.3d at 568-71. <i>Hewitt </i>itself reiterated <i>Ketchum</i>,
which established the bright-line rule that a suspect is “in custody” “when
probable cause to arrest exists upon an initial stop or detention.” <i>Hewitt</i>,
153 Hawai'i at 43, 526 P.3d at 568.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">The HSC held that the
rule does not apply when the “police have not stopped or detained the suspect,
or have not otherwise deprived the suspect of freedom of action in any significant
way.” Probable cause is beside the point if there is no detention or stop.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">Even if the CW was
working for the police when she reached out to James, and even if there had
been probable cause to arrest at that point, James was not “in custody” because
there had been no “initial stop or detention” or deprivation of freedom of
action.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">But what if there was a
stop or detention? </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">The HSC did not disturb the finding that the CW was
an agent of the police when she called and texted James. What if the police
sent the CW to find James, corner him, confront him, and stop, detain, or “otherwise
deprive his freedom of action”? It would seem like <i>Miranda </i>would apply
then.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The right to counsel did
not attach during the text exchange. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">The HSC took on the
circuit court’s alternative basis to suppress the statements. Even when the suspect
is not subjected to a custodial interrogation, the right to counsel may attach:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">An
individual has a right to counsel under the sixth amendment to the United States
Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Hawai'i State Constitution which guarantees
an accused the right to assistance of counsel for [the accused’s] defense. However,
this right attaches at critical stages of the criminal prosecution, only at or
after the initiation of adversarial judicial criminal proceedings—whether by
way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information or
arraignment.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">State v. Luton</span></i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">,
83 Hawai'i 443, 448, 927 P.2d 844, 849 (1996).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">The HSC held that the
right to counsel did not attach until criminal proceedings were initiated
through the grand jury and indictment. This constitutional right did not apply during
the text exchange.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The ICA has appellate
jurisdiction to review the denial of the prosecution’s motion for
reconsideration. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">The HSC also held that the ICA erred when it ruled
that it did not have jurisdiction to review the denial of the motion for
reconsideration. The “right of appeal in a criminal case is purely statutory
and exists only when given by some constitutional or statutory provision.” <i>State
v. Bohannon</i>, 102 Hawai'i 228, 236, 74 P.3d 980, 988 (2003).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">Appeals initiated by the
prosecution are limited by HRS § 641-13. The prosecution may appeal “[f]rom a
pretrial order granting a motion for the suppression of evidence, including a
confession or admission, or the return of property, in which case the appellate
court shall give priority to the appeal and the order shall be stayed pending
the outcome of the appeal[.]” The statute does not expressly cover order
denying a motion for reconsideration.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">“As a general rule, we
strictly construe” this statute. <i>State v. Timoteo</i>, 87 Hawai'i 108, 112,
952 P.2d 865, 869 (1997). But not always:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">[T]his
strict construction rule, like the rule applicable to penal statutes generally,
does not permit the court to ignore legislative intent in the face of statutory
ambiguity, nor require the court to reject the construction that best harmonizes
with the design of the statute or the end sought to be achieved.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">State v. Fukusaku</span></i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">,
85 Hawai'i 462, 492, 946 P.2d 32, 62 (1997). In <i>Bohannon</i>, the HSC
examined the prosecution’s appeal from both an order suppressing evidence and
an order denying the motion for reconsideration of that suppression. <i>Id.</i>
at 235, 74 P.3d at 987. The HSC held that the prosecution’s “right to appeal
from the order granting [the defendant’s] motion to suppress under HRS §
641-13(7) encompasses a right to appeal from the order denying its motion to
reconsider[.]” 102 Hawai'i at 234, 74 P.3d at 986. That is because the denial
of the reconsideration is “merely an extension of its order granting . . . motions
to suppress and to dismiss.” <i>Id.</i> at 235, 74 P.3d at 987.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">The HSC held that this situation
is indistinguishable from <i>Bohannon</i>. While the statute does not expressly
cover the denial of a motion for reconsideration, it “implicitly encompasses a
right to appeal” from the order. The ICA erred when it ruled that it had no
jurisdiction to review the denial of the motion for reconsideration.<o:p></o:p></span></p>B. Lowenthalhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13293689883439389796noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-844955418635981150.post-90747716598375071112024-01-02T13:12:00.001-10:002024-01-02T13:18:39.366-10:00Judge accidentally strikes the entire expert opinion in a murder trial<p> <b style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">State
v. Sylva </span></i></b><b style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">(HSC
December 29, 2023)</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Background. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Kumulipo Sylva was indicted for murder in
the second degree after he was arrested for killing Eduardo Cerezo in the
bathroom of the Queen Kaahumanu Shopping Center. Sylva raised the insanity
defense and three examiners were appointed to determine penal responsibility. All
three concluded that Sylva suffered from a physical or mental disease,
disorder, or defect. Two out of the three believed he lacked capacity under the
insanity defense was not criminally responsible.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">At trial, the prosecution presented evidence that
Cerezo and Kyle Keoho got on the bus in Pukalani when they saw Sylva on the bus.
Cerezo called Sylva a “pussy” and threatened to beat him up. When the bus got
to the shopping center, the three of them got off and Sylva challenged Cerezo
to a fight. Cerezo said he did not want to fight and Sylva walked away from
them.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Cerezo and Keoho went to the bathroom together.
Sylva also went into the bathroom with a cane knife and said, “you guys are
like demons. I send them to the moon.” Sylva struck Cerezo’s neck killing him.
Sylva said “I guess he was a demon” and told Keoho “believe it or not, he was a
demon.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Sylva left the shopping center and witnesses
testified he tried to hide his jacket and the cane knife. The police apprehended
him at a park near the shopping center. Sylva made several references to demons.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Evidence in support of the insanity defense. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The defense called two of
the three examiners. Dr. Melissa Vargo testified that Sylva suffered from
schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, which caused him to hallucinate, have
delusional thoughts, mania, and depression. She testified that to a degree of psychological
certainty, Sylva lacked the “capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
conduct or to conform his behavior to the conduct of the law” at the time of
the killing. She explained the basis of her opinion and added that Sylva told her
that he did not believe killing Cerezo was wrong because Cerezo was a demon and
it was a service to God.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Dr. Martin Blinder, a forensic psychiatrist, testified
for the defense. Dr. Blinder testified that Sylva was suffering from a
psychotic disability profoundly affecting his ability to think clearly and his interpretation
of events. He also believed that this “resulted in a lack of capacity to
control conduct under the law or appreciate wrongfulness.” When Sylva’s counsel
asked Dr. Blinder to explain the basis for the opinion, he provided his methodology:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 1in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Let me tell you how I go
about making these judgments. The first thing that I look at when there’s a
homicide is whether or not there’s a reasonable reason for the defendant to
have done what he did. I’m not saying a good reason. There’s never a good
reason to kill someone. But maybe a drug bust—a drug deal that went bad, guy is
supposed to give him drugs, he pays him and doesn’t get the money, he takes his
life, or he’s insulted on a racial basis or something that we wouldn’t approve
of but we can understand, that there’s been a longstanding conflict between the
killer and the person that he kills, and it’s unforgivable but understandable.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 1in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>I look for that. If I find that, then it’s pretty well the
end of my participation. . . . As far as I’m concerned, he does not meet that
standard that you just heard.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 1in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>In the case of Mr. Sylva, there is no rational reason. There’s
a very superficial reason, but the basic reason is he’s got a mission, he’s got
a mission to rid the world of demons, and he was just getting started. This was
obviously, in his delusional mind, a dangerous demon, and for some reason, he—he’s
been anointed by what he reads in the Bible to take care of this problem.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 1in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>And that’s nutty and it’s crazy, and absent for that nutty,
crazy thing, he wouldn’t have hurt anybody. He’s not, you know, a bad man who
goes around hurting people.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The prosecutor objected “to the last phrase” and
moved to strike it. Counsel asked for the grounds. The circuit court—the Hon.
Judge Richard T. Bissen—responded instead: “that wasn’t the question that was
asked.” The parties approached for a sidebar.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 1in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">At the bench, the circuit
court told counsel that Dr. Blinder was “just editorializing, saying if it wasn’t
for this, this wouldn’t happen and he’s not a bad man. If that was the question
you asked, that would be okay, but that’s not the question you asked. And the
State is correct, I think, in saying he’s going beyond the opinion.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The circuit court sustained the objection and ordered
to “have it stricken.” The circuit court instructed the jury to “disregard the
last response made by the witness and ordered that it be stricken.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Sylva continued his direct examination of Dr.
Blinder, when the circuit court interjected again:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 1in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Q.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Your opinion is based in par ton the fact that there is no
rational explanation, correct?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 1in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">A.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Yes. Based—to a reasonable degree of medical probability, there
does not appear to be a rational basis for his action, and that but for his psychotic
illness, he would not have taken the life of this man.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The prosecutor objected on the grounds that that
was speculative. Sylva responded that this was part of Dr. Blinder’s explanation
for his opinion. The circuit court sustained the objection:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 1in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">I know. I heard. He’s—it’s
his opinion that he suffers from a mental disease, and he’s giving a conclusion—or,
excuse me, the word opinion about that. He’s adding on to that at the end of
the answer. I ordered it stricken earlier. I’ll order it stricken again.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 1in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Ladies and gentlemen, when the court orders something
stricken, you’re not to consider it in your deliberations in any way.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">When the prosecutor cross-examined Dr. Blinder,
the prosecutor referred back to his methodology in determining a rational basis
for killing someone. That was not stricken.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The prosecution called the third examiner as a rebuttal
witness. Although he agreed that Sylva was suffering from a mental illness, he
believed that he was not legally insane.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><br /></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The order of the instructions, verdict, and appeal.
</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The circuit
court instructed the jury on the elements of murder in the second degree, the
included offense of manslaughter, and the affirmative defenses of insanity and
extreme mental or emotional disturbance (EMED). The circuit court instructed
the jury ton consider the EMED defense “if and only if” it found Sylva guilty
of either murder in the second degree or manslaughter and that Sylva was not
insane at the time of the killing. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of
manslaughter based on EMED. The circuit court sentenced Sylva to prison for
twenty years. The ICA affirmed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Although the prosecutor objected to the “last
phrase,” the circuit court struck Dr. Blinder’s “last response” and erroneously
instructed the jury to disregard his entire explanation. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">“[I]t
is the duty of the trial court to properly instruct the jury. As a result, once
instructional error is demonstrated, we will vacate, without regard to whether
timely objection was made, if there is a reasonable possibility that the error
contributed to the defendant’s conviction, <i>i.e.</i>, that the erroneous jury
instruction was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” <i>State v. Nichols</i>,
111 Hawai'i 327, 479, 141 P.3d 974, 984 (2006)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">The HSC held that the
circuit court erred. Once Dr. Blinder testified about Sylva lacking capacity, counsel
asked him to explain the basis for his opinion. Dr. Blinder provided his explanation
and said that Sylva is not a “bad man who goes around hurting people.” The prosecutor
objected to Dr. Blinder’s “last response.” But after the bench conference, the
circuit court ordered the jury to disregard Dr. Blinder’s “last response.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">The HSC held that a reasonable
juror could have interpreted the instruction striking Dr. Blinder’s “response”
to mean the entire answer to the question. Moreover, the circuit court later
sustained the prosecutor’s objection and reminded jurors that “I ordered it
stricken earlier. I’ll order it stricken again.” That, according to the HSC, implied
to the jury that more than “the last phrase” was stricken.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">It was error to strike the
“last response” anyways. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">“Evidence that the defendant was
affected by a physical or mental disease, disorder, or defect is admissible
whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant did or did not have a state
of mind that is required to establish an element of the offense.” HRS §
704-400.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">Examiners who determine
penal responsibility “shall be permitted to make a statement as to the nature
of the examiner’s examination, the examiner’s diagnosis of the physical or
mental condition of the defendant at the time of the conduct alleged, and the
examiner’s opinion of the extent, if any to which the capacity of the defendant
to appreciate the wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct or to conform the
defendant’s conduct to the requirements of the law[.]” HRS § 704-410(3).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">At trial, examiners “shall
be permitted to make any explanation reasonably serving to clarify the examiner’s
diagnosis and opinion and may be cross-examined as to any matter bearing on the
examiner’s competency or credibility or the validity of the examiner’s
diagnosis or opinion.” HRS § 704-410(4). The HSC held that Dr. Blinder testified
about his opinion on penal responsibility and his belief that “that’s nutty and
it’s crazy, and absent for that nutty, crazy thing, he wouldn’t have hurt
anybody” was a clarified his diagnosis and opinion.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">This was not at the
discretion of the circuit court because HRS § 704-410(4) states that the
examiner “shall be permitted.” It “is a well-established tenet of our statutory
interpretation that the use of the word ‘shall’ generally indicates the
legislature’s intention to make a provision mandatory, as opposed to discretionary.”
<i>State v. Shannon</i>, 118 Hawai'i 15, 25, 185 P.3d 200, 210 (2008).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Harmless error in criminal
cases must be applied narrowly.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"> The “error must be
examined in light of the entire proceedings and given the effect to which the
whole record shows it is entitled. In that context, the real question becomes
whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed
to the conviction.” <i>State v. Aplaca</i>, 96 Hawai'i 17, 25, 25 P.3d 792, 800
(2001). Harmless error arises when “there is a wealth of overwhelming and
compelling evidence tending to show the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt[.]” <i>State v. Veikoso</i>, 126 Hawai'i 267, 276, 270 P.3d 997, 1006
(2011).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">The application of the harmless
error doctrine must be narrow in criminal cases in order to protect “a
defendant’s rights and the integrity of the trial process.” <i>State v. Aplaca</i>,
96 Hawai'i at 27 n. 7, 25 P.3d at 802 n. 7. The HSC emphasized that defendants
have the right to present a complete defense and the prosecution’s presentation
of evidence would not cure a violation of this right. <i>See State v. Abion</i>,
148 Hawai'i 445, 454, 478 P.3d at 270, 279 (2020). Moreover, the HSC pointed
out that “because the jury was precluded from considering Dr. Blinder’s answer
. . ., the jury may have placed less weight on his opinion, which was pivotal
to Sylva’s insanity defense.” Even though some of the same evidence was
presented by the prosecution during the cross-examination of Dr. Blinder, the
circuit court’s error cannot be deemed harmless. The HSC vacated the conviction
and remanded for a new trial.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The order of the jury
instructions were not erroneous. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">The HSC rejected Sylva’s
argument that the circuit court was required to instruct the jury to consider
the insanity defense <i>after </i>finding that the killing was the result of an
EMED. Jury instructions must be considered as a whole and error arises only
when they are “prejudicially insufficient, inconsistent, or misleading.” <i>State
v. Uyesugi</i>, 100 Hawai'i 442, 457, 60 P.3d 843, 858 (2002).</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">The HSC adopted Justice Acoba’s
concurrence in <i>State v. Yamada</i>, 99 Hawai'i 542, 57 P.3d 467 (2002), and <i>Uyesugi</i>:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 1in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">The
jury was required to decide the insanity defense which would exclude responsibility
for . . . murder, before proceeding to consider the mitigating defense of
manslaughter, inasmuch as the insanity defense completely negates guilt, while
the emotional disturbance defense only mitigates guilt.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">Uyesugi</span></i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">,
100 Hawai'i at 473, 60 P.3d at 874 (Acoba, J. concurring).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">The circuit court did
not err in having the jury decide the insanity defense before moving on to the mitigating
EMED defense. According to the HSC, “[i]f the jury had accepted the insanity
defense, it would have been required to acquit Sylva, and the EMED mitigating
defense would have been inapplicable.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>B. Lowenthalhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13293689883439389796noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-844955418635981150.post-2435525633377231732023-12-27T18:33:00.004-10:002023-12-28T07:23:02.134-10:00HSC examines when county ordinances are (and aren't) preempted by state statutes<p> <b style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">State
v. Pickell</span></i></b><b style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">
(HSC December 26, 2023)</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Background. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Michael Pickell was charged with operating
a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant. He filed a motion to
suppress evidence challenging the basis for the traffic stop. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">At the hearing, Officer Raul Mehra testified that
he was on duty in Kihei one night when he saw Pickell in the left-turn-only lane
with his left-turn signal on at the intersection of Pi‘ilani Highway and Ohukai
Road. In Pickell’s lane was a left-turn-only sign and a left directional arrow.
Next to the traffic light there was a gin that indicated left-turn only. When
Pickell’s light turned green, he made a U-turn instead of turning left onto
Ohukai Road. The turn required Pickell to drive across double solid yellow
lines and a dashed white line. Officer Mehra initiated a traffic stop. Pickell
said he was going home but later said he was going to Safeway. He also said he
thought he could make a lawful U-turn because he was from California and did
not know if U-turns were legal in Hawai'i. No signs near the intersection
permitted U-turns.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The district court—with the Hon. Blaine J.
Kobayashi presiding—denied the motion to suppress. Pickell entered a
conditional plea and appealed. The ICA affirmed and the HSC took certiorari.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The preemption problem. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Pickell argued that HRS §
291C-82(c) requires a sign expressly prohibiting him from making U-turns:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 1in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The director of
transportation and the counties by ordinance with respect to the highways under
their respective jurisdictions prohibit the turning of any vehicle so as to
proceed in the opposite direction on the highway at any location where such
turning would be dangerous to those using the highway or would unduly interfere
with the free movement of traffic.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The prosecution countered with Maui County Code §
10.24.100(E):<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 1in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">In all cases where
official marks, buttons, sings or directional arrows painted on the pavement
are placed within or adjacent to intersections, no operator of a vehicle shall
execute a movement at such intersections, otherwise than as directed and
required by such marks, buttons, signs or arrows.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">When a county ordinance is preempted by state
statutes, the county must yield. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The HSC characterized the issue as one of
preemption and whether HRS § 291C-82(c) preempts the county code. “The
legislature shall create counties, and may create other political subdivisions
within the State, and provide the government thereof. Each political
subdivision shall have and exercise such powers as shall be conferred under
general laws.” Haw. Const. Art. VIII, Sec. 1.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">In other words, “a county’s powers are limited to
those conferred by the legislature under general laws.” <i>Ruggles v. Yagong</i>,
135 Hawai'i 411, 422, 353 P.3d 953, 964 (2015). The Legislature empowered
counties to enact laws that are not “inconsistent with, or tending to defeat,
the intent of any state statute where the statute does not disclose an express
or implied intent that the statute shall be exclusive or uniform throughout the
State.” HRS § 46.-1.5(13).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The two paths to preemption. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The statute preempts “any
ordinance that either conflicted with the intent of a state statute or
legislated in an area already staked out by the legislature for exclusive and
statewide statutory treatment.” <i>Richardson v. City and Cnty of Honolulu</i>,
76 Hawai'i 46, 60, 868 P.2d 1193, 1207 (1994). The HSC broke the <i>Richardson </i>test
down into two alternatives.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">A municipal ordinance may be preempted by state
law if “(1) it covers the same subject matter embraced within a comprehensive
state statutory scheme disclosing an express or implied intent to be exclusive
and uniform throughout the state or (2) it conflicts with state law.” <i>Id.</i>
at 62, 868 P.2d at 1209.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The state’s traffic code is not a “comprehensive
state statutory scheme” preempting counties from regulating traffic. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The HSC examined the first
alternative. When determining if the ordinance covers the same subject matter
as a state statutory scheme, the HSC looked to the “comprehensive statutory
scheme.” <i>See In re: Application of Anamizu</i>, 52 Haw. 550, 554, 481 P.2d
116, 119 (1971); <i>Citizens Utilities Co. v. County of Kauai</i>, 72 Haw. 285,
814 P.2d 398 (1991).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The HSC surveyed the State Traffic Code enacted in
1971. According to the HSC, the legislative history “evinces clear legislative
intent to allow counites to enact their own traffic ordnances.” Moreover, the
traffic code applies throughout the State “and in all political subdivisions
therein provided that any matter not covered in this chapter relating to rules
of the road may be subject to appropriate county ordinances in any county.” HRS
§ 291C-162. The Code also “shall not be deemed to prevent counties with respect
to streets and highways under their jurisdiction” from regulating traffic. HRS
§ 291C-163(a)(2).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The HSC also examined HRS § 291C-82, its legislative
history, and various amendments. Although the statute no longer states it, the
history shows that it was intended to apply to dangerous locations at highways
and did not address intersections. That was enough for the HSC to conclude that
it does not indicate a comprehensive state statutory scheme. The ordinance is
not preempted under the first alternative of the <i>Richardson </i>test.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The ordinance does not conflict with state law.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> A county ordinance is
preempted when it conflicts with state law. <i>Richardson</i>, 76 Hawai'i at
62, 868 P.2d at 1209. A conflict arises when the ordinance “prohibits what the
statute permits or permits what the statute prohibits.” <i>Waikiki Resort
Hotel, Inc. v. City and Cnty of Honolulu</i>, 63 Haw. 222, 241, 624 P.2d 1353,
1366 (1981).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The HSC held that MCC § 10.24.100(E) does not conflict
with HRS § 291C-82. The statute requires signs prohibiting U-turns in areas
deemed dangerous. It was intended to apply to highway locations and does not
refer to intersections. The ordinance, however, requires a driver follow
directional movements on markings and signs at intersections. The HSC noted
that abiding by signs, pavement markings, and signals under the county
ordinance would not cause a driver to violate HRS § 291C-82(c). “Drivers executing
left turns as required by the signs satisfy MCC § 10.24.100(E); they do not
violate HRS § 291C-82(c) because they are not executing U-turns against
prohibitive signage. Alternative, if an intersection has a sign prohibiting a
U-turn as well as a sign and markings indicating left turn only, a driver could
adhere to both by making a left turn.” The statute and ordinance co-exist and “neither
permits what the other prohibits.” The HSC held there was no conflict.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">Without preemption, the
county ordinance applies and was violated by Pickell.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;"> Having upheld the county ordinance,
the HSC held that Officer Mehra had reasonable suspicion to stop Pickell. He
saw him make a U-turn at an intersection that only allowed a left turn. That
was reasonable suspicion to believe Pickell violated MCC § 10.24.100(E).</span>B. Lowenthalhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13293689883439389796noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-844955418635981150.post-48696201572129786862023-10-22T09:33:00.001-10:002023-10-22T09:33:37.242-10:00Probation doesn't toll when the motion to revoke probation is never heard on the merits and is dismissed <p> <b style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">State v. Banares </span></i></b><b style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">(ICA October 16, 2023)</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Background.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> Joven Joseph Banares was charged with promoting a
dangerous drug in the third degree, pleaded no contest, and was sentenced to
four years of probation. Probation started in May 2016. A little more than a
year into his probationary term, the prosecution filed a motion to revoke
probation and to resentence him to imprisonment based on alleged violations of
the terms and conditions of probation. To bring Banares into court, the court
issued a warrant for his arrest on February 7, 2017. The warrant was not served
until January 17, 2022.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Banares moved to dismiss on the grounds that the delay
in serving the warrant violated Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure Rule 9.
Banares also argued that upon dismissal, his time on probation would have run because
it has not been tolled. The prosecution agreed that there was no effort to
serve the warrant and agreed that there was a Rule 9 violation. It did object
to tolling the time. The circuit court—the Hon. Judge Kevin Morikone—granted the
motion in part. The circuit court concluded there was a Rule 9 violation, but
tolled the probationary period pursuant to HRS § 706-627. Banares appealed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Violations of HRPP Rule 9 and the remedy. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Warrants “shall be
executed without unnecessary delay by the arrest of the defendant.” HRPP Rule 9(c)(3)(i).
<i>See also State v. Owens</i>, 116 Hawai'i 172, 174-75, 127 P.3d 484, 486-87
(2007). The delay here was nearly five years old and the prosecution conceded
that it should have been served sooner. The fact that there was a violation of HRPP
Rule 9 is not in dispute. The motion to revoke probation must be “dismissed.” <i>Id.</i><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Now what? </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">That leaves the issue of whether Banares was still
on probation under HRS § 706-627:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Tolling
of probation.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">
(1) Upon the filing of a motion to revoke a probation or a motion to enlarge
the conditions imposed thereby, the period of probation shall be tolled pending
the hearing upon the motion and the decision of the court. The period of
tolling shall be computed from the filing date of the motion through and including
the filing date of the written decision concerning the motion for purposes of
computation of the remaining period of probation, if any. In the event the court
fails to file a written decision upon the motion, the period shall be computed by
reference to the date the court makes a decision upon the motion in open court.
During the period of tolling of the probation, the defendant shall remain
subject to all terms and conditions of the probation except as otherwise
provided by this chapter.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> (2) In the event the court, following hearing, refuses to
revoke the probation or grant the requested enlargement of conditions thereof
because the defendant’s failure to comply therewith was excusable, the defendant
may be granted the period of tolling of the probation for purposes of
computation of the remaining probation, if any.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The power to toll probation is limited to cases
when there has been a ruling on the merits of the prosecution’s motion to
revoke probation. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">“[I]mplicit
in the task of statutory construction is our foremost obligation to ascertain
and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained
primarily from the language contained in the statute itself.” <i>State v. Borge</i>,
152 Hawai'i 458, 464, 526 P.3d 435, 441 (2023). The ICA noted that probation is
tolled pending “the hearing upon the motion [to revoke probation] and the
decision of the court.” HRS § 706-627(1). The ICA held that the plain language
of the statute allows tolling only when there has been a “decision” “concerning
the motion” or, when there is no written decision upon the announcement of the “decision
upon the motion” in open court. <i>Id.</i> There was “decision” in this case because
before the hearing on the prosecution’s motion to revoke was heard, Banares
moved to dismiss the proceedings based on the HRPP Rule 9 violation.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">The ICA held that “[b]ecause
the circuit court did not . . . hear or issue a decision concerning or upon the
motion to revoke, the tolling provision set forth in HRS § 706-627 cannot apply
to toll the period of Banares’s probation.” The ICA vacated the circuit court’s
ruling that tolled the probation.</span>B. Lowenthalhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13293689883439389796noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-844955418635981150.post-26730080758626358802023-09-16T14:11:00.002-10:002023-09-16T14:11:15.960-10:00Courts don’t need a charging document for jurisdiction, but do need a pretty good reason to impose consecutive terms<p> <b style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">State v. Bautista </span></i></b><b style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">(HSC September 13, 2023)</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Background.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> The prosecution filed a complaint in the district
court alleging seven crimes of violence against Rommel Bautista, including
attempted murder in the second degree. All of the charges stemmed from an
incident that occurred between Bautista and his wife in their home in Kahului.
The district court held a preliminary hearing and found probable cause
supported every count. The district court confirmed bail and committed the case
to the circuit court.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The prosecution did not file a complaint in the
circuit court. At the arraignment, Bautista pleaded not guilty. Five months
later, the parties reached an agreement. Bautista pleaded no contest to three
class C felonies: assault in the second degree, terroristic threatening in the
first degree, and abuse of a family or household member in the presence of a
minor. All other counts—including the attempted murder and assault in the first
degree—were dismissed. There were no agreements as to sentencing. The circuit
court—with the Honorable Judge Rhonda I. L. Loo presiding—accepted the plea, found
him guilty of the three offenses, and ordered a presentence investigation and
report.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The PSI report included supportive letters from
Bautista’s family, coworkers, and his wife, the complainant. She wrote that the
incident “did not have any lasting effects on me. The only effect it has had on
our son is that his father is gone and he misses his father. Please we ask for
your help and kindness to lessen him years in jail.” She added this was the
first time Bautista hit him and “despite what happened that night I feel safe
with him if he could be on probation and be given another chance.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">At the sentencing hearing, Bautista’s wife,
parents, and sister sat in the courtroom. Bautista appeared on zoom from the
jail and was not brought up due to the COVID-19 pandemic. He agreed to waive
his physical presence for the sentencing hearing. At the hearing, the
prosecution asked the court to sentence Bautista to three consecutive five-year
terms of imprisonment for a total of 15 years. Bautista argued for probation.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The court addressed Bautista. “Mr. Bautista, you
know, what’s worse than a jealous man is a drunk, jealous man. And that night
you . . . were drinking a lot of tequila, and you went off on your wife.” The court
recounted the incident and the impact it had on children exposed to domestic
violence. The court recounted the complaining witness’s injuries and commented
that “there was no part of your wife’s body that was not untouched.” The court then
commented on Bautista’s letter that was in the PSI report:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">You know, Mr. Bautista, your statement to the
Court that you wrote was: ‘I’d like to spread my wings, fly high again, and
catch . . . my dreams.’ . . . Sure sounds like a caged bird to me. Well, I know
Big Bird, Angry Birds, and jail birds. And you know what we do with jailbirds?
. . . We clip their wings and we keep them locked up in cages.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The court acknowledged the lack of criminal
record, but said it was a “very severe case” and the offenses were “so serious
you could have killed your wife.” And while she “maybe now . . . has changed
her tune, she thought that night that she as going to die.” The court then
sentenced Bautista:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">So the Court feels that
there’s a need for respect for the law and you need to be justly punished and
afford adequate deterrence to everyone. Will five years protect her and your family?
I don’t think so. Will ten years protect your wife and your family? I don’t
think so. Will fifteen years protect your wife and your family? Perhaps.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The court sentenced him to the fifteen years—three
five-year terms running consecutively. Bautista moved to reconsider the
sentence. The court—this time with the Hon. Judge Kirstin M. Hamman presiding—denied
the motion. Bautista appealed and the ICA affirmed. Bautista petitioned for a
writ of cert, which was accepted.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The circuit court had jurisdiction to sentence—even
without a charging document filed in the circuit court. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Bautista first presented a
jurisdictional challenge. After the preliminary hearing, the case was committed
to the circuit court and the prosecution did not file a charging document.
Bautista argued that without a charging document in the circuit court, the
circuit court did not have jurisdiction to accept the no-contest plea, find him
guilty, and sentence him. “Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority
on the part of the court to hear and judicially determine and dispose of the
cause pending before it.” <i>Schwartz v. State</i>, 136 Hawai'i 258, 262, 361
P.3d 1161, 1165 (2015).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC rejected Bautista’s argument that without
a charging document filed in the circuit court, the circuit court lacked
jurisdiction. The HSC specifically rejected his reliance on <i>State v. Kaulia</i>,
128 Hawai'i 479, 291 P.3d 377 (2013). In that case, the HSC held that after the
defendant demanded a jury trial for assault in the third degree and after the
prosecution moved to amend the complaint to aver a petty misdemeanor, the
district court lacked jurisdiction on remand because the prosecution failed to
file an amended charging document averring the petty misdemeanor. <i>Id.</i> at
491, 291 P.3d at 389.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC explained that the jurisdictional problem
in <i>Kaulia</i> was that the prosecution did not file an amended complaint in
the district court and no “valid charging document re-established district
court jurisdiction. Instead, the original misdemeanor complaint was still in
play. That meant Kaulia retained his constitutional right to a jury trial, and
the circuit court still had jurisdiction.” This, according to the HSC, was
different. The prosecution charged Bautista with felony offenses and the case
was committed to the circuit court without an amendment of the charges. The
charges did not change when the case was committed to the circuit court. There being
no amendment to the charge, there was no need to file a charging document in
the circuit court.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Narrowing <i>Obrero. </i></span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC also rejected
Bautista’s reliance on <i>State v. Obrero</i>, 151 Hawai'i 472, 517 P.3d 755 (2022).
Circuit courts have jurisdiction over “offenses cognizable under the laws of the
State, committed within their respective circuits or transferred to them for trial
by change of venue from some other circuit.” HRS § 603-21.5(a)(1). “Cognizable
means capable of being known or recognized, or capable of being judicially tried
or examined before a designated tribunal; within the court’s jurisdiction.” <i>State
v. Obrero</i>, 151 Hawai'i at 478 n. 12, 517 P.3d at 761 n. 12. Here, the
charging document pleaded cognizable offenses and it did not matter that it was
filed in the district court. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC also rejected Bautista’s argument that the
prosecution violated HRS § 801-1, a statute that required an indictment to be
filed before the arraignment pursuant to <i>Obrero</i>. The HSC held that <i>Obrero
</i>does not apply retroactively.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">We hold that <i>Obrero </i>applies
to cases that were pending trial before the decision. <i>Obrero </i>does not
apply retroactively to defendant who pled out or to defendants convicted after
a trial. So defendants awaiting sentencing, or those challenging a charging
instrument’s validity for the first time on appeal (like Bautista) or even
later per HRPP Rule 40, are foreclosed from having their pleas nullified or
their trial conviction overturned per HRS § 801-1.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC reasoned, among other things, that “vacating
virtually every conviction initiated by a felony complaint does not” further the
interests of justice.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The Rules of Penal Procedure do not Require a
Second Complaint in the Circuit Court. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC also rejected Bautista’s argument that the
penal rules contemplate that a complaint be filed in the circuit court after a
preliminary hearing in the district court.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">A complaint may be filed
in either the district or circuit court; provided that a complaint shall not be
filed initially in the circuit court when it charges: (i) a felony, and none of
the 3 conditions set for in Rule 7(b) of these rules has yet occurred, or (ii)
only an offense or offenses other than a felony.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">HRPP Rule 7(h)(2). HRPP Rule 7(b) identified the
three conditions: a finding of probable cause by the district court after a
preliminary hearing; the defendant waiving the right to a preliminary hearing;
or the defendant waiting the right to an indictment.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">According to the HSC, because there was no waiver
of indictment or preliminary hearing, and because there was a preliminary
hearing and finding of probable cause, HRPP Rule 5(c) applied: “If the defendant
is held to answer in the circuit court, the court shall transmit to the circuit
court all papers and articles received in evidence at the preliminary hearing
and any bail received by it.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC held that no rule requires a scone
complaint to be filed in the circuit court. While the complaint “may be filed
in either the district or circuit court,” HRPP Rule 7(h)(2), it is not required
to do both. The circuit court had jurisdiction to sentence Bautista.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Each consecutive term of imprisonment requires an adequate
on-the-record basis. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The
sentencing court must consider the factors in HRS § 706-606 when imposing any sentence.
<i>Id. </i>The sentencing court is presumed to have reviewed and considered these
factors absent any evidence to the contrary. <i>State v. Hussein</i>, 122 Hawai'i
495, 518, 229 P.3d 313, 336 (2010).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">While courts may impose consecutive terms of
imprisonment, “there exists a presumption that multiple terms of imprisonment
run concurrently, unless the court orders or the [applicable] statute mandates
that the terms run consecutively.” <i>Lewi v. State</i>, 145 Hawai'i 333, 350,
452 P.3d 330, 347 (2019). The sentencing court is required to explain the need
for consecutive sentences as opposed to the presumed concurrent sentence. <i>Id.</i>
at 351, 452 P.3d at 348.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Thus, a sentencing court must put on the record “a
meaningful rationale to the defendant, the victim, and the public” when imposing
consecutive terms of imprisonment. <i>State v. Hussein</i>, 122 Hawai'i 509,
229 P.3d at 327. When the sentencing court uses the same factors to justify
multiple consecutive sentences, it must still “specify . . . or identify another
basis for determining how many consecutive sentences to impose.” <i>Barrios</i>,
139 Hawai'i at 337, 389 P.3d at 932. A “clearly articulated rationale is
necessary when there is a large disparity between the maximum statutory
sentence for each offense and the aggregate consecutive sentence imposed by the
court.” <i>Id.</i> at 338, 389 P.3d at 933. This must be given for “each and
every consecutive sentence.” <i>State v. Sandoval</i>, 149 Hawai'i 221, 236,
487 P.3d 308, 323 (2021).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The sentencing court did not provide an adequate
basis for each consecutive sentence. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC held that the sentencing court did not
follow these “stringent” directives. The sentencing court’s rationale was that “perhaps”
fifteen years would protect the complaining witness and Bautista’s family. This
was<u> </u>not enough. The HSC noted that the rationale
“must be tethered to each consecutive sentence. The court acted as if it were
sentencing Bautista to one count with a potential range of 0 to 15 years.” The
HSC emphasized the need for “substantial and pointed reasons to justify a
consecutive sentence.” Reciting sentencing factors may sometimes work for
concurrent terms, but not consecutive ones. The HSC noted that the sentencing
court did not distinguish the three offenses and treated them all as a single
offense. “Stacking sentences after merely reciting a case’s circumstances is an
abuse of discretion.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">Finally, it noted that
consecutive terms are severe. “Our law requires a court to do much more than
express a desire to clip a person’s wings, and put them in a cage.” The HSC vacated
the judgment and remanded for resentencing.</span>B. Lowenthalhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13293689883439389796noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-844955418635981150.post-25206873831504543402023-06-27T11:02:00.002-10:002023-06-27T11:02:38.669-10:00Prosecuting a true threat requires at least a reckless state of mind<p><b style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Counterman v. Colorado </span></i></b><b style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">(SCOTUS June 27, 2023)</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Background.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> Billy Counterman was charged by Colorado
prosecutors for harassment and stalking. For two years, Billy Counterman sent a
local musician hundreds of messages on Facebook. Messages started with “A fine
display with your partner” and a “couple physical sightings” were sent to her. She
never responded. The messages took a turn: “Fuck off permanently.” “Staying in
cyber life is going to kill you.” “You’re not being good for human relations.
Die.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The musician got scared and believed her life was
in danger. She went to the authorities. Colorado has a statute criminalizing
repeated communications “that would cause a reasonable person to suffer serious
emotional distress and does cause that person . . . to suffer serious emotional
distress.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-602(1)(c). Counterman moved to dismiss on
the grounds that it was not a true threat under the First Amendment. Counterman
challenged the objective “reasonable person” standard and argued that the
statute’s failure to consider his subjective intent violated his freedom of
expression under the First Amendment. The trial court denied the motion. He was
found guilty at trial. The Colorado appellate court affirmed and the Colorado
Supreme Court denied review. Counterman petitioned to the Supreme Court of the
United States.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The Freedom of Speech and its limitations. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">“Congress shall make no law
. . . abridging the freedom of speech[.]” U.S. Const. Am. I. The First
Amendment is not absolute. “From 1791 to the present, . . . the First Amendment
<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>has permitted restrictions on the
content of speech in a few limited areas.” <i>United States v. Stevens</i>, 559
U.S. 460, 468 (2010). The limited restrictions are “historically unprotected
categories of speech as being of such slight social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest” in criminalizing them. <i>Id.</i> at 470. These limitations
lying outside the protections of the First Amendment include incitement, statements
“directed [at] producing imminent lawless action[,]” <i>Brandenburg v. Ohio</i>,
395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); defamation—false statements harming another’s
reputation, <i>Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.</i>, 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974), and
obscenity, valueless material that “appeals to the prurient interest” describing
“sexual conduct” in “a patently offensive way.” <i>Miller v. California</i>,
413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">A true threat lies outside the First Amendment and
can be criminalized, but only with <i>mens rea</i>. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">True threats of violence are
another category that do not enjoy First Amendment protections and can be
criminalized by the State. <i>Virginia v. Black</i>, 538 U.S. 434, 359 (2003). Here’s
how the majority today, written by Justice Elena Kagan, defined it:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The “true” in that term
distinguishes what is at issue from jests, “hyperbole,” or other statements
that when taken in context do not convey a real possibility that violence will
follow (say, “I am going to kill you for showing up late”). <i>Watts v. United States</i>,
394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (<i>per curiam</i>). True threats are “serious
expression[s]” conveying that a speaker means to “commit an act of unlawful
violence.” <i>Black</i>, 538 U.S. at 359. Whether the speaker is aware of, and
intends to convey, the threatening aspect of the message is not part of what
makes a statement a threat, as this Court recently explained. <i>See Elonis v.
United States</i>, 575 U.S. 723, 733 (2015). The existence of a threat depends
not on “the mental state of the author,” but on “what the statement conveys” to
the person on the other end. <i>Ibid.</i> When the statement is understood as a
true threat, all the harms that have long made threats unprotected naturally
follow. True threats subject individuals to “fear of violence” and to the many
kinds of “disruption that fear engenders.” <i>Black</i>, 538 U.S. at 360.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The SCOTUS held that a true threat requires the
prosecution to also establish some kind of <i>mens rea</i>, or state of mind,
when the defendant makes the threat. The SCOTUS explained that prohibitions on
speech can “chill, or deter, speech outside their boundaries:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">A speaker may be unsure about
the side of a line on which his speech falls. Or he may worry that the legal
system will err, and count speech that is permissible as instead not. Or he may
simply be concerned about the expense of becoming entangled in the legal
system. The result is “self-censorship” of speech that could not proscribed—a cautious
and restrictive exercise of the First Amendment freedoms.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The SCOTUS examined the other historical exceptions
to the First Amendment and found that most require some kind of state of mind
requirement. <i>New York Times v. Sullivan</i>, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964)
(malicious intent required in defamation action brought by public figure); <i>Hamling
v. United States</i>, 418 U.S. 87, 122-23 (1974) (defendant’s awareness that materials
were obscene is required); <i>Smith v. California</i>, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959)
(punishing distribution of obscene materials without regard to state of mind
has the “collateral effect of inhibiting” protected expression). The SCOTUS found
no reason to depart from this requirement when it comes to true threats:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The same reasoning counsels
in favor of requiring a subjective element in a true-threats case. This Court
again must consider the prospect of chilling non-threatening expressing, given
the ordinary citizen’s predictable tendency to steer wide of the unlawful zone.
The speaker’s fear of mistaking whether a statement is a threat; his fear of
the legal system getting that judgment wrong; his fear, in any event, of
incurring legal costs—all those may lead him to swallow words that are in fact
not true threats.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Thus, an objective standard—true threats based on
what a “reasonable person” would consider a true threat without consideration
of the speaker’s state of mind—discourages “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open
debate that the First Amendment is intended to protect.” <i>Rogers v. United
States</i>, 422 U.S. 35, 48 (1975) (Marshall, J. concurring).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Recklessness is good enough. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Having held that some kind
of state of mind requirement is needed to prosecute a true threat, the SCOTUS
examined what level is necessary. In the hierarchy of <i>mens rea</i> with intentional
(or as Justice Kagan called it, “purposeful”), knowing, recklessness, the SCOTUS
held that recklessness is adequate to prevent the chilling effect and at the
same time allow governments to protect those from being threatened.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">A person acts recklessly when the person “consciously
disregard[s] a substantial [and unjustifiable] risk that the conduct will cause
harm to another.” <i>Voisine v. United States</i>, 579 U.S. 686, 691 (2016).
The SCOTUS explained that the recklessness state of mind is adequate because it
requires proof that the defendant was aware of the impending harm, but made the
“deliberate decision to endanger another.” <i>Id.</i> at 694. In the context of
a threat, it means “a speaker is aware ‘that others could regard his statements
as’ threatening violence and ‘delivers them anyway.’” (quoting <i>Elonis</i>,
575 U.S. at 746 (Alito, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The SCOTUS vacated the judgment and remanded the
case back to Colorado. At trial, the State needed to only show that a
reasonable person would understand Counterman’s statements to be threats and “did
not have to show any awareness on his part that the statements could be understood
that way. For the reasons stated, that is a violation of the First Amendment.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> Justice Sotomayor agreed
that the judgment must be vacated and that a state of mind is required when
prosecuting a true threat. She suggests that recklessness is too low of a
standard:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">[T]his Court’s precedent,
along with historical statutes and cases, reflect a commonsense understanding
that threatening someone is an intentional act. As to what intent is needed,
traditionally, one intends certain consequences when he desires that his acts
cause those consequences or knows that those consequences are substantially
certain to result from his acts. This does not require showing that an individual
intends to carry through with the threat. But it does require showing that an
individual desires to threaten or is substantially certain that her statements
will be understood as threatening.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">While Justice Sotomayor joined the majority’s
holding that “some subjective <i>mens rea</i> is required” and that in this particular
case recklessness is “amply sufficient[,]” she disagreed with the general
holding that recklessness is sufficient for all true threat prosecutions. It was
unnecessary for the Court to establish recklessness as the standard in all true
threat cases. She was concerned about how even under the reckless standard,
people will be prosecuted wrongly:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Without sufficient
protection for unintentionally threatening speech, a high school student who is
still learning norms around appropriate language could easily go to prison for
sending another student violent music lyrics, or for unreflectingly using
language he read in an online forum. A drunken joke in bad taste can lead to
criminal prosecution. In the heat of the moment, someone may post an enraged comment
under a news story about a controversial topic. . . .<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">. . . .<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The burdens of overcriminalization will fall hardest on certain
groups. A jury’s determination of when angry hyperbole crosses the line will
depend on amorphous norms around language, which will vary greatly from one discursive
community to another. Juries’ decisions will reflect their background knowledge
and media consumption. . . . Members of certain groups, including religious and
cultural minorities, can also use language that is more susceptible to being
misinterpreted by outsiders. And unfortunately yet predictably, radical and
cultural stereotypes can also influence whether speech is perceived as
dangerous. See, <i>e.g.</i>, A. Dunbar, C. Kurbin, & N. Scurich, The Threatening
Nature of “Rap” Music, 22 J. Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 281, 281-282, 288-290
(2016).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">For Justice Sotomayor, under the recklessness
standard, “there will be some speech that some find threatening that will not
and should not land anyone in prison.” In sum, she wrote that the Court did not
have to adopt a general standard, but if it did, it should have been
intentional conduct. “Our society has often concluded that an intent standard
sets a proper balance between safety and the need for a guilty mind, even in
cases that do not involve the First Amendment. Surely when the power of the
State is called upon to imprison someone based on the content of their words
alone, this standard cannot be considered excessive.” Justice Gorsuch joined.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Justice Barrett’s dissent.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> Justice Amy Coney Barrett
dissented. She would have upheld the conviction and found no need to establish
a subjective test of any kind. True threats lie outside the protections of the
First Amendment and putting on a state of mind “unjustifiably grants true
threats preferential treatment[.]”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The bottom line is this:
Counterman communicated true threats, which everyone agrees, lie outside the
bounds of the First Amendment’s protection. He knew what the words meant. Those
threats caused the victim to fear for her life, and they upended her daily
existence. Nonetheless, the Court concludes that Counterman can prevail on a
First Amendment defense. Nothing in the Constitution compels that result. I respectfully
dissent.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Justice Thomas joined.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Justice Thomas’ dissent.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> Justice Thomas wrote separately
to point out his intense dislike for <i>New York Times v. Sullivan</i>, 376
U.S. 254 (1964). He berated it as a “policy-driven decision[] masquerading as
constitutional law.” <i>McKee v. Cosby</i>, 586 U.S. __, __ (2019) (Thomas, J.
concurring in denial of certiorari). He once again asked to reconsider that
case.<o:p></o:p></span></p>B. Lowenthalhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13293689883439389796noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-844955418635981150.post-84599446328016354852023-04-07T08:58:00.003-10:002023-04-07T08:58:59.825-10:00Reimbursement of costs associated with prostitution are not “profits” under the promoting statute<p> <b style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">State v. Ibarra </span></i></b><b style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">(HSC March 15, 2023)</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Background.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> Paola Ibarra was charged with sex trafficking and
kidnapping with a male co-defendant Gustavo Ferreira. At trial, Ibarra and the
complainant testified they flew from Oakland, California to Honolulu on
Halloween. He paid for their airfare and hotel in Waikiki. The complainant
testified that they were going there for her to “strip and dance” and that she
was going to repay Ibarra for the airfare and hotel as she made money in Hawai'i.
Ibarra called it a “paycation,” in which they were getting paid while being on
vacation. The complainant’s friend, Samantha King, testified that the complainant
was “fully” aware she was going to Hawai'i to engage in prostitution in
addition to stripping and dancing.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">They get to Hawai'i and Ibarra puts out prostitution
advertisements for the complainant on the website Backpage. He posted
photographs of the complainant. The complainant testified she brought two cell
phones and set her own prices for prostitution dates. Ibarra testified she
would go on the dates together for safety but did not engage in sex acts with
customers. The complainant testified she went on two or three of these dates.
She testified that it was her choice to answer the phone, make dates, set
prices, and engage in sexual acts for money. She was not scared of Ibarra and
had a good time in Hawai'i.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">That changed when Ferreira joined them on November
3. The complainant testified that “the vibe chang[ed].” All money went directly
to him after that. The jury found Ibarra guilty of the included offense of
promoting prostitution in violation of HRS § 712-1203(1). Ibarra moved for a
judgment of acquittal after the verdict or a new trial as an alternative.
Ibarra argued that there was insufficient evidence showing that that she “advanced”
or “profited” from the prostitution as defined in HRS § 712-1201(1). The circuit
court, with the Honorable Judge Shirley M. Kawamura presiding, denied the motion.
Ibarra was sentenced to probation and required to register as a sex offender.
She appealed and the ICA affirmed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Promoting prostitution requires proof of advancing
or profiting from prostitution.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> The issue came down to interpreting the prosecution
statutes. A person commits the offense of promoting prostitution when the
person “knowingly advances or profits from prostitution.” HRS § 712-1203(1).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">A person “advances
prostitution” if, acting other than as a prostitute or patron of a prostitute,
the person knowingly causes or aids a person to commit or engage in
prostitution, procures or solicits patrons for prostitution, provides persons
for prostitution purposes, permits premises to be regularly used for
prostitution purposes, operates or assists in the operation of a house of
prostitution or a prostitution enterprise, or engages in any other conduct
designed to institute, aid, or facilitate an act or enterprise of prostitution.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">HRS § 712-1201(1).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The issue was whether there was sufficient
evidence that Ibarra “profited” from the complainant’s prostitution. A person “profits”
when the person “accepts or receives money or other property pursuant to an
agreement or understanding with any person whereby the person participates or
is to participate in the proceeds of prostitution activity.” HRS § 712-1201(2).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Reimbursement is not “profiting” from prostitution.
</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC held
that the circuit court erred in finding that fronting the expenses of the airfare
and hotel and being reimbursed was “profiting.” According to the HSC, the
circuit court did not take into account the term “profit,” which means “a
valuable return,” “gain,” or “the excess of returns over expenditure in a
transaction or series of transactions.” HRS § 712-1201(2). The HSC explained
there must be some kind of benefit or receipt of something of value for it to
be a “profit.” According to the HSC, reimbursement is not a “profit.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC buttressed this holding by examining the legislative
intent of HRS §§ 712-1203 and 712-1201. Courts can look to legislative intent “in
order to discern the underlying policy [that] the legislature sought to
promulgate in the enactment of the statute.” <i>O’Grady v. State</i>, 141 Hawai'i
26, 28, 404 P.3d 292, 294 (2017). The legislative history revealed that the
statute is aimed at criminalizing “traffickers and pimps” who benefit most from
prostitution.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">“Profiting” also requires an “agreement or
understanding.”</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">
The HSC also took issue with the words “agreement or understanding” in HRS §
712-1201(2). The “understanding” between Ibarra and the complainant was that
the complainant would reimburse Ibarra for the airfare and hotel rooms and that
Ibarra knew she would get reimbursed. There was no “agreement or understanding”
that Ibarra would benefit from the prostitution. And so the HSC reversed the
conviction because the circuit court should have granted the motion for a
judgment of acquittal.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Chief Justice Recktenwald’s dissent.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> The Chief Justice believed
that the plain language and legislative history of HRS §§ 712-1201(2) and
712-1203 penalizes any agreement or understanding to receive proceeds from
prostitution—whether it was for reimbursement or not. He also worried about the
ramifications of the majority’s interpretation:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Considering the dynamic of
economic coercion in trafficking relationships, I am concerned that the
majority’s interpretation unintentionally creates a safe harbor for traffickers
who have extended a loan or a service to their victims but have not yet “profited”
from the arrangement.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The Chief Justice cited the “general rule of
construction” that courts “are bound to follow legislative definitions of terms
rather than commonly accepted dictionary, judicial or scientific definitions.” <i>State
v. Kantner</i>, 53 Haw. 327, 329, 493 P.2d 306, 308 (1972). The Legislature
defined “profits from prosecution” to mean accepting or receiving property
based on an agreement or understanding to share those proceeds from another’s
prostitution. This definition, according to the CJ, broadens the term “profit”
to include reimbursements. Justice Nakayama joined.<o:p></o:p></span></p>B. Lowenthalhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13293689883439389796noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-844955418635981150.post-71525700546911102492023-04-06T21:29:00.001-10:002023-04-06T21:29:06.247-10:00Five different and unrelated cases are still one “sentence” and credit for time served applies to all five, not each individual case<p> <b style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">State v. Vaden </span></i></b><b style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">(HSC March 15, 2023)</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Background.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> Jonathan Vaden was on probation when he was
prosecuted for five separate criminal cases alleging various drug and property
offenses. After spending several months in jail, Vaden pleaded no contest to
every offense except for a class A drug offense. The parties waived a presentence
(PSI) report and the circuit court of the second circuit—with the Honorable
Judge Richard T. Bissen, Jr. presiding—did not order one. Vaden was sentenced
to four years probation in each case with the condition that he complete the
Maui Drug Court Program. He petitioned into the program by having his probation
revoked and resentenced to a new term of probation.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">He was ultimately terminated from the program. His
probation was revoked and he was resentenced to prison. He was sentenced to 5
years prison for the felonies, 1 year for the misdemeanors, and 30 days for the
petty misdemeanors in the four unrelated cases. Those counts and cases ran
concurrently to each other. In this case there was a class B felony. He was
sentenced to 10 years in that, 5 years in the other felony count, and 1 year in
the misdemeanor. Those counts ran concurrently to each other, but consecutively
to the four unrelated cases. The total came to 15 years. The resentencing order
did not identify the credit he had served in any case and the Department of
Public Safety did not give the court the certificates of detention showing his
credit.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">He was credited 340 days against the four
unrelated cases and 1 days for the 10-year sentence. Vaden moved to correct the
credit calculation and argued that he was entitled to the credit that had
accrued in the 10-year sentence because it accrued simultaneously with the four
unrelated cases. The motion was denied. Vaden appealed and the ICA affirmed. He
petitioned for a writ of certiorari.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">A note about PSI reports. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC took issue with
the waived PSI report. It noted that these reports have “many uses in the
criminal justice process.” <i>State v. Carlton</i>, 146 Hawai'i 16, 27, 455
P.3d 356, 367 (2019). It gives victims and their families an opportunity to be
heard. HRS § 706-604(3). The Hawai'i Paroling Authority uses it to determine
the minimum term of imprisonment. HRS § 706-669(2). Probation officers and
mental health professionals conducting court-ordered assessments get it too.
HRS §§ 806-73(b)(3)(F) & 806-73(b)(3)(C). The HSC noted that waiving a PSI
may be appropriate when a recent pre-existing one has been made, “trial courts
should not consent to their waiver as a matter of course” pursuant to HRS § 706-601(3).
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">And about certificates of detention. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC also took issue
with the lack of a certificate of detention from DPS. DPS is required to
provide the sentencing court with a certificate showing how long the defendant
was in custody. HRS § 706-671(1). A certificate is also required when the defendant
is resentenced in the same case. HRS § 706-671(2). That did not happen here.
The HSC observed that this is particularly problematic because the calculation
may be wrong.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The types of jail credit. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Jail credit is determined
by HRS § 706-671:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">(1) When a defendant who is
sentenced to imprisonment has previously been detained in any State or local
correctional or other institution following the defendant’s arrest for the
crime for which sentence is imposed, such period of detention following the
defendant’s arrest shall be deducted from the minimum and maximum terms of such
sentence. . . .<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">(2) When a judgment of
conviction or a sentence is . . . vacated and a new sentence is thereafter imposed
upon the defendant for the same crime, the period of detention and imprisonment
theretofore served shall be deducted from the minimum and maximum terms of the
new sentence. . . .<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC noted that HRS § 706-671(1) controls
credit for detention time from arrest to the initial sentence. Subsection (2)
credits time served as part of the sentence. It applies when a defendant serves
time pursuant to probation that is later revoke. <i>State v. Delima</i>, 78 Hawai'i
343, 348, 893 P.2d 194, 199 (1995). According to the HSC, the 340 days at issue
are three different time periods: time served from arrest to the initial
sentencing, which is governed by HRS § 706-671(1); time served under probation controlled
by subsection (2); and time served from reassert for violating the Drug Court
Program and resentencing, which is also under subsection (1).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">There court must credit the “aggregate” once
across all five cases. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">When the issue is determining credit under HRS § 706-671(1), “credit
for presentence imprisonment is properly granted against only the aggregate of
the consecutive sentence terms.” <i>State v. Tauiliili</i>, 96 Hawai'i 195, 199,
29 P.3d 914, 918 (2001). The HSC held that this case remains good law and that
Vaden is entitled to credit just once against the aggregate of later imposed
consecutive sentences.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC rejected Vaden’s argument that he was
entitled to credit for this case and that it cannot be transferred to the four
other cases. <i>See State v. March</i>, 94 Hawai'i 250, 255, 11 p.3d 1094, 1099
(2000). The HSC held that nothing in the plain text of HRS § 706-671(1)
suggests he is entitled to what the HSC called “double dipping.” The HSC noted
that term “sentence” in the jail credit statute could refer to more than one
case:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The statute’s use of the
singular “sentence” reflects the fact that the word may refer not only to a
particular term of incarceration imposed for a conviction on a single criminal
count, but also to the sum of the terms of incarceration and other penalties imposed
on a defendant for their crimes. Multiple consecutive sentences are really just
one sentence.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">That meant that Vaden already received credit for
this case. It was credited against the four unrelated cases as part of a single
sentence. The HSC applied the same meaning for subsection (2) with credit for
time served from an earlier sentence. The HSC also noted that crediting against
each individual case would be unfair and curb the sentencing court’s ability to
impose consecutive sentences. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">For instance, if a defendant
commits five misdemeanors in five separate cases and serves one year before
sentencing, they would receive five years of credit if the court imposes consecutive
statutory maximum terms (one year for each misdemeanor). In that situation, the
defendant would ultimately serve no additional jail time, and the court’s
decision to impose consecutive would be pointless.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Not a Double Jeopardy problem either. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">No person<b> </b>“subject
for the same offence” shall not be “twice put in jeopardy of life or limb[.]”
U.S. Const. Art. V. <i>See also </i>Haw. Const. Art. I, Sec. 10. Double
Jeopardy “protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.” <i>North
Carolina v. Pearce</i>, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). This requires that the “punishment
already exacted must be fully ‘credited’ in imposing sentence upon a new
conviction for the same offense.” <i>Id.</i> at 718-719.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC rejected Vaden’s constitutional argument.
If Vaden’s jail time accrued on probation was vacated and if the trial court
refused to credit that time against a sentence imposed for a “new conviction
for the same offense,” there would be a Double Jeopardy violation. That, according
to the HSC, is not what happened. His 340 days were served before sentencing
and his probation was not vacated, but revoked. Moreover, the HSC noted that
his constitutional rights would only be at issue if the “total punishment”
exceeded the statutory maximum—that would be 21 years, not the concurrent 10.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Justice Wilson’s Dissent. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Justice Wilson wrote a
lengthy dissent.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Based on the plain
language of the statutory provisions, Vaden’s presentence detention time and
probation incarceration time should be deducted from <u>each</u> of the
five-year and ten-year sentences comprising his fifteen-year consecutive
sentence, rather than just once from the aggregate fifteen-year consecutive
sentence. The Majority’s misinterpretation of the credit due Vaden for his
previous incarceration improperly extends Vaden’s sentence by failing to deduct
340 days credit from Vaden’s ten-year sentence. Depriving Vaden of credit toward
each of the offenses . . . contravenes important Hawai'i public policy,
codified in HRS § 353L-3(b), to reduce the State’s incarceration population.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Justice Wilson explained that the jail credit
statute refers to a single sentence and the entitlement of credit for time
served. It makes no distinction between concurrent and consecutive sentences. “Respectfully,
the language required to reach [the Majority’s] result is ringingly absent from
the statute’ plain terms.” The Majority, according to Justice Wilson, is
fixated on <i>Tauiliili</i>, and not the language of the statute itself, and
the case should be overruled. He also took issue with the fact that the “Majority
increases the period of incarceration for all defendants receiving a consecutive
sentence who have been held in custody prior to imposition of a consecutive
sentence.” The Legislature has addressed the impact of mass incarceration in Hawai'i
and the need to reduce the incarcerated population. HRS § 353L-3(b). This
mandate to reduce the inmate population should have been considered when
interpreting the jail credit statute. “Inventing an exception to preclude
credit for time served in the context of consecutive sentencing perpetuates
overincarceration, and defies the legislature’s mandate to reduce the
population of incarcerated individuals in Hawai'i.” He would have awarded the
jail credit in this case. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Moreover, the plea agreement in which the
defendant agreed to consecutive terms if he did not complete Drug Court was
unlawful and unenforceable. He would have also vacated and remanded for
resentencing entirely to consider the factors of HRS § 706-606. Justice McKenna
joined.<o:p></o:p></span></p>B. Lowenthalhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13293689883439389796noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-844955418635981150.post-75306153511578142452023-04-02T21:03:00.005-10:002023-04-03T13:27:18.432-10:00HSC overrules a nine-month-old case and goes back to the bright-line rule to determine “custody” in custodial interrogation<p> <b style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">State v. Hewitt </span></i></b><b style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">(HSC March 15, 2023)</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Background.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> Hawai'i County Officer Chandler Nancio and another officer were
called to the Kona Community Hospital in the middle of the night to see a
possible victim of assault. An unknown man dropped Cyrina Hewitt off at the
emergency room. He found Hewitt awake with contusions on her face, her eyes
were swollen shut, a laceration was on her ear, and she had a broken breast
plate. She was disoriented and “rambling incoherently.” She did not know where
she was or why she as in the hospital.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Officer Nancio waited for the nurse to treat her
and then asked for her name and birth date. He stayed at her bedside and asked
her questions about how she got her injuries. Hewitt at first said she had
pink-eye, but then said it was a stye. Then paramedics came by and asked what
was going on. The paramedics said that they saw a truck’s taillights sticking
out of the bushes on the side of the road.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Sgt. Mekia Rose followed up on the truck and found
it near the intersection of Queen Kaahumanu Highway and Kuakini Highway. It had damages
to the front and its airbags were deployed. Sgt. Rose found Hewitt’s
identification card in the truck and texted a photo of the card to Officer
Nancio. Officer Nancio asked Hewitt if she was involved in an accident. She
said yes and said she was driving that night. Officer Nancio stopped
questioning her and arrested her under suspicion of operating a vehicle while
under the influence of an intoxicant. Officer Nancio and none of the other
officers at the scene advised Hewitt about her <i>Miranda </i>rights before
questioning her at the hospital. They also did not tell her if she was free to
remain silent, leave, or terminate the conversation. She was subjected to a blood
draw without a warrant. Officer Nancio also learned Hewitt had a suspended
license.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Hewitt was charged with operating a vehicle while
under the influence of an intoxicant and driving without a license. She moved
to suppress her statement and the blood draw, but the district court—with the
Hon. Margaret K. Masunaga presiding—denied the motion. She was convicted of
both offenses and appealed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><a href="http://hawaiiopinions.blogspot.com/2021/02/when-warrantless-blood-draws-still.html" target="_blank">The ICA vacated the conviction</a> not on <i>Miranda </i>grounds
but on the grounds that the warrantless blood draw violated Hewitt’s
constitutional rights. Hewitt petitioned for a writ of certiorari to address
whether she was in custody for <i>Miranda </i>purposes. The HSC accepted certiorari.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><br /></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">A procedural wrinkle: the HSC retained appellate
jurisdiction after the dismissal. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">After the HSC accepted cert, the prosecution
contacted Hewitt’s counsel and offered to dismiss the case with prejudice if
she withdrew the appeal. Hewitt moved for a temporary remand to the district
court. The HSC granted the motion and remanded the case for 30 days, after
which it would resume in the Supreme Court. On remand, the prosecution moved to
“nolle prosequi” with prejudice. Nolle prosequi is short for dicit nolle prosequi,
meaning that the government will no longer prosecute. <i>King v. Robertson</i>,
6 Haw. 718 (King. 1889).<i> </i>The district court—with the Hon. Judge Robert
Crudele presiding—granted the motion. When the case resumed in the HSC, Hewitt
moved to set aside oral argument or clarify the status of the case. The motion
was denied.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The HSC explained that a judgment of nolle prosequi
did not terminate the certiorari proceeding. The HSC retained jurisdiction<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 1in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">[t]o make . . . such . . .
orders . . . and do such other acts and take such other steps as may be necessary
to carry into full effect the powers which are or shall be given to it by law
or for the promotion of justice in matters pending before it.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">HRS § 602-5(a)(6). The HSC’s remand order specifically
noted that the court would resume proceedings after the remand. Thus, the HSC
retained appellate jurisdiction after the remand.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The <i>Miranda </i>issue is moot, but the
public-interest exception applies. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Unlike federal courts, prudential concerns of
judicial governance like mootness and ripeness are not set in stone. <i>See
Trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Yamasaki</i>, 69 Haw. 154, 737
P.2d 466 (1987). A moot point does not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction.
<i>Tax Foundation v. State</i>, 144 Hawai'i 175, 177, 439 P.3d 127 (2019).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Even though the issue is moot, courts have
recognized the public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine. <i>State v.
Kiese</i>, 126 Hawai'i 494, 509, 273 P.3d 1180, 1195 (2012). The HSC held that
this exception applies here. The ICA issued a published opinion in which it
held that there was no <i>Miranda </i>violation. A nolle prosequi of the case
would not change the fact that the ICA’s analysis is precedential and would
remain the law of the land. The HSC held that under these circumstances, the
public interest exception applies. The HSC noted that allowing the prosecution
to nolle prosequi charges after a favorable ICA opinion in exchange for Hewitt’s
dismissal of the appeal would result in the loss of precedential value of
judicial decisions from the HSC, cause a diminished respect for the judicial
process, allow the parties to obtain dismissals as a matter of right and could
encourage the prosecution to delay offers until after certiorari is accepted,
and places the defense of the integrity of the judicial decisions in the hands
of the litigants, not the court.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The <i>Miranda </i>issue hinges on whether Hewitt
was “in custody.” </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of
the Hawai'i Constitution guarantee that no person “shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself[.]” To ensure that this
constitutional right is safeguarded, suspects must be apprised of their constitutional
rights before they are subjected to a custodial interrogation.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 1in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The <i>Miranda </i>rule
is, at core, a constitutionally prescribed rule of evidence that requires the
prosecution to lay a sufficient foundation—i.e., that the requisite warnings
were administered and validly waived before the accused gave the statement
sought to be adduced at trial—before it may adduce evidence of a defendant’s
custodial statements that stem from interrogation during [their] criminal
trial.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 1in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> The prosecution’s burden of establishing that the requisite
warnings were given, however, is not triggered unless the totality of the circumstances
reflect that the statement it seeks to adduce at trial was obtained as a result
of “custodial interrogation,” which, as the United States Supreme Court defined
it in <i>Miranda</i>, consists of “questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of [their]
freedom of action in any significant way.” In other words, the defendant,
objecting to the admissibility of [their] statement and, thus, seeking to
suppress it, must establish that [their] statement was the result of (1) “interrogation”
that occurred while [they were] (2) “in custody.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">State v. Wallace</span></i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">, 105 Hawai'i 131, 137, 94 P.3d 1257, 1281
(2004).<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><br /></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The HSC overrules the 9-month old “clarification”
of what constitutes being “in custody.” </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The HSC’s standard for what constitutes being “in
custody” for <i>Miranda </i>purposes is a bright-line rule:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 1in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">[A] person is “in custody”
for purposes of Article I, Section 10 of the Hawai'i Constitution if an
objective assessment of the totality of the circumstances reflects either (1)
that the person has become impliedly accused of committing a crime because the
questions of the police have become sustained and coercive, such that they are
no longer reasonably designed briefly to confirm or dispel their reasonable suspicion
or (2) that the point of arrest has arrived because either (a) probable cause
to arrest has developed or (b) the police have subjected the person to an
unlawful “de facto” arrest without probable cause to do so.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Ketchum</span></i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">, 97 Hawai'i 107, 126, 34 P.3d 1006, 1025 (2001).
Nine months before this opinion, the majority in <a href="http://hawaiiopinions.blogspot.com/2022/06/hsc-restates-custody-in-custodial.html" target="_blank"><i>State v. Sagapolutele-Silva</i>,
151 Hawai'i 283, 511 p.3d 782 (2022)</a>, “clarified” this standard and held that
the existence of probable cause is just one factor in the totality of the circumstances
test. <i>Id.</i> at 291, 511 P.3d at 390. The HSC overruled <i>Sagapolutele-Silva</i>.
The rule in <i>Ketchum</i>, according to this HSC, gave a “clear, easily
applied, bright-line rule: when probable cause to arrest exists upon an initial
stop or detention, the Hawai'i constitution requires that <i>Miranda </i>rights
be given before ‘interrogation’ occurs.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The HSC noted that bright-line rules “foster
uniformity and predictability.” <i>See </i>Antonin Scalia, <i>The Rule of Law
as a Law of Rules</i>, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1179 (1989). Simply put, bright-line
rules are preferable. Here, the HSC held that probable cause to arrest Hewitt certainly
arose when Sgt. Rose discovered Hewitt’s identification card in the truck, but
Hewitt was “in custody” at an earlier time due to a different reason.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Based on the totality of the circumstances, Hewitt
was already “in custody” even before probable cause arose. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Having re-established the
bright-line rule of probable cause to determine “custody,” the HSC also
observed that a person can be in “custody” before probable cause arises. “Whether
the defendant was in custody or otherwise deprived of [their] freedom of action
for <i>Miranda </i>purposes is to be determined from the totality of the
circumstances, objectively appraised.” <i>State v. Patterson</i>, 59 Haw. 357,
361, 581 P.2d 752, 755 (1978). These circumstances include the place and time
of the interrogation, length of the interrogation, nature of the questions, and
the conduct of the police. <i>Id.</i><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Receiving medical treatment is a relevant circumstance
to consider for “custody.” </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">When a person is questioned while confined to a hospital bed
or receiving medical treatment is a relevant circumstance to determine “custody.”
“When an individual is unable to ‘leave’ the place of interrogation solely due
to circumstances incident to medical treatment, the question is said to be
slightly different: whether [they were] at liberty to terminate the interrogation
and ‘cause the [officers] to leave.” <i>United States v. Infante</i>, 701 F.3d
386, 396 (1st Cir. 2012). The HSC adopted more or less the First Circuit’s
approach for the Hawai'i Constitution:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 1in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">We hold that, under the Hawai'i
Constitution, if a person is unable to leave a place of interrogation due to
circumstances incident to medical treatment, determining whether the person is “in
custody” under a totality of circumstances requires an inquiry into whether the
person was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and cause the officer(s)
to leave.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Here, Hewitt was in a hospital bed and was
injured. She was disoriented. Officers stood at her bedside for three hours.
She was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and cause them to leave. The
HSC applied the other factors from <i>Patterson</i>. It held that Hewitt was in
custody and should have been <i>Mirandized</i>.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Justice Nakayama’s Dissent. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Justice Nakayama disagreed
that Hewitt was in custody before there was probable cause to arrest. She took
issue with the fact that the police were there to investigate a possible
assault and suspected that Hewitt might have been the victim. She wrote that “police
officers should not be discouraged from investigating a possible assault when
they are called to do so.” Under these circumstances, Justice Nakayama believed
that she was not “in custody.” Chief Justice Recktenwald joined.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">A note. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">This case overrules <i>Sagapolutele-Silva</i>,
an opinion that came out about nine months before this one. In that case, the
majority constituted, the CJ, Justice Nakayama, and Circuit Court Judge Paul
Wong, who was assigned by reason of a vacancy. Justices McKenna and Wilson
dissented there. In this case, the majority constituted Justices McKenna,
Wilson, and Eddins. Justice McKenna wrote the opinion.</span>B. Lowenthalhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13293689883439389796noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-844955418635981150.post-25993833860147225912023-04-02T08:10:00.002-10:002023-04-02T08:10:35.758-10:00Dissecting when sentencing court can set discretionary terms of probation and when they can be enforced<p> <b style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">State v. Talo </span></i></b><b style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">(HSC March 15, 2023)</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Background.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> Logovii Talo was charged with assault in the
second degree after punching an employee at the Rent-A-Center in Wahiawa and
causing a concussion. There were no weapons involved. Talo pleaded no contest
to the charge and was sentenced to probation. One of the terms and conditions
of probation required him to submit at reasonable times to a search of his
person, residence, vehicle, or other property under his control by any probation
officer without a warrant based on reasonable suspicion that illicit substances
or “contraband” may be in that place. He was also prohibited from owning or
possessing firearms or ammunition.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Two years later, Talo’s wife, Jenifer applied for restraining
orders against Talo. She averred that he may own or possess a weapon. The
applications were dissolved. Months after that, the police called the probation
office and told the supervisor that Jenifer reported that Talo had a gun.
Probation started to investigate a possible probation violation. They
ultimately decided to conduct a warrantless search of the Talo’s house. It would
take approximately another two months to execute the search. Probation found a
gun wrapped in a lavalava under the mattress of Talo’s bed. They found
ammunition in the same room. The gun and ammunition were given to the police
because the probation office did not have the means to store the weapons. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The prosecution moved to revoke Talo’s probation. At
the hearing on the motion, Talo moved to suppress the firearm and ammunition on
the grounds that the search was really subterfuge for an independent police
investigation. The motion to suppress was denied, the motion to revoke was
granted, and the circuit court—with the Hon. Judge Karen T. Nakasone presiding,
sentenced Talo to five years of imprisonment. Talo appealed. The ICA affirmed.
Talo petitioned to the HSC. The HSC then requested supplementary briefing on
the issue of whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in allowing
probation to conduct warrantless searches based on reasonable suspicion.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The sentencing court’s discretionary power to
impose conditions of probation. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC began its analysis by restating the cases
that allow probation officers to conduct warrantless searches. Empowering
probation officers to search without a warrant must be balanced against the defendant’s
constitutional rights. <i>State v. Fields</i>, 67 Haw. 268, 279, 686 P.2d 1379,
1388 (1984). Defendants on probation still have the right to privacy—albeit a
more diminished one. <i>Id.</i> at 277, 686 P.2d at 1387. The probation
condition must contribute to the rehabilitation of the defendant. <i>Id.</i> at
278, 686 P.2d at 1387. Probation officers have a unique interest in invading
the defendant’s privacy to monitor them and help them safely reenter the
community. <i>Id.</i> at 280, 686 P.2d at 1388. Even if there is a legitimate basis
to empower probation officers to conduct warrantless searches, the search must
still be based on “specific and articulable facts giving rise to a reasonable
suspicion that illicit drugs are concealed on the person, in the property, or
at the place of residence[.]” <i>Id.</i> at 281, 686 P.2d 1389.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Later, this condition was codified in HRS §
706-624(2)(q) as a discretionary condition of probation. When imposing a
discretionary term of probation, the sentencing court must have “a factual
basis in the record indicating that such conditions are reasonably related to
the factors set forth in HRS § 706-606 and insofar as such conditions involve
only deprivations of liberty or property that they are reasonably necessary for
the purposes indicated in HRS § 706-606(2).” <i>State v. Kahawai</i>, 103 Hawai'i
462, 462-463, 83 P.3d 725, 725-726 (2004).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">There are notice requirements too. Probation cannot
be revoked unless and until the prosecution can established that the defendant
received written notice of the condition at issue pursuant to HRS § 706-624(3).
Moreover, the written notice requirement is intended to provide defendants of
notice of what is expected. <i>State v. Lee</i>, 10 Haw. App. 192, 198, 862
P.2d 295, 298 (1993).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC examined probationary searches again in <i>State
v. Propios</i>, 76 Hawai'i 474, 879 P.2d 1057 (1994). There, the HSC held that
the search was unlawful because its true purpose was to obtain evidence for a
future criminal prosecution. <i>Id.</i> at 487, 879 P.2d at 1070.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The sentencing court did not abuse its discretion
in imposing the search condition. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">A discretionary condition of probation must be
reasonably related to the factors in HRS § 706-606. HRS § 706-624(2). <i>See also
Kahawai</i>, 103 Hawai'i at 462-463, 83 P.3d at 725-726. In this case, the HSC rejected
Talo’s argument that the search condition was not reasonably related. Talo was
convicted of a felony and a “crime of violence” as defined in HRS § 134-1. That
meant he could not own, possess, or control a firearm or ammunition. HRS §
134-7(b).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The facts of the assault in the second-degree
conviction were beside the point. The condition as reasonably related to “protecting
the public from further crimes by Talo involving firearms.” The factual basis
in the record supporting this condition is the fact that he is convicted of a
felony and a crime of violence.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">There was adequate notice that probation could
search for “contraband.” </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC examined the language of the condition in the
judgment:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Submit at reasonable times
to a search of your person, residence, vehicle, or other sites and property
under your control by any probation officer, with or without a warrant, based
on reasonable suspicion that illicit substance(s) or other contraband, may be
in the place(s) of your search. Any illicit substance(s) or contraband found or
observed in search a search may be seized[.]<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC held that this condition standing alone
does not satisfy the notice requirements in HRS § 706-624(3) and <i>Lee</i> even
though the word “contraband” is not clear:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">“Contraband” could include
firearms, child pornography, illegal fireworks, military equipment, or even
endangered animals kept as pets, just to name a few examples. Hence, special condition
Q does not provide sufficient notice to a person on probation as to what “contraband”
the person is prohibited from possessing so as to “enable the [person] to
comply with the conditions accordingly.” HRS § 706-624(3).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC, however, examined other conditions of
probation and noted the clear warning in another condition that prohibited Talo
from possessing firearms and ammunition. Read together, that provided him with lawful
notice.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Pornography, fireworks, and nene geese.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> The HSC whittled down a
lot of the discretionary conditions in the judgment. It noted that there was no
factual basis to impose drug conditions—that is the prohibition of possessing,
use, or consuming drugs and drug testing—because nothing in the record justified
as required in <i>Kahawai</i>. The HSC also held that the term “contraband” was
too vague to give adequate notice as required in HRS § 706-624(3) and <i>Lee</i>.
But for the other condition prohibited the possession of firearms and
ammunition, it would not have passed muster.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Chief Justice Recktenwald’s concurrence and
dissent. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The
Chief Justice would have gone further. He agreed that the condition allowing
the search complies with HRS § 706-624(2) and the requirement in <i>Kahawai</i>
as it relates to firearms and ammunition. The CJ wrote separately because he
disagreed with the majority’s reasoning. For him, the search condition should
be available for any crime—not just felonies or crimes of violence. He also
disagreed that the term “contraband” is ambiguous and vague. It simply means “goods
that are unlawful to import, export, produce, or posses.” <i>Black’s Law
Dictionary</i> (11th ed. 2019). There is no other way to read it. <i>See Farmer
v. Admin. Dir. Of Court, State of Haw.</i>, 94 Hawai'i 232, 236, 11 P.3d 457, 461
(2000) (a term is ambiguous when it could be understood in “two or more
different senses.”).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">He was joined by Judge Clarissa Y. Malinao, who was
assigned Justice Nakayama’s seat on this case because she had to recuse
herself. <o:p></o:p></span></p>B. Lowenthalhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13293689883439389796noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-844955418635981150.post-52079297603359835822023-04-01T21:27:00.001-10:002023-04-07T08:18:53.532-10:00Anonymous jurors was harmless error, but standardized instructions on extended term sentencing was erroneous<p> <b style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">State v. Lafoga </span></i></b><b style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">(HSC March 15, 2023)</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Background.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> Brandon Lafoga and Ranier Ines were indicted. Lafoga
was charged with attempted murder in the second degree, conspiracy to commit
murder in the second degree, carrying or use of a firearm while in the
commission of a separate felony, kidnapping, and prohibited ownership of a firearm
and ammunition. Ines was charged as an accomplice to attempted murder in the second
degree, conspiracy to commit murder, and robbery in the first degree.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The circuit court—with the Hon. Judge Paul Wong
presiding—ruled that the jury would be “innominate.” That is, everyone would
refer to the prospective jurors by number, and not by name. the parties would
conceal the jurors’ identifying information like their name, phone number, and
address. The court alone had that information. Both the prosecution and defense
counsel objected. The judge explained that in the past he encountered anxious
jurors who would be too afraid to serve. The court compromised by allowing
counsel for the parties to know the names of jurors, but not their addresses or
phone numbers. The parties were also prohibited from saying the jurors’ names
on the record. No further objections were made.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">After a trial—<a href="http://hawaiiopinions.blogspot.com/2022/05/anonymous-jurors-rule-48-reset-no.html" target="_blank">and the facts in that trial can be found here</a>—the jury found Lafoga guilty of attempted murder, use of a firearm
in a separate kidnapping, kidnapping, and being a felon in possession of a firearm.
They also found that the kidnaping merged with attempted murder. The kidnapping
charge was dismissed. Ines was found guilty of accomplice to attempted murder,
kidnapping, and robbery in the first degree. The kidnapping and robbery counts
also merged with the accomplice to attempted murder count and were dismissed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Jurors remained for the extended hearing portion
of trial. The jury had to determine if extending their sentences from life with
the possibility of parole to life without parole (LWOP) was “necessary for the
protection of the public.” HRS §§ 706-662 and 706-664. The court’s instructions
informed the jury that if extended, their sentences would go from “a possible
life term of imprisonment to a definite life term of imprisonment.” There was
no reference to parole. Both defendants objected on the grounds that “definite”
was confusing and urged the court to provide instructions on the parole
process. Their instructions were refused. The jury found the facts necessary to
extend the sentence. The circuit court extended their sentences to LWOP. Lafoga
received consecutive LWOP sentences making it the harshest in Hawai'i history.
Both defendants appealed. <a href="http://hawaiiopinions.blogspot.com/2022/05/anonymous-jurors-rule-48-reset-no.html">The ICA affirmed in a published opinion.</a> They
petitioned for a writ of certiorari. Before this opinion was issued, <a href="https://www.civilbeat.org/2023/02/a-hawaii-inmate-serving-a-life-sentence-has-died-in-a-florida-prison/" target="_blank">Lafoga died.</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Confidential jurors (<i>i.e.</i>, withholding names
from the public and the defendants) are constitutional. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The HSC began by pointing
out that this is not an anonymous jury in which the defense and the prosecution
do not know any of the prospective jurors’ names. <i>See United States v.
Harris</i>, 763 F.3d 881, 885-886 (7th Cir. 2014); <i>United States v. Ross</i>,
33 F.3d 1507, 1521 n. 27 (11th Cir. 1994). Nor was it a “partially anonymous”
jury in which some of the information is withheld. <i>State v. Samonte</i>, 83 Hawai'i
507, 928 P.2d 1 (1996). The HSC described this as a “confidential jury” in which
information is kept from the public.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Confidential jurors address the public’s right to
access trial under the First Amendment, not the parties’ right to juror
information. <i>See Oahu Publications Inc. v. Ahn</i>, 133 Hawai'i 482,
495-496, 331 P.3d 460, 473-474 (2014). The defendants did not raise this as an access-to-courts
challenge either. Their focus was on keeping the information from them and they
are not members of the public. The HSC found there was no prejudice to the
defendants because counsel were free to use “information-gathering techniques,
like online and social media research, that might discover helpful information
to challenge a juror for cause, exercise a peremptory challenge, or tailor an
argument.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Is counsel ineffective for not spying on jurors?</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> The HSC noted the practice
of searching for potential jurors online ahead of trial is so common now that
it is encouraged:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 1in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">With the potential jurors’
names in hand, handy info is keystrokes away. <i>See id.</i> (citing Thaddeous
Hoffmeister, <i>Investigating Jurors in the Digital Age: One Click at a Time</i>,
60 U. Kan. L. Rev. 611, 612 (2012) for observation that “[t]he speed and easy
by which information about jurors is now discovered online has led attorneys to
increasingly investigate and research jurors. In fact, the practice has become
fairly commonplace, with courts, practitioners, and state bar associations all
approving and encouraging its use.”).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The HSC never addressed this point, but the question
may eventually arise if counsel’s failure to do that constitutes ineffective assistance
of counsel.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The circuit court’s use of numbers instead of
names was not supported by the record . . . </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The HSC next examined the use of numbers
instead of names. It described this as “drastic” and can undermine the
presumption of innocence. It “raises the specter that the defendant is a
dangerous preson from whom the jurors must be protected, thereby implicating the
defendant’s constitutional right to a presumption of innocence.” <i>State v.
Samonte</i>, 83 Hawai'i at 519, 928 P.2d at 12-13. Thus, the HSC cautioned that
it should be used sparingly and must be based on evidence of a “strong reason”
the jury needs the protection and then make clear findings supporting the
conclusion. <i>Id.</i> at 520, 928 P.2d at 14.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The trial court here explained to the jurors that
using numbers instead of names was not to protect them from the defendants, but
to shield them from the media that was covering the case. This reason was,
according to the HSC, “naivete” and jurors “may not buy it.” Moreover, the
circuit court made this decision based on a “hunch that some jurors might say
they are ‘afraid to serve[.]’” This was insufficient evidence to depart from
the normal procedure of using names.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">. . . notwithstanding HRS § 612-18(c) . . . </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Ines argued to the ICA
that this procedure also violated HRS § 612-18(c), which provides that names of
jurors and their qualification forms “shall be made available to the litigants
concerned.” The “shall” here, however, is director, not mandatory. <i>State v.
Samonte</i>, 83 Hawai'i at 523, 928 P.2d at 17. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">. . . and didn’t warrant a new trial. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Nevertheless, the HSC
affirmed the conviction. The error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. <i>See
State v. Mundon</i>, 121 Hawai'i 339, 368, 219 P.3d 1126, 1155 (2009). The
defendants could not show how this method of selecting the jury prejudiced
them. The lawyers had a chance to gather information, lawyers engaged with
prospective jurors and learned about their backgrounds and attitudes, jurors
were rejected, and the defendants sat with their lawyers. The trial was
constitutionally sound.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The extended sentencing phase, however, needs to
be vacated. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The
HSC examined the jury instructions during the extended sentencing phase. Upon
conviction, a defendant is subject to an extended term of imprisonment if the jury
finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the extended term is “necessary for the protection
of the public” and the defendant meets certain statutory criteria such as being
a “persistent offender.” HRS § 706-662. The defendants here were charged as “persistent
offenders” and the challenge focuses on the jury’s determination that the
extended term is “necessary for the protection of the public.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Jurors need to know the extended term is life
without parole, not a “definite life term of imprisonment.” </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The circuit court’s
instructions tracked the HAWJIC standardized instructions for life sentences. The
question for the jury was whether it was necessary for the protection of the
public to extend the sentence “from a possible life term of imprisonment to a
definite life term of imprisonment.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">In <i>State v. Keohokapu</i>, 127 Hawai'i 91, 276
P.3d 660 (2012), the HSC examined the instruction that asked jurors to
determine if it was necessary to extend a class A felony from twenty years to
life with the possibility of parole. <i>Id.</i> at 127 Hawai'i at 100 n. 16,
276 P.3d at 669 n. 16. The HSC held that the jury did not need to be instructed
about parole procedures. <i>Id.</i> at 116, 276 P.3d at 685. The majority in <i>Keohakapu</i>
recommended that the instruction for second-degree murder ask juror to consider
“whether the defendant’s sentence should be extended from possible life
imprisonment to a definite (or fixed) sentence of life imprisonment.” <i>Id.</i>
at 112 n. 33, 276 P.3d at 681 n. 33.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The HSC now “clarified” that the jurors need to
know the difference between the ordinary sentence of life with the possibility of
parole and LWOP. First, the statute is clear in its terms. HRS § 706-661. The jury
must hear the word “parole.” Here’s how the HSC put it:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 1in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">No evidence or jury instructions
describing parole matters are needed for the jury to consider the difference between
life <i>with </i>and life <i>without </i>parole. <i>Keohokapu</i>’s holding is
satisfied in this respect. “Parole” is all the jury needs to hear. The jury
inquiry depends on the word “parole” but does not depend on the nuances of
parole.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 1in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>A jury navigates complex words and concepts. The collective
wisdom of twelve citizens is a defining virtue of America’s jury trial system. We
believe jurors will use their common understanding and knowledge to grasp what “parole”
means for purposes of extended term sentencing. That is, “life with the possibility
of parole” means the defendant may someday get out of prison. And “life without
the possibility of parole” means the defendant will never get out of prison. So
there is no reason to define or explain “parole.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The HSC held that the instructions, though following
the standard pattern instructions, were erroneous and vacated the case for a
new sentencing trial.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Justice Wilson’s
Concurrence and Dissent. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Justice Wilson took issue with the majority’s analysis on the
anonymous jury procedure. For him, the way it went down raised a number of
structural errors. Withholding the names of jurors from the defendants deprived
them of their constitutional right to be presumed not guilty—a significant due
process violation of Article I, Section 14 of the Hawai'i Constitution. Justice
Wilson wrote that it “unduly restrict[ed] voir dire, which deprived the
defendants of effective assistance of counsel.” The circuit court’s belief that
jurors would be too scared to serve also deprived the defendants of a fair and
impartial tribunal. He wrote that the judge “assumed the role of the prosecutor”
and presumed guilt. <i>State v. Silva</i>, 78 Hawai'i 115, 120, 890 P.2d 702,
707 (App. 1995), <i>overruled on other grounds in Tachibana v. State</i>, 79 Hawai'i
226, 900 P.2d 1293 (1995).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">In perhaps one of his last dissenting opinions as
an associate justice, he worries about the future:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">There is no dispute that the
circuit court erred in empaneling a jury whose identity was disguised behind a
number. The Majority’s holding portends a future where it is deemed harmless
for judges to act upon no record to deny defendants the fundamental right to a
fair trial judged by a known jury. I depart from such a profound weakening of
the right to a fair trial. Respectfully, withholding the names of the twelve jurors
from the defendants without any basis violated Lafoga’s and Ines’
constitutional rights to the presumption of innocence, right to counsel, right
to an impartial jury, and right to an impartial judge.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">He agreed with the majority’s analysis on the
extended term instructions and the remand for a new extended term sentencing
hearing and resentencing.</span></p><p></p>B. Lowenthalhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13293689883439389796noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-844955418635981150.post-87764167800486313202023-04-01T11:37:00.002-10:002023-04-01T11:37:43.205-10:00Self-defense and the emphasis on the defendant’s subjective belief that deadly force is necessary<p> <b style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">In re: DM </span></i></b><b style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">(HSC March 15, 2023)</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Background.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> The prosecution charged a minor, DM, with attempted
assault in the first degree. The family court held a bench trial. The facts are
largely undisputed. A group of teenagers got together one night at Hau Bush in
Ewa Beach. It was dark and illuminated primarily by open car and truck doors. Most
of the kids were drinking. DM and his cousin went to the party and met some
girls there. As DM was talking, the complainant intervened. He was shirtless
and looked sketchy. DM told him to leave. He did, but soon came back and
harassed a girl talking with DM. DM stood up for her and the complainant
challenged DM to fight. DM said he did not want to cause trouble and asked him
to leave. He would not, and asked where he was from. When DM said he was from
Kalihi, they started arguing.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">It got physical when the complainant rushed at DM
and punched him several times. DM fought back. The complainant’s friends and
others jumped in to pull them apart. The complainant’s friends tried to
restrain him, but he would not listen, broke from their grasp and rushed at DM
again. He punched DM and tackled him to the ground. They wrestled on the
ground. Others intervened. Someone grabbed DM and walked away with him while others
tried to settle the complainant down. Then other fights broke out making Hau
Bush “chaotic” and rowdy.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">DM lost his cousin. He went to his cousin’s car
and picked up a knife. He faced the crowd a few feet from his car. It had only
been 10 to 15 seconds when he held the knife and said, “who like get stab?”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The crowd backed off except for the complainant. He
broke free from his friend, lunged at DM, and tackled him to the ground. DM
never moved from his spot next to his cousin’s car. The complainant landed on
top of DM, punched him. DM held his arms over his face. The complainant rolled
off him because DM stabbed him once in the abdomen. DM got up, found his
cousin, told him he “accidentally” stabbed someone. They drove away.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">DM testified at his trial. He explained that when
the complainant attacked him and got him to the ground the first time, another
kid punched his head. He was “side-blinded from somebody else.” He was scared. He
went to his cousin’s car and got the knife. DM testified that after warning
folks, he heard the complainant yell “I no give a fuck if you have the knife”
and attacked him a second time. DM was on his back as the complainant was
punching him. He testified that he stabbed the complainant, but it was in
self-defense.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The family court, with the Hon. Judge Brian A.
Costa presiding, rejected his defense and found that his use of deadly force
was not objectively reasonable. The family court found that the use of deadly
force included not just the stabbing, but the moments before when he asked the crowd
who wanted to get stabbed. The family court found that DM could have waited in
the vehicle or leave in complete safety. DM appealed. The ICA affirmed, but
Judge Karen T. Nakasone dissented. DM petitioned for certiorari.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The use of deadly force is in the use, not in the
moments before. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The
HSC first examined when deadly force was used. Deadly force means “force which
the actor uses with the intent of causing or which the actor knows to create a
substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm.” HRS § 703-300. The
family court erred in finding that the brandishing of the knife and asking who
wanted to get stabbed was part of the <i>use</i> of deadly force. <i>See State
v. Pemberton</i>, 71 Haw. 466, 477, 796 P.2d 80, 95 (1990) (defendant’s
perspective relevant “at the time [they] tried to defendant [themselves]” with
deadly force). Moreover, “[a] threat to cause death or serious bodily injury,
by the production of a weapon or otherwise, so long as the actor’s intent is
limited to creating an apprehension that the actor will use deadly force if
necessary, does not constitute deadly force.” HRS § 703-300.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC held that DM intended to create
apprehension that, if necessary, he would use deadly force. He was just
attacked by the complainant and others in the crowd. He testified he wanted
them to back off and stayed in one spot by his cousin’s car when he showed them
the knife and asked “who like get stab?” This was the apprehension he was
entitled to use under HRS § 703-300. The HSC held that DM did not use deadly
force when he got the knife and told the crowd to back off.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The duty to retreat is subjective and based on the
defendant’s perspective. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The defendant does not have a duty to retreat before using
deadly force unless the defendant “knows that [they] can avoid the necessity of
using such force with complete safety by retreating.” HRS § 703-304(5)(b). The
HSC held that this is a subjective inquiry. <i>State v. Mark</i>, 123 Hawai'i 205,
226, 231 P.3d 478, 499 (2010).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC held that the family court did not
consider if DM knew he could retreat with complete safety. There was no
evidence showing that DMR knew he could sit in the car or leave the area with
complete safety. <i>See State v. Augustin</i>, 101 Hawai'i 127, 128, 63 P.3d
1097, 1098 (2002) (defendant has knowledge of circumstances only when aware of
them). Moreover, the family court erred in finding that DM had a duty to
retreat when he brandished the knife. The HSC disagreed and held that the duty
to retreat did not arise until the complainant broke free from his friends and
rushed at DM a second time. DM had no legal duty to retreat before then. Moreover,
nothing in the record shows that DM knew he could retreat with complete safety
without using deadly force.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Deadly force combines subjective and objective
assessments. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The
use of deadly force for self-defense is justified “if the actor believes that
deadly force is necessary to protect [themselves] against death, serious bodily
injury, kidnapping, rape, or forcible sodomy.” HRS § 703-304(2). “Believes”
means “reasonably believe.” HRS § 703-300.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">This is a two-step inquiry. First, the factfinder
must determine if the defendant subjectively believed that deadly force was
necessary. If so, the factfinder then determines if that belief is objectively
reasonable. In assessing reasonableness, the factfinder measures it “from the
point of view of a reasonable person in the Defendant’s position under the
circumstances as [they] believed them to be.” <i>State v. Pemberton</i>, 71
Haw. 466, 477, 796 P.2d 80, 85 (1990). <i>See also State v. Lubong</i>, 77 Hawai'i
429, 433, 886 P.2d 766, 70 (App. 1994).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC held that the family court disregarded DM’s
subjective perspective when evaluating the reasonableness of his belief. Here
is how the HSC described it:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">A defendant’s
circumstances—what they think, see, hear, touch, smell, and (sometimes even)
taste—frame the objective inquiry. Because the defendant’s subjective belief
shapes the objective standard, the judge or jury wears the defendant’s headset
and enters the defendant’s reality.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The ICA in <i>Lubong</i> described it as the factfinder
placing itself “in the shoes of the defendant[.]” <i>Id. </i>The HSC was “unconvinced”
that the family court did that and vacated the adjudication order.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Chief Justice Recktenwald’s dissent. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The Chief Justice
dissented. He pointed out that a key part of the factfinder’s job is to also
assess the credibility of the defendant when providing evidence of the self-defense
claim. <i>State v. Lealeao</i>, 126 Hawai'i 460, 470, 272 P.3d 1227, 1232
(2012). Credibility is central here. The prosecution disproves self-defense
claims “when the trier of fact believes [the prosecution’s case] and
disbelieves the defense.” <i>In re Doe</i>, 107 Hawai'i 12, 19, 108 P.3d 966,
978 (2005). In this case, the family court made credibility determinations and ultimately
found that the prosecution met its burden in disproving DM’s self-defense claim.
The appellate court should “not pass upon issues dependent upon the credibility
of witnesses and the weight of the evidence[.]” <i>State v. Jenkins</i>, 93 Hawai'i
87, 101, 997 P.2d 13, 27 (2000).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">The CJ took issue with the
way the majority examined the family court’s findings. Trial judges are “required
to only make brief, definite, pertinent findings and conclusions upon contested
matters; there is no necessity for over-elaboration of detail or
particularization of facts.” <i>State v. Ramos-Saunders</i>, 135 Hawai'i 299,
304-305, 349 P.3d 406, 411-412 (App. 2015). The family court is not required to
be as detailed as the majority demands. Finally, the CJ believed that the
family court did not err in determining that a reasonably prudent person in the
same situation as DM would not have believed that deadly force was necessary. The
CJ would have affirmed. Justice Nakayama joined.</span>B. Lowenthalhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13293689883439389796noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-844955418635981150.post-34092805927879275162023-04-01T10:03:00.001-10:002023-04-01T10:03:20.680-10:00HSC reins in restitution awards and prosecutors at the grand jury<p> <b style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">State v. Borge </span></i></b><b style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">(HSC March 15, 2023)</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Background.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> On November 5, 2019, Maui police officers
responded to the Paia Youth and Cultural Center between Baldwin Beach and Paia Bay.
They found the complainant had suffered serious injuries after Borge struck him
on the head several times with a piece of wood. Borge was arrested. The
prosecution went to the grand jury and called Detective Dennis Clifton. Det.
Clifton testified he investigated the case and met with Borge after he was
arrested. The following exchange took place:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Q. <span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>. . . . Did you notice any injuries to Mr. Borge?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">A. <span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>No.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Q.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>None to his head, arms, anyplace?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">A.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>No, sir.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Q.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Okay. And you didn’t take any statement from <span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Mr. Borge?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.5in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: -.5in;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">A.<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>We attempted to question him, but he
requested to speak to an attorney.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">After Det. Clifton finished testifying, the
prosecutor said, “[b]efore I proceed, Detective Clifton testified Mr. Borge was
asking for an attorney. I’m going to advise the grand jury that you’re not to
consider that information in your deliberation.” The grand jury returned a true
bill of indictment charging Borge with attempted second-degree murder. Borge
moved to dismiss the second indictment for improperly eliciting testimony about
his right to remain silent. The circuit court, with the Hon. Judge Kelsey T.
Kawano presiding, denied the motion.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Borge pleaded no contest to assault in the first
degree and reserved the right to appeal from the denial of the motion to
dismiss. A presentence investigation (PSI) was ordered. The prosecution filed
an addendum including 115 pages of billing from the Maui Memorial hospital. The
bills totaled $1,461,444.01 even though some of were paid by AlohaCare, a medical
insurance provider, and other adjustments and write-offs were made. Over Borge’s
objection, the circuit court awarded the entire amount in restitution and
sentenced him to prison for ten years. He appealed. The ICA affirmed. The HSC
accepted Borge’s writ of certiorari.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Testimony about the right to remain silent violates
the due process right to a fair and impartial grand jury. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">“No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law[.]” Haw.
Const. Art. I, Sec. 5. Due process requires a fair and impartial grand jury
hearing. <i>State v. Rodrigues</i>, 63 Haw. 412, 417, 629 P.2d 1111, 1115
(1981). Prosecutorial misconduct “is a legal term of art that refers to any
improper action committed by a prosecutor, however harmless or unintentional.” <i>State
v. Williams</i>, 146 Hawai'i 62, 72, 456 P.3d 135, 145 (2020). Prosecutorial
misconduct undermining the fundamental fairness and integrity of the grand jury
process is presumptively prejudicial. <i>State v. Wong</i>, 97 Hawai'i 512,
517-518, 40 P.3d 914, 919-920 (2002).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">There is also the constitutional right against self-incrimination.
No person shall “be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
oneself.” Haw. Const. Art. I, Sec. 10. It is “an established doctrine of our
civilized society.” <i>Brown v. Walker</i>, 161 U.S. 591, 637 (1896). It is
sacrosanct and “[t]here is nothing more basic and more fundamental than that
the accused has a constitutional right to remain silent, and the exercise of
this privilege may not be used against” them. <i>State v. Mainaaupo</i>, 117 Hawai'i
235, 252, 178 P.3d 1, 18 (2008).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The right against self-incrimination prohibits the
prosecution from adducing evidence of or commenting on a person’s exercise of
the right. <i>State v. Beaudet-Close</i>, 148 Hawai'i 66, 72-73, 468 P.3d 80,
86-87 (2020). Moreover, prosecutors cannot directly or indirectly imply guilt
through witness testimony about the right to remain silent. <i>State v.
Tsujimura</i>, 140 Hawiai 299, 315-318, 400 P.3d 500, 516-519 (2017). Whether
the prosecution’s presentation of evidence at trial infringes upon the accused’s
right against self-incrimination depends on “whether the prosecutor intended for
the information elicited to imply the defendant’s guilt or whether the character
of the information suggests to the factfinder that the defendant’s prearrest
silence may be considered as inferential evidence of the defendant’s guilt.” <i>Id.</i>
at 315, 400 P.3d at 516.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC extends the test to grand jury
proceedings. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The
HSC extended these rights to grand jury proceedings:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">[W]e hold that in the
grand jury context, the test is whether the prosecutor intended for the information
elicited to imply probable cause exists <u>or</u> whether the character of the
information suggests to the jurors that the accused’s silence may be considered
as inferential evidence to find probable cause.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC held that it did not matter if the
prosecution anticipated Det. Clifton’s response. The character of the evidence
was clearly improper and the prosecutor adduced evidence that Borge refused to
give a statement to the police. The prosecutor should have never asked the
question in the first place. The HSC held this was a “flagrant violation of
Borge’s due process rights” and the circuit court erred in denying the motion
to dismiss.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The prosecutor’s advisement was not a curative
instruction. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">In
a footnote, the HSC rejected the prosecution’s claim that the prosecutor’s
advisement at the end of Det. Clifton’s testimony was a curative instruction. According
to the HSC, a curative instruction can “sometimes” remedy prosecutorial
misconduct, but a “cure” generally comes from the judge, not the prosecutor.
HRS § 616-16(d) requires the court—not the prosecutor—to give grand jurors
information on the law as it deems necessary and proper. Furthermore, the HSC
held that the “advisement” was not a cure at all. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The restitution award was erroneous. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Restitution in criminal
cases comes from HRS § 706-646:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">(1) As used in this
section, “victim” includes any of the following:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">(a)
The direct victim of a crime . . .;<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">.
. . .<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.5in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">(c) A governmental entity
that has reimbursed the victim for losses arising as a result of the crime or
paid medical care provided to the victim as a result of the crime[.]<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">.
. . .<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">(2) The court shall order
the defendant to make restitution for reasonable and verified losses suffered
by the victim or victims as a result of the defendant’s offense when requested
by the victim. . . .<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">(3) . . . Restitution
shall be a dollar amount that is sufficient to reimburse any victim fully for
losses, including but not limited to:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.5in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">. . . .<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.5in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">(b) Medical expenses,
which shall include mental health treatment, counseling, and therapy;<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>. . . .<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.5in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">(d) Lost earnings, which
shall include paid leave.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC found two errors below.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Restitution is limited to amounts claimed by
victims, not their family, the insurance company, or the hospital. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">A “victim” that can make a
restitution claim is ether the “direct victim of a crime” or a “governmental entity
that has reimbursed the victim for losses arising as a result of the crime or
paid for medical care provided to the victim as a result of the crime[.]” HRS §
706-646(1)(a) & (c). The complainant here is the direct victim of the
crime. But it does not include Maui Memorial or AlohaCare.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Moreover, the “victim” has to make the claim
pursuant to HRS § 706-646(2). <i>See State v. Demello</i>, 136 Hawai'i 193, 196,
361 P.3d 420, 423 (2015). In this case, the circuit court awarded close to $1.4
million in restitution to complainant even though the complainant did not
request restitution for the medical bills. The record shows that the claim came
from the complainant’s mother. That alone warranted vacating the restitution
order.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The amount itself is not a reasonable and verified
loss. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Even
if the victim did claim it, restitution is limited to “reasonable and verified
losses” incurred by the victim. <i>State v. Demello</i>, 136 Hawai'i at 196,
361 P.3d at 423. The restitution here constituted billings from Maui Memorial even
though $204,174.49 was paid by AlohaCare and $996,283.16 was deducted in
adjustments and write-offs.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">“Restitution shall be a dollar amount that is
sufficient to reimburse any victim fully for losses.” HRS § 706-646(3). The statute
does not define the term “losses” beyond a list of listed categories. In
construing an older version of the restitution statute, the HSC held that the total
amount “should be the actual loss or damage incurred by the victim.” <i>State
v. Johnson</i>, 68 Haw. 292, 295, 711 P.2d 1295, 1298 (1985). The HSC took a similar
approach:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify; text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The
plain language of HRS § 706-646(3) does not allow a restitution award to
include adjustments of bills written off by medical providers. The victim never
paid these amounts. Hence, the victim does not need to be “reimbursed” for
amounts never paid.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>By the same token, this plain language does not allow a
restitution award to a direct victim to include medical expenses paid by an
insurer or indemnifier. A direct victim has not paid these amounts, so there is
nothing to “reimburse.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">HSC overrules <i>Tuialii</i>! </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">In reaching this holding,
the HSC addressed <a href="http://hawaiiopinions.blogspot.com/2009/07/restitution-is-collateral-consequence.html" target="_blank"><i>State v. Tuialii</i>, 121 Hawai'i 135, 214 P.3d 1125 (App.
2009)</a>. In that case, the ICA upheld a restitution award that included amounts already
paid by the victim’s insurer. <i>Id.</i> at 139, 214 P.3d at 1129. The ICA concluded
that lower courts “need not sort out insurance indemnities, subrogation rights,
and/or other potential civil law implications before ordering a thief or other
criminal to repay his victim under the criminal restitution statute.” <i>Id</i>.
at 142, 214 P.3d at 1132.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC picked upon Justice Pollack’s dissenting opinion
in <i>State v. Demello</i>, 136 Hawai'i at 216 n. 24, 361 P.3d at 443 n. 24
(Pollack, J., dissenting), when he noted that gross receipts instead of net
income does not represent “actual loss” and should not be included. The HSC also
characterized the problem of including insurance payouts with the restitution
award as an improper importation of the collateral source rule, a common law
doctrine in tort law. <i>Bynum v. Magno</i>, 106 Hawai'i 81, 86 n. 11, 101 P.3d
1149, 1154 n. 11 (2004). The collateral source rule requires civil defendants
in tort cases to be responsible for the whole amount even though medical
expenses may have been paid in party by an independent or collateral source. <i>Id.</i>
Contrary to the ICA’s justification in <i>Tuialii</i>, the point of restitution
is to prevent injustice and unjust enrichment, not award “damages.” <i>Small v.
Badenhop</i>, 67 Haw. 626, 636 n. 12 & 13, 701 P.2d 641, 654 n. 12 & 13
(1985). The collateral source rule has no place in the law of victim
restitution.<o:p></o:p></span></p>B. Lowenthalhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13293689883439389796noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-844955418635981150.post-73911219538966777122023-04-01T08:25:00.002-10:002023-04-01T08:26:24.238-10:00Thompson doesn’t apply to complaints without a warrant or summons (and it doesn’t apply to any complaints after March 28, 2022).<p> <b style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">State v. Mortensen-Young </span></i></b><b style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">(HSC March 15, 2023)</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Background.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> This is a consolidated appeal in which all three
defendants have the same operative facts. In 2021, Raven Mortensen-Young,
Marlin Tornquist Tucker, Ryan Wood, and Lance Oshima were arrested under
suspicion of operating a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant. They
all posted a bond, released from custody, and given a court date. During that
time, the prosecution filed complaints and served them at their return dates. The
complaints included a line for prosecutors to declare under penalty of law that
the “foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.” No warrants
or summons were issued.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The defendants moved to the dismiss the complaints
on the grounds that the complaint was not supported by the complainant’s
signature and a declaration in lieu of an affidavit thereby violating Hawai'i Revised
Statutes (HRS) § 805-1 and the holding in <i>State v. Thompson</i>, 150 Hawai'i
262, 500 P.3d 447 (2021). The motions were granted. The State appealed and
transferred the case to the HSC.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">HRS § 805-1, <i>Thompson</i>, and the bonanza in 2021.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> Before it was amended,
HRS § 805-1—for cases before March 28, 2022—stated the following:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">When a complaint is made
to any prosecuting officer of the commission of any offense, the prosecuting
officer shall examine the complaint, shall reduce the substance of the
complaint to writing, and shall cause the complaint to be subscribed by the
complainant under oath, which the prosecuting officer is hereby authorized to administer,
or the complaint shall be made by declaration in accordance with the rules of
court. If the original complaint results from the issuance of a traffic summons
or a citation in lieu of an arrest pursuant to section 803-6, by a police
officer, the oath may be administered by any police officer whose name has been
submitted to the prosecuting officer and who has been designed by the chief of
police to administer the oath, or the complaint may be submitted by declaration
in accordance with the rules of court. Upon presentation of the written
complaint to the judge in whose circuit the offense allegedly has been
committed, the judge shall issue a warrant, reciting the complaint and
requiring the sheriff, or other officer to whom it is directed, except as
provided in section 805-3, to arrest the accused and to bring the accused before
ethe judge to be dealt with according to law; and in the same warrant the judge
may require the officer to summon such witnesses as are named in the warrant to
appear and give evidence at trial. The warrant may be in the form established
by the usage and practice of the issuing court.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Id.<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">In <i>State v. Thompson</i>, the defendant
challenged the initiation of the prosecution against him on the grounds that
the complaint signed by the deputy prosecuting attorney, did not include an
affidavit or declaration required by HRS § 805-1. <i>Id.</i> at 264, 500 P.3d
at 449. The prosecution in that case was initiated by the filing of a complaint
and the issuance of a penal summons. <i>Id.</i> The HSC agreed with Thompson
and held that HRS § 805-1 “provides for only a single type of criminal
complaint regardless of whether the complaint is used to initiate proceedings
through an arrest warrant or a penal summons.” <i>Id.</i> at 267, 500 P.3d at
452. This statutory obligation applied “regardless of whether the State uses
the complaint to seek a penal summons or an arrest warrant.” <i>Id.</i><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Distinguishing <i>Thompson</i>. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC held that this
class of cases were different. In <i>Thompson</i>, the State initiated its prosecution
by filing a complaint and getting the clerk to issue a penal summons. In this
case, the defendants were arrested, posted bail, and were served with
complaints when they came to court. There was no penal summons or arrest
warrant issued with the complaint. The HSC noted that <i>Thompson </i>“did not
hold that all complaints must satisfy the requirements of HRS § 805-1.” It was
limited to complaints seeking a penal summons or an arrest warrant.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC rejected the defendants’ arguments about
what <i>Thompson</i> meant. In <i>Thompson</i>, the HSC looked to the legislative
history in HRS § 805-1. It quoted the Senate Committee of Judiciary and Labor’s
explanation that “allowing the use of
declarations in lieu of affidavits for arrest citations and traffic crime
complaints is consistent with current rules of court, and would not harm the
offender’s right to challenge the veracity of the officer.” <i>Id.</i> at 268,
500 P.3d at 453 (quoting S. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 1194, in 2007 Senate Journal,
at 1557-58.). According to the defendants, the purpose of HRS § 805-1 is to
protect this “right to challenge the veracity of the complaint.” The HSC,
however, concluded otherwise. It noted that the statute “would not harm” the
right, which is different from protecting it.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The plain language of HRS § 805-1 does not apply
when the State files a complaint without a summons or arrest warrant. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">“It is well-established
that when a statute’s language is plain and unmistakable, the court is bound by
the plain and clear unambiguous language of the statute.” <i>Id.</i> at 267,
500 P.3d at 452. The HSC held that the third sentence in HRS § 805-1 makes clear
that the statute applies to complaints for an arrest warrant and <i>Thompson</i>
makes it clear that it includes a penal summons. According to the HSC, nothing in
HRS § 805-1 establishes that it applies to complaints that do not include
either method of securing the defendant’s presence.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC’s reading of HRS § 805-1 is supported by territorial
precedent. There was an old difference between a complaint that allowed “the
magistrate to determine whether or not there is probable cause to believe that an
offense has been committed by the accused so as to justify his apprehension”
and a complaint where the defendant is charged with a criminal offense. <i>Territory
v. Sing Kee</i>, 14 Haw. 586, 587-588 (Terr. 1903). The complaint contemplated
in the statute predating HRS § 805-1 is not the one “upon which the defendant
is tried.” <i>Id.</i> It is simply to determine and support the issuance of a warrant.
<i>Id.</i> This distinction prevailed throughout the territorial years. <i>Territory
v. Mix</i>, 41 Haw. 163, 164 (1955); <i>Territory v. Williams</i>, 41 Haw. 348,
355 (1956).<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><br /></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The criminal proceedings
here were properly initiated. </span></b><span style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 14pt;">The HSC agreed with the State that it properly
initiated the proceedings against the defendants. First, it was undisputed that
the police complied with a lawful arrest pursuant to HRS §§ 803-5 and 803-6(a).
Second, because there was no arrest warrant or penal summons, the only
authority governing the initiation of the prosecution was Hawai'i Rules of
Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 7:</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> (a) <u>Use of Indictment, Information, or Complaint.</u>
The charge against a defendant is an indictment, a superseding indictment, an information,
or a complaint filed in court. . . .<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">. . . .<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> (d) <u>Nature and Contents.</u> The charge shall be a
plain, concise and definite statement of the essential facts constituting the offense
charged. . . . A complaint shall be signed by the prosecutor. . . .<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">That was all the State needed to do and the HSC
held that it did.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Justice Wilson’s Dissent. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Justice Wilson took issue
with the HSC’s distinction between a statute that “would not harm” as opposed
to “protect” the right to ensure the veracity of the complaint. For him, HRS §
805-1 plainly requires all complaints to “be subscribed . . . under oath” or “made
by declaration in accordance with the rules of the court.” He wrote that the
statute “mitigates the possibility that the facts which underlie a complaint
are unfounded, retaliatory, or harassing.” Notwithstanding this plain language,
Justice Wilson wrote that the majority excludes a class of defendants who were
arrested, bailed out, and served a complaint without a summons or warrant from
this right. He added that “in light of the need to protect Hawai'i’s people
from abuse of prosecutorial authority, there is no logical reason to remove this
statutory protection from people in Hawai'i who have been arrested without a
warrant.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">He wrote that the importance
of HRS § 805-1 cannot be understated. It “protects the integrity of the
information that underlies the accusation that the defendant must face. Without
it, there is no one to be held accountable for the truth or falsity of the
contents of the complaint.” Removing this protection for defendants arrested
without a warrant “serves no laudable purpose” and is “illogical.” For Justice
Wilson, “[a]ll defendants are entitled to the opportunity to challenge the
veracity of their accuser.”</span>B. Lowenthalhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13293689883439389796noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-844955418635981150.post-20193140869918052932023-03-12T16:31:00.000-10:002023-03-12T16:31:05.669-10:00HSC “clarifies” forty-year-old test to determine whether offenses arise from one episode<p> <b style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">State v. Sardinha </span></i></b><b style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">(HSC March 9, 2023)</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Background.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> Bronson Sardinha’s appeal involves two cases. On
November 28, 2015, Honolulu Police Department Officer Crystal Roe arrived at
the intersection of Farrington Highway and Waipio Point Access Road in Waipahu.
There was a traffic accident involving a damaged vehicle. The other vehicle
that caused the accident fled the scene. Later, police tracked down Sardinha
and cited him for multiple traffic offenses. He was charged with those traffic
offenses in district court and pleaded no contest to inattention to driving.
The district court convicted and sentenced him on March 16, 2016.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The other case involves assault. On the same night
of the traffic citations, officers were called to Nancy’s Kitchen at the Waipio
Shopping Center because a man and woman were arguing. When they got there, they
separated the man, who turned out to be Sardinha, and the woman. Sardinha was
outside and acted aggressively toward the officers. One of the officers noticed
that Sardinha’s vehicle had damage to it. Officer Roe came to Nancy’s Kitchen
and recognized Sardinha from past interactions. A warrant check showed that he
was wanted on a contempt warrant and the police tried to detain him. Sardinha
refused and headbutted one of the police officers. He was arrested and later
indicted for assault of a law enforcement officer in the first degree. The
indictment came down on March 8, 2016—eight days before he pleaded no contest
to the traffic offense.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Sardinha moved to dismiss the indictment on the
grounds that it should have been joined with the traffic offenses pursuant to
HRS §§ 701-109 and 701-111. The circuit court, with the Hon. Judge Glenn J. Kim
presiding, granted the motion. The State appealed. The ICA vacated the
dismissal order and Sardinha petitioned the HSC for a writ of certiorari.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The Compulsory Joinder Statute and the Single-Episode
Test. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The
subsequent prosecutions cannot arise from the same episode:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">[A] defendant shall not be
subject to separate trials for multiple offenses based on the same conduct or
arising from the same episode, if such offenses are known to the appropriate prosecuting
officer at the tie of the commencement of the first trial and are within the
jurisdiction of a single court.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">HRS § 701-109(2). The statute ensures “defendants
should have to face the expense and uncertainties of two trials based on
essentially the same episode.” Commentary to HRS § 701-109(2). “It is designed
to prevent the State from harassing a defendant with successive prosecutions
where the State is dissatisfied with the punishment previously ordered or where
the State has previously failed to convict the defendant.” <i>State v. Carroll</i>,
63 Haw. 345, 351, 627 P.2d 776, 780 (1981).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Determining when offenses arise from the same
criminal episode is “based on whether the alleged conduct was so closely
related in time, place and circumstances that a complete account of one charge
cannot be related without referring to details of the other charge.” <i>Id.</i><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Justice
Nakayama’s Restatement of the Single-Episode Test.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> Justice Nakayama, writing
for the majority, broke down test into a restatement. HRS § 701-109(2) requires
multiple offenses to be joined into a single trial when all three elements and sub-elements
are met.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 112.5pt; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo1; text-align: justify; text-indent: -.5in;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Georgia; mso-fareast-font-family: Georgia;">(1)<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;"> </span></span><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">the
offenses are based on the same conduct or arise from the same episode;<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 112.5pt; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo1; text-align: justify; text-indent: -.5in;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Georgia; mso-fareast-font-family: Georgia;">(2)<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;"> </span></span><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">the
offenses are all known to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of
the commencement of the first trial; and<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 112.5pt; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo1; text-align: justify; text-indent: -.5in;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Georgia; mso-fareast-font-family: Georgia;">(3)<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;"> </span></span><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">the</span><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">HRS § 701-109(2). For the
offenses to arise from the same episode in (1), the offenses must:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 1.5in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; text-align: justify; text-indent: -.5in;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Georgia; mso-fareast-font-family: Georgia;">(a)<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;"> </span></span><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">be
so closely related in time that a complete account of one charge cannot be
related without referring to details of the other charge;<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 1.5in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; text-align: justify; text-indent: -.5in;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Georgia; mso-fareast-font-family: Georgia;">(b)<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;"> </span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">be
so closely related in place that a complete account of one charge cannot be
related without referring to details of the other charge; and<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 10.0pt; margin-left: 1.5in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; text-align: justify; text-indent: -.5in;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Georgia; mso-fareast-font-family: Georgia;">(c)<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;"> </span></span><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">be
so closely related in circumstances that a complete account of one charge
cannot be related without referring to details of the other charge.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">State v. Carroll</span></i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">, 63 Haw. at 351, 627 P.2d
at 780. When multiple offenses arise from a single episode, the State is barred
from bringing related charges in a subsequent proceeding. HRS § 701-111(1)(b). <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The “Circumstances” must be “legally and/or
factually interrelated.” </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC examined when the single-episode test came to Hawai'i.
It was introduced in <i>Carroll</i> and came from <i>State v. Boyd</i>, 533
P.2d 795 (Or. 1975). The Oregon Supreme Court recognized that the prosecutions
arise out of the same episode when they are “cross-related” to the point where “a
complete account of one charge necessarily includes details of the other[.]” <i>Id.</i>
at 799. Since then, the HSC has applied the test in <i>Carroll</i>, <i>State v.
Servantes</i>, 72 Haw. 35, 804 P.2d 1347 (1991), and <i>State v. Keliiheleua</i>,
105 Hawai'i 174, 181, 95 P.3d 605, 612 (2004). The HSC explained that these
cases show that it is not enough for the two cases to share some of the same
facts.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">“Our precedents make clear, instead, that multiple
offenses arise from the same episode when the offenses are legally connected and/or
share substantial factual overlap.” <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The Restatement “Clarifies” that Probable Cause
has nothing to do with it. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC also addressed <i>State v. Akau</i>, 118 Hawai'i 44,
185 P.3d 229 (2008), in which the Court held that offenses arise from the same “circumstances”
when “the facts and circumstances of the first discovered offense provided
sufficient probable cause to suspect that the defendant had committed or would
commit the second discovered offense.” <i>Id.</i> at 57, 185 P.3d at 242. The
HSC noted that this formulation of the test is “problematic” because multiple
offenses can be closely related even when one offense does not give rise to
probable cause of the other. Thus, probable cause is not dispositive in determining
when multiple offenses are closely related in circumstances under the <i>Boyd-Carroll</i>
test. Thus, <i>Akau </i>was wrongly decided to the extent that it required
probable cause to compel joinder of multiple offenses.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The Traffic Offenses and the Assault were not so closely
related in circumstances and the indictment did not violate HRS §§ 701-109(2)
and 701-111(b).</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">
The HSC applied the newly restated test and held that there were no overlapping
legal issues or shared material facts among the cases. First, it examined the
elements of the traffic offense to which Sardinha pleaded. They are wholly
unrelated to the elements of assault of a law enforcement officer in the first
degree. “Based purely on the elements of the charges, any evidence that would
establish that Sardinha was responsible for the Traffic Offenses would not
establish that Sardinha assaulted a law enforcement officer, and vice versa.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Second, there are shared facts meriting compulsory
joinder. The HSC rejected Sardinha’s argument that on officers on cross-examination
would have delved into the traffic offenses. The HSC held that the relevant
inquiry is not what the defendant could show about the other offense, but
whether “the prosecution can fairly put on a complete case without reference to
the other offense.” The HSC affirmed the ICA’s decision to vacate the dismissal
order.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">Justice Wilson’s Dissent. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">Justice Wilson disagreed
with the rest of the justices. The disagreement stems over the application of
the single-episode test. Justice Wilson believed that the traffic offenses and
the assault were closely related in time, place, and circumstance. He would
have preserved the need to examine probable cause and called out the majority
for “disregard[ing] forty years of precedent” by doing away with the probable
cause analysis. He noted that just because the test comes from Oregon did not
necessarily mean that the Court needed to adhere to it through the years.
Justice Wilson also noted that this was not a deviation or even a
clarification, but the adoption of a whole new rule. The whole point of this
statute is to protect defendants from facing “expense and uncertainties of two
trials based on essentially the same episode.” Commentary on HRS § 701-109(2). The
holding for Justice Wilson thwarts that purpose. He would have vacated the ICA
and upheld the dismissal order.</span>B. Lowenthalhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13293689883439389796noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-844955418635981150.post-53298082417479541862023-03-11T12:00:00.001-10:002023-03-11T12:00:34.904-10:00Apprendi applied to enhanced sentencing in 2003, but so did the prior-convictions exception<p> <b style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">State v. Perry </span></i></b><b style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">(HSC March 8, 2023)</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Background.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> In 2002, Jason Perry was indicted with two counts
of murder in the second degree. HRS § 707-701.5 (1993). At his trial in 2003, a
co-defendant testified against him. Perry took the stand and testified too.
Their testimony centered around count 2 and the shooting of the possible
witness to the killing of the decedent in count 1. The co-defendant testified
that Perry shot the witness. Perry said it was the co-defendant.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The jury returned a guilty verdict for count 1 and
answered a special interrogatory establishing that Perry was both a principal
and accomplice in the murder. In count 2, the jury found Perry guilty as an
accomplice only. The circuit court—with the Hon. Judge Karen S. Ahn presiding—gave
another special interrogatory about whether the prosecution proved that Perry
was carrying or using a semi-automatic weapon at the time of the killing in
count 2. The jury answered that he had. This fact is needed to impose a mandatory
minimum. The prosecutor objected and did not move for a mandatory minimum.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">After the verdict, the prosecution moved for
consecutive terms and life without parole on both counts pursuant to the
extended sentencing statute pursuant to HRS §§ 706-656 and 706-657 (1993 &
Supp. 1998). The prosecution sought life without parole in count 2 on the
grounds that he was now “previously convicted” of the murder in count 1. On
July 28, 2003, the circuit court granted the motion and sentenced Perry to two
consecutive sentences of life without the possibility of parole. Perry
appealed. The ICA affirmed. Perry petitioned for a writ of certiorari, but the
HSC rejected it on the grounds that it was untimely filed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Fifteen years later, Perry brought a petition in the
circuit court alleging that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not
filing for a writ of certiorari in time. The circuit court, now with the Hon. Judge
Clarissa Malinao presiding, agreed that counsel was ineffective and ordered the
ICA to vacate its judgment on appeal from 2007 and re-enter it so that Perry
could apply for another writ of certiorari. The ICA did just that and Perry
reapplied. This time the HSC accepted certiorari.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Nothing ambiguous about the count 2 verdict. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC made quick work of
Perry’s first argument that the inapplicable and unnecessary interrogatory
about the semi-automatic firearm in count 2 created confusion and ambiguity
about the elements of the murder offense and accomplice liability. The HSC
examined the jury instructions and found nothing “prejudicially, insufficient,
erroneous, inconsistent, or misleading.” <i>Stanely v. State</i>, 148 Hawai'i 489,
500, 479 P.3d 107, 118 (2021). The instructions, according to the HSC, detailed
the elements of murder and accomplice liability. Moreover, the HSC found nothing
suggesting that the jury had a hard time following the trial court’s
instructions and was “unconvinced” that the jury felt it needed to answer the
firearms interrogatory as part of the guilty verdict.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The guilty verdicts were not “irreconcilably
inconsistent.” </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The
HSC then rejected Perry’s argument that the jury’s guilty verdict in count 2
was inconsistent. Perry argued that it is impossible to be found guilty of
count 2 as an accomplice while being in possession of a semi-automatic firearm
that killed the witness. When it comes to “irreconcilably inconsistent”
verdicts, courts “attempt to first reconcile seemingly-inconsistent verdicts
before vacatur.” <i>State v. Bringas</i>, 149 Hawai'i 435, 443, 494 P.3d 1168,
1176 (2021). If there is “a reasonable way to reconcile” the jury’s findings,
the conviction stands. <i>Id. </i>The HSC explained that looking for any
reasonable reconciliation of the jury’s findings is meant “to avoid speculation
into the jury’s confidential deliberations and to safeguard the result of those
deliberations, if at all possible.” <i>Id.</i><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC applied <i>Bringas</i> here. An accomplice
to murder can possess a firearm without pulling the trigger. Accomplice
liability arises when the person has the intent to commit the offense and the
person either solicits another to commit it, aids or agrees another in planning
or committing it. HRS § 702-222. The HSC held that the verdict was not
irreconcilably inconsistent. It was possible to find that Perry possessed a
semi-automatic handgun while being an accomplice. The special interrogatory did
not require that it be the murder weapon. The HSC also noted that this finding
was not needed to find Perry guilty, and the prosecution did not move for a
mandatory minimum so it did not prejudice Perry.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Expanding <i>Bringas</i>? </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC applied the <i>Bringas
</i>standard to the jury’s findings on a special interrogatory and the guilty
verdict itself. Then again, it noted that that the interrogatory should have
never been given and that the prosecution did not use the answer to the
interrogatory against Perry. It is unclear if those are part of the <i>Bringas</i>
analysis, which requires appellate courts to try and reconcile the findings
themselves regardless of what they were used for or even if they should have
been made in the first place. The standard from <i>Bringas</i> is ironic.
Appellate courts will look for “any reasonable way to reconcile a jury’s verdicts”
in order “to avoid speculation into the jury’s confidential deliberations and
to safeguard the result of those deliberations, if at all possible.” <i>Id.</i>
In other words, the appellate court will reconstruct possible rationales to
reconcile the findings in order to avoid speculation. But isn’t that
speculating? <a href="http://hawaiiopinions.blogspot.com/2021/09/when-verdict-gets-weird-try-to-not-make.html" target="_blank">When <i>Bringas </i>came out, Justice McKenna and Justice Wilson
dissented.</a> This time around, they joined the majority. It is unclear just how
far <i>Bringas </i>goes.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Apprendi </span></i></b><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">rule applied sentencing enhancement for
murder in the second degree. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The sentence for murder in the second degree is
usually life with the possibility of parole. HRS § 706-656(2). It can be
enhanced to life without parole if the murder either “heinous, atrocious, or
cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity” or the defendant “was previously convicted
of the offense of murder in the first degree or murder in the second degree[.]”
HRS § 706-657. In this case, the prosecution moved for life without parole on
the grounds that Perry by virtue of the guilty verdict in count 1 was “previously
convicted of the offense” of murder in the second degree. Perry argued that the
finding of being previously convicted must be found by the jury and proven
beyond a reasonable doubt pursuant to <i>Apprendi v. New Jersey</i>, 530 U.S.
466 (2000). The HSC agreed that Perry can raise this challenge. The “line of
demarcation” to raise <i>Apprendi </i>issues is the issuance of <i>Apprendi</i>
itself back in 2000. <i>Flubacher v. State</i>, 142 Hawai'i 109, 118, 414 P.3d
161, 170 (2018).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">HSC applied the <i>Apprendi </i>rule narrowly to
the 2003 sentencing. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of
the Hawai'i Constitution require that any fact used to extend a sentence beyond
the statutory maximum is an element of the offense that must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt and found by a jury. <i>Apprendi</i>, 530 U.S. at 494; <i>Flubacher</i>,
142 Hawai'i at 118-119, 414 P.3d at 170-171. However, prior convictions are an
exception to the <i>Apprendi </i>rule: “Other than the fact of a prior conviction,
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” <i>Apprendi</i>,
530 U.S. at 490. <i>See also State v. Maugaotega</i>, 115 Hawai'i 432, 446 n.
15, 168 P.3d 562, 576 n. 15 (2007).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC held that this prior-conviction exception
applied to Perry’s sentencing hearing in 2003. The jury did not need to find
that Perry was previously convicted of murder in the second degree.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Did the HSC apply the prior conviction exception
or did the jury find that Perry had been convicted? </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">It is unclear whether the
prior-conviction exception even applied to Perry’s case. The HSC noted that
prior convictions “are different” and “float outside the constitutional ambit.”
But then it held that the simultaneous convictions meant that the jury did not
have do anything else. Perry was eligible to sentencing under HRS § 706-657.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The prior conviction exception to <i>Apprendi</i> is
on shaky ground in Hawai'i (after 2015). </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC appears to have applied the state
of the law regarding <i>Apprendi </i>and <i>Maugaotega </i>as it was in 2003.
Long after Perry’s sentencing, the HSC examined the prior-conviction exception
to <i>Apprendi </i>in the context of mandatory minimums in <i>State v. Auld</i>,
136 Hawai'i 244, 361 P.3d 471 (2015). There, it held that while the SCOTUS has
yet to get rid of the prior-convictions exception under the Sixth Amendment,
Article I, Section 14 of the Hawai'i Constitution requires the jury to “find
beyond a reasonable doubt that his or her prior convictions trigger the
imposition of a mandatory minimum term sentence[.]” <i>State v. Auld</i>, 136 Hawai'i
at 254, 361 P.3d at 481. It being a new rule, the HSC held that its ruling in <i>Auld
</i>was prospective only. It did not look backward to Auld’s own case and certainly
did not reach back to Perry. <i>Id.</i> at 256-257, 361 P.3d at 483-484.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></b></p>
<b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">Guilty verdicts for both counts
constitute “previous convictions.” </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">The HSC also rejected Perry’s argument that he
was not previously convicted by virtue of the guilty verdicts. The term “previously
convicted” in HRS § 706-657 means “a sentence imposed at the same time or a
sentence previously imposed which has not been set aside, reversed, or vacated.”
<i>Id. </i>The intent is to give life without parole when the defendant commits
more than one murder. Commentary to HRS § 706-657. The HSC affirmed the
judgment of conviction.</span>B. Lowenthalhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13293689883439389796noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-844955418635981150.post-29654065863462392602023-03-11T10:30:00.001-10:002023-03-11T10:32:42.693-10:00Violations aren't "crimes" so defendants convicted to amended violations can get their arrest records expunged<p> <b style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Barker v. Young </span></i></b><b style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">(HSC March 6, 2023)</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Background.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> Phillip Barker was arrested under suspicion of harassment,
a petty misdemeanor. He ultimately pleaded no contest to the amended charge of disorderly
conduct, a violation. Approximately two years after the arrest, he applied to
the <a href="https://ag.hawaii.gov/hcjdc/" target="_blank"><span style="color: #2b00fe;">Hawai'i Criminal Justice Data Center (HCJDC)</span></a> to have his arrest records
expunged. The application was denied.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Barker filed a civil complaint against the HCJDC asking
the circuit court to order the HCJDC to accept his application because he was
eligible for an expungement. Both Barker and the HCJDC filed motions for
summary judgment. The circuit court—with the Hon. Bert I. Ayabe presiding—ruled
for the HCJDC and granted its motion for summary judgment. Barker appealed. The
ICA in a published opinion written by the Hon. Judge Karen T. Nakasone
affirmed. The circuit court and the ICA relied on legislative history and concluded
that the expungement statute did not cover violations because a violation is a “crime.”
Barker petitioned the HSC for further review. The HCJDC did not respond and the
HSC granted its writ of certiorari.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The expungement statute. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The case centers around
the interpretation of the expungement statute:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 1in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Expungement orders.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> (a) The . . . attorney
general’s duly authorized representative . . ., upon written application from a
person arrested for, or charged with but not convicted of a crime, . . . shall
issue an expungement order annulling, cancelling, and rescinding the record of
arrest[.]”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">HRS § 831-3.2. There is an exception. An expungement
order shall not issue “[f]or a period of five years after arrest or citation in
the case of a petty misdemeanor or violation where conviction has not been obtained
because of a bail forfeiture[.]” HRS § 831-3.2(a)(2).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The expungement statute clearly and unambiguously applies
to those charged with, but never convicted of a “crime.” </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">When the statute’ “is
plain and unambiguous, our sole duty is to give effect to its plain and obvious
meaning.” <i>State v. Wheeler</i>, 121 Hawai'i 383, 390, 219 P.3d 1170 (2009). According
to the HSC, HRS § 831-3.2(a) is clear: a person arrested for or charged with a
crime, but who is not convicted of one is eligible for an arrest record
expungement. Barker was arrested for and charged with a “crime,” but was never convicted
of one. He was convicted of a criminal violation. “A violation does not
constitute a crime, and conviction of a violation shall not give rise to any
civil disability based on conviction of a criminal offense.” HRS § 701-107(5). Thus,
the HCJDC was required to grant his application.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The exception in HRS § 831-3.2(a)(2) does not
change that. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The
HSC rejected the HCJDC’s argument that the exception created an ambiguity
warranting other canons of statutory construction. According to the HSC, the exception
means that “if there is no conviction on a petty misdemeanor or violation
charge because of a bail forfeiture (non-appearance in court), an expungement order
cannot issue until five years from the date of arrest or citation.” However, a
conviction on a charged violation is different. That does not trigger the
exception and the general rule under HRS § 831-3.2(a) would apply. There is no
ambiguity here and using other canons of construction to create an ambiguity must
be avoided. <i>See State v. Obrero</i>, 151 Hawai'i 472, 479, 517 P.3d 755, 762
(2022) (canons of construction “should not be used to muddle the meaning of
unequivocal, but inconvenient, black letter law.”).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The HSC vacated the circuit court’s order granting
summary judgment for the HCJDC.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The HCJDC’s hypothetical. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The HCJDC pointed out the
problem with the statute. It plainly and unambiguously provides that if a
person is arrested for or charged with a petty misdemeanor and is later
convicted to a violation, like Barker, he gets the arrest records expunged. But
if a person is charged with or arrested for a violation and later is convicted
of the violation, that person cannot because a violation is not a “crime.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The HSC “appreciate[d] the concern expressed by the
HCJDC” but noted that that issue was not before the Court. It did address the
problem in a footnote:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 1in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">If such a case were to
arise, other rules of statutory interpretation could be triggered. For example,
“[i]f a literal construction of statutory language would produce an absurd
result, we presume that result was not intended and construe the statute in
accord with its underlying legislative intent.” <i>State v. Abella</i>, 145 Hawai'i
541, 552, 454 P.3d 482, 493 (2019) (citation omitted).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 1in 0in 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">And so it looks like
amending charges down to violations permits defendants to get an expungement—and
without a waiting period to boot. The application process—<u><a href="https://ag.hawaii.gov/hcjdc/expungements/" target="_blank">which can be found here</a></u>—could get busy.</span>B. Lowenthalhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13293689883439389796noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-844955418635981150.post-25266263486027008972023-03-04T09:37:00.004-10:002023-03-04T09:37:27.008-10:00Appeal from dismissal of the first case does not divest trial court’s jurisdiction over the later-filed second case.<p> <b style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">State v. Michaeledes </span></i></b><b style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">(HSC March 3, 2023)</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Background.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> The prosecution charged in a felony information
and non-felony complaint David Michaeledes with three counts of reckless
driving, assault in the 2d degree, and accidents involving substantial bodily
injury. Michaeledes moved to dismiss the charging document on the grounds that
its language was fatally flawed. The prosecution moved to amend the charging
document. The circuit court, with the Honorable Randal G. B. Valenciano
presiding, denied the prosecution’s motion to amend, granted Michaeledes’
motion to dismiss, and dismissed the case without prejudice. The prosecution filed
a notice of appeal thereby appealing from the order dismissing the case and the
order denying its motion to amend.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">While the case was on appeal, the prosecution
filed a second charging document—this time with the correct language—alleging the
same counts. Michaeledes moved to dismiss this case on the grounds that the circuit
court did not have jurisdiction to preside over the case while the first case
was appending on appeal. The circuit court agreed and dismissed the case.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The prosecution moved to “reopen the hearing” to
clarify if the dismissal of the second charging document was with or without
prejudice. The circuit court held that hearing with the lawyers but without Michaeledes.
The circuit court clarified it was without prejudice. The prosecution appealed from
the order dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. Michaeledes appealed on
the grounds that it was without prejudice. The appeals were consolidated and transferred
to the HSC.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The notice of appeal divests the lower court of
jurisdiction in <i>that </i>case, not the subsequent one.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> The HSC examined whether the
prosecution could file the second charging document after appealing from the
dismissal of the first. “[T]he general rule is that the filing of a notice of
appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction over the appealed case.” <i>State
v. Ontiveros</i>, 82 Hawai'i 446, 448-449, 932 P.2d 388, 390-391 (1996).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC rejected Michaeledes’s argument that the
circuit court could not proceed on the second charging document. The HSC stressed
that the “notice of appeal divested the circuit court only of jurisdiction over
the appealed case and not the subsequent case, which is based on a distinct charging
document.” In other words, jurisdiction is linked to the charging document. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC explained that recharging defendants “does
not revive the original case. Rather, recharging the defendant initiates a new
case.” <i>State v. Kalani</i>, 87 Hawai'i 260, 262, 953 P.2d 1358, 1360 (1998).
Thus, the circuit court had jurisdiction over the second charging document and
erred in dismissing the case.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Simultaneously hearing the second case in the
circuit court and the first one on appeal advances rationale behind the rule in
<i>Ontiveros.</i> </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The
general rule in <i>Ontiveros </i>is meant to “avoid the confusion and inefficiency
that might flow from placing the same issue before two courts at the same time.”
<i>TSA Int’l Ltd. v. Shimizu Corp.</i>, 92 Hawai'i 243, 265, 990 P.2d 713, 735
(1999). The HSC explained that these two rationales—avoid confusion and prevent
inefficiency—were advanced by the holding here.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC noted that allowing the first appeal to
proceed on whether the language in the first charging document was faulty raises
a legal issue distinct from the second case, which “more broadly concerns
Michaeledes’s criminal liability.” Thus, the HSC was not concerned about any
confusion that might arise. The HSC also noted that allowing both cases to
proceed would not result in “undue inefficiency.” The HSC explained that simultaneously
proceeding on both the appeal in one case and the trial proceedings in the other
is efficient. The HSC, in a footnote, also confirmed that jeopardy did not
attach in either case because “it is generally accepted that in jury trials,
jeopardy attaches when the jury is empaneled and sworn[.]” <i>State v. Quitog</i>,
85 Hawai'i 128, 141, 938 P.2d 559, 572 (1997).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">When it comes to determining dismissal with or
without prejudice here, the rule of lenity does not apply </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC made quick work of
Michaeledes’s arguments for his appeal from the dismissal of the second charge
without prejudice. First, it rejected his argument that the dismissal for lack
of jurisdiction should be with prejudice based on the rule of lenity. The rule
of lenity does not apply here. It is a rule of statutory construction that is
used to assist courts in interpreting ambiguous statutory language. <i>State v.
Guyton</i>, 135 Hawai'i 372, 380, 351 P.3d 1138, 1146 (2015).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The circuit court did not have to consider <i>Estencion
</i>factors when dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> The HSC also rejected Michaeledes’s
argument that the circuit court erred in articulating the <i>Estencion </i>factors
when it dismissed the case without prejudice. Those factors must be applied
when the right to a timely trial pursuant to Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure
(HRPP) Rule 48 is violated and the case must be dismissed. <i>State v.
Estencion</i>, 63 Haw. 264, 269, 625 P.2d 1040, 1044 (1981). It does not apply
to pretrial dismissals for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to HRPP Rule 12(b)(1).
Moreover, the HSC noted that dismissal with prejudice is not “appropriate given
the circumstances of this case[.]” The jurisdictional defect is curable and “would
be eliminated once the first appeal is resolved[.]”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">The defendant’s presence is
not required for conferences “upon a question of law.” </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">Finally, the HSC rejected
Michaeledes’s argument that the circuit court erred in holding the “clarification”
hearing without the presence of the defendant. While HRPP Rule 43 requires defendants
to be present “at pretrial evidentiary hearings” and “at every state of the
trial,” defendants are not needed when “the proceeding is a conference or
argument upon a question of law[.]” HRPP Rule 43(c)(2). And that was what the
hearing was in this case—a hearing on a purely legal question. </span>B. Lowenthalhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13293689883439389796noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-844955418635981150.post-16464812030107488692023-02-25T12:52:00.000-10:002023-02-25T12:52:08.989-10:00Speedy trial analysis applies to delays in sentencing<p> <b style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">State v. Canosa </span></i></b><b style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">(HSC January 17, 2023)</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Background.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> Stanley Canosa was charged with burglary in the
first degree, sexual assault in the first degree, unauthorized entry into a
dwelling, and two counts of sexual assault in the third degree. A jury found
him guilty of every count except for the offenses of sexual assault in the
third degree. He was also subject to extended sentencing and sentenced to 20
years for the burglary, 10 for unauthorized entry into a dwelling, and life for
sexual assault in the first degree. The ICA vacated the judgment and remanded
the case for a new trial.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">In the second trial, Canosa asked for a new
attorney. The third trial resulted in a jury deadlocked on sexual assault in
the first degree. That count was dismissed. The jury found him guilty of
burglary and unauthorized entry into a dwelling and extended sentencing again. The
circuit court sentenced him to 20 years for the burglary and 10 for the
unauthorized entry into a dwelling. The circuit court imposed the terms
consecutively. Canosa appealed and the ICA vacated judgment after finding a
sentencing error. The case was remanded for sentencing.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The judgment on appeal was issued on November 15,
2018. Canosa applied for certiorari to the HSC. The HSC rejected the
application on January 18, 2019. Nearly a year and a half later on June 4, 2020,
Canosa filed a written objection. He argued that before sentencing could occur,
the ordinary terms of imprisonment had run and he was no longer subjected to
extended terms of imprisonment. The circuit court—the Honorable Judge Karen
Nakasone presided—overruled overruled the objection. The Court imposed the same
terms of imprisonment: 20 for the burglary and 10 for the unauthorized entry
into a dwelling, but ordered that they be served concurrently. Canosa appealed.
The ICA affirmed. He petitioned for certiorari by the HSC.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Due Process continues after trial and at
sentencing. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Canosa
argued that the near 16-month delay after the rejection of certiorari and
sentencing deprived him of his due process rights under the State and federal
constitutions. The HSC agreed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">“After conviction, a defendant’s due process right
to liberty, while diminished, is still present. He retains an interest in a sentencing
proceeding that is fundamentally fair.” <i>Betterman v. Montana</i>, 578 U.S.
437, 447-448 (2016). The HSC agreed with the SCOTUS that “although the Speedy
Trial Clause does not govern, a defendant may have other recourse, including,
in appropriate circumstances, tailored relief under the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” <i>Id.</i> at 439.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC agreed with Justice Sotomayor’s concurring
opinion in <i>Betterman </i>that the four factors from <i>Barker v. Wingo</i>,
407 U.S. 514 (1972), apply to delays in sentencing. <i>Betterman v. Montana</i>,
578 U.S. at 451 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Here are the factors:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">(1) the length of the
delay; (2) reasons for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right;
and (4) prejudice to the defendant.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Id.</span></i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> at 451. The HSC adopted this analysis and applied
the four factors here. The HSC also held that all four factors weighed in
Canosa’s favor.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The length of the delay. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC examined the
length of the delay from the denial of his certiorari petition on January 18,
2019 to the sentencing hearing on June 4, 2020—sixteen months and seventeen days.
Given that the delay in <i>Betterman</i> was fourteen months, this was
sufficient to move on to the next factor. The HSC also noted that a seven-month
delay may also be sufficient. <i>See State v. Almeida</i>, 54 Haw. 443, 509,
P.2d 549 (1973). The HSC also noted it was “especially striking” that the delay
encompassed the expiration of ordinary statutory terms on September 22, 2019.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The reasons for the delay.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> The HSC agreed that when
examining the reason for the delay, there is a shared responsibility between
the prosecution and the trial court. At oral argument, the prosecution acknowledged
Canosa’s case “slipped through the cracks.” The HSC concluded that the delay was
caused by “unexplained government inaction[.]” When the reasons for the delay
are deliberately caused by the government, the factor weighs heavily against
the government. <i>State v. Visintin</i>, 143 Hawai'i 143, 159, 426 P.3d 367,
383 (2018). When it is a neutral reason like mere negligence, the factor weighs
less heavily but still falls on the prosecution and the circuit court, not the
defendant. <i>Id.</i> Slipping through the cracks is in the neutral-negligence
category. The factor weighs against the prosecution.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Assertion of the right to be sentenced. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The third factor—assertion
of the right—puts the onus on the defendant to bring about commencement of
proceedings:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">[A] defendant has no duty
to bring himself [or herself] to trial; the State has that duty. Thus, a
defendant does not waive his or her right to a speedy trial by failing to
demand one. However, the assertion of the right to a speedy is entitled to
strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being
deprived of the right.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Visintin</span></i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">, 143 Hawai'i at 160, 426 P.3d 384 (citations
omitted).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC applied these principles here. It noted
that Canosa asserted his right to be sentenced without unreasonable delay with
a written objection to the court filed the morning of the June 4, 2020 hearing.
The delay meant that he could not argue that he was entitled to ordinary
statutory maximum terms. He even testified at the hearing that he wrote to his
attorney before the expiration of the ordinary terms asking why he was not
being sentenced. He offered to enter the letter in evidence, but the circuit
court declined.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">As with the delays between arrest and indictment, <i>Visintin</i>,
143 Hawai'i at 161, 426 P.3d at 385, <i> </i>The
HSC noted that there was no other “conventional forum” for Canosa to assert the
right sooner. Moreover, “[a]fter adjudication of guilt, sentence shall be
imposed without unreasonable delay.” Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP)
Rule 32(a). According to the HSC, this created a “reasonable presumption that
when his illegal sentence was vacated and remanded . . . he would have the opportunity
to be sentenced” before expiration of the ordinary terms of imprisonment. The
third factor weighed in Canosa’s favor. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The prejudice factor. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The fourth factor also
went Canosa’s way.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Prejudice, of course, should
be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial
right was designed to protect. This Court has identified three such interests:
(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and
concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense
will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability
of a defendant adequately to prepare [the] case skews the fairness of the
entire system.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Barker</span></i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">, 407 U.S. at 532. The HSC went straight to the
third interest. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC agreed with Canosa that the delay
prevented him from seeking ordinary terms of imprisonment—the 10 and the 5—and deprived
him of the right to allocution. It also prejudiced him in preventing the parole
board from setting his mandatory term of imprisonment and delaying his ability
to be paroled.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC addressed allocution. Allocution is the defendant’s
constitutional right to be heard before sentence is imposed. Haw. Const. Art.
I, Sec. 5; HRS § 706-604(1). This right of allocution means that there has to
be a meaningful opportunity to be heard:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">[T]he right of presentence
allocution is an important constitutional right guaranteed under the due process
clause of the Hawai'i Constitution. As a due process right, a defendant’s right
of allocution is violated if the court fails to afford the defendant an
opportunity to exercise the right at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner. In order to be meaningful, the opportunity for allocution must be
reasonably calculated to achieve its purposes of providing the defendant with
an opportunity to plead for mitigation, contest the factual bases for
sentencing, and acknowledge wrongdoing.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">State v. Carlton</span></i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">, 146 Hawai'i 16, 25-26, 455 P.3d 356,
365-366 (2019) (citations omitted).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC held that the delay prevented Canosa from
having a meaningful opportunity to plead for mitigation. The HSC explained that
the prosecution’s delay put the sentencing court in an “unusual situation” in
which the defendant had been detained beyond the statutory maximum. The circumstance
deprived him of having “the appearance of justice.” The prosecution had 9
months to sentence Canosa before the ordinary terms expired. The failure to do
so deprived him of a meaningful opportunity to be heard before sentencing. The fourth
factor of prejudice weighs against the prosecution.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">An unusual remedy:
immediate release. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">On
balance, the delay in sentencing was a due process violation. The Court has
authority to “take such other steps as may be necessary . . . for the promotion
of justice in matters pending before it” to fashion a remedy. HRS § 602-5(a)(6).
The Court, therefore, ordered Canosa immediately released from custody and
vacated his sentence.</span>B. Lowenthalhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13293689883439389796noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-844955418635981150.post-35597379023867966542022-12-04T09:54:00.005-10:002022-12-04T09:58:39.797-10:00Disappearing elements and when you can file the motion to dismiss after trial<p> <b style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">State v. Van Blyenburg </span></i></b><b style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">(HSC November 23, 2022)</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Background.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> George Van Blyenburg was indicted with one count
of leaving the scene of an accident involving death or serious bodily injury
(HRS § 291C-12) and negligent homicide in the second degree (HRS § 707-703(1)(b)).
Here is how the prosecution alleged the first count:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 1in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">On or about August 6,
2016, in the City and County of Honolulu, State of Hawai'i, GEORGE VAN
BLYENBURG, as the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in
serious bodily injury to or death of [decedent], with intent, knowledge, or
reckless disregard of the substantial and unjustifiable risk that he was such a
driver, did intentionally, knowingly or recklessly fail to immediately stop the
vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close thereto as possible, and did
intentionally, and did intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly fail to forthwith
return to and in every event remain at the scene of the accident and fulfill
the requirements of section 291C-14(a) of the Hawai'i Revised Statutes and/or
Section 291C-14(b) of the Hawai'i Revised Statutes, thereby committing the offense
of Accidents Involving Death or Serious Bodily Injury, in violation of Section
291C-12 of the Hawai'i Revised Statutes.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Van Blyenburg argued that the charging document
failed to include essential elements of the offense and did not define “simple
negligence” for negligent homicide.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Van Blyenburg moved to dismiss the indictment <i>after</i>
the guilty verdict, and <i>before</i> sentencing. The motion was denied and he
was sentenced. He appealed. The ICA relied on the complaint and jury
instructions requested by the State filed before the motion to dismiss to
affirm the denial. Van Blyenburg petitioned to the HSC.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The duty to stop and the traffic provision. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Driver’s have a duty to
stop, remain, and assist the police at the scene after certain traffic accidents:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; margin: 0in 1in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The driver of any vehicle
involved in a collision resulting in serious bodily injury to or death of any
person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the collision or as
close thereto as possible but shall then forthwith return to and in every event
shall remain at the scene of the collision until the driver has fulfilled the
requirements of section 291C-14. Every stop shall be made without obstructing
traffic more than is necessary.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">HRS § 291C-12. HRS § 291C-14 has more details on a
driver’s duties like providing contact information and vehicle information to
the police and rendering to persons injured “reasonable assistance, including
the carrying, or the making of arrangements for the carrying, of the person to
a physician, surgeon, or hospital for medical or surgical treatment[.]”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The charging document did not include the last
sentence in HRS § 291C-12 that “[e]very stop shall be made without obstructing
traffic more than is necessary.” The HSC rejected Van Blyenburg’s argument that
this sentence is an attendant circumstance that must be pleaded.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The traffic provision is an element for some (but
not all) of the alternative theories of the prosecution. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">HRS § 291C-12(a) “proscribes
an offense that can be committed by factually alternative types of conduct.” <i>State
v. Batson</i>, 73 Haw. 236, 249-250, 831 P.2d 924, 932 (1992). A person can
violate the statute by stopping but refusing to provide information or failing
to stop altogether. The HSC noted that defendants “can be charged with having
committed an offense in two different ways when [they are] alleged to have
committed it in both ways.” <i>Id.</i> at 250, 831 P.2d at 932.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The traffic provision requiring drivers to stop “without
obstructing traffic more than is necessary” differs from the common understanding
of the phrase. <i>State v. Baker</i>, 146 Hawai'i 299, 307, 463 P.3d 956, 964
(2020). And so when the prosecution alleges that the defendant stopped the
vehicle, but failed to fulfill some of the duties in HRS §§ 291C-12(a) and
291C-14, the provision is an attendant circumstance that must be pleaded and
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. <i>Id.</i> at 305-308, 463 P.3d at 962-965.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The HSC, however, held that the charge’s first
theory—that Van Blyenburg failed to stop altogether and then failed to comply
with HRS § 291C-14—does not need the traffic provision. Thus, according to the
HSC, the indictment had the “elements of the offense intended to be charged,
and sufficiently apprise[d] the defendant of what [they] must be prepared to
meet.” <i>State v. Hitchcock</i>, 123 Hawai'i 369, 376, 235 P.3d 365, 372
(2010).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Due Process Violations v. Violation of Art. I,
Sec. 1’s Notice of the “Nature and Cause” of the charge. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">In a footnote, the HSC
admonished the ICA for looking beyond the four corners of the indictment in
upholding the dismissal. “[T]he appellate court can consider other information
in addition to the charge that may have been provided to the defendant . . .
until the time defendant objected to the sufficiency of the charges” only when
the defendant alleges the charging document states the offense, but is
deficient because it failed to inform the defendant about the nature and cause of
the charges against them. <i>State v. Wheeler</i>, 121 Hawai'i 383, 396, 219
P.3d 1170, 1183 (2009). <i>See </i>Haw. Const. Art. I, Sec. 14.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">A charge that fails to include every essential
element, in contrast, violates Due Process and when the charge does not have
every element, it fails “to state an offense, and a conviction based upon it
cannot be sustained[.]” <i>State v. Jendrusch</i>, 58 Haw. 279, 281, 567 P.2d
1242, 1244 (1977); <i>see also State v. Israel</i>, 78 Hawai'i 66, 73, 890 P.2d
303, 310 (1995). The HSC added that when a charge omits an element and violates
Due Process, there can be no conviction based on it—“no matter what other
information the defendant may have received from the State.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">It appears that when the motion to dismiss alleges
the omission of an essential element and thus a violation of Due Process, the
court cannot look beyond the charging instrument—even after the verdict and
before sentencing. When the motion alleges a failure to afford notice of the
nature and cause of the charge in violation of Article I, Section 14, the court
can look at what the defendant received before the filing of the motion like
discovery, jury instructions, and the evidence at trial.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Due Process requires inclusion of the state of mind, not defining it. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The
HSC rejected Van Blyenburg’s argument that the prosecution’s failure to include
the definition of “simple negligence” warranted dismissal of the other count—negligent
homicide.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The offense occurs when a driver causes death of a
“vulnerable user . . . in a manner that constitutes simple negligence as
defined in [HRS] section 707-704(2).” HRS § 707-703(1)(b). “A person acts with
simple negligence with respect to a result of the person’s conduct when the
person should be aware of a risk that the person’s conduct will cause that
result.” HRS § 707-704(2)(c). It is “essentially a civil standard of
negligence.” HRS § 702-206 cmt.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The HSC noted that the state of mind “animates”
the elements of the offense, but is not an element. The charging document must nevertheless
allege the correct state of mind for each element. <i>State v. Nesmith</i>, 127
Hawai'i 48, 56, 276 P.3d 617, 625 (2012). That is because the state of mind is
an “essential fact” that needs to be pleaded pursuant to Hawai'i Rules of Penal
Procedure Rule 7(d).” <i>State v. Maharaj</i>, 131 Hawai'i 215, 219, 317 P.3d
659, 663 (2013). The HSC also has held in the past that the failure to include
the state of mind is a Due Process violation. <i>Id.</i><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">The HSC in the end rejected the argument that the
state of mind must be defined. It needs to be alleged and included in the charge,
but it held that the prosecution does not need to include the definition of the
state of mind. The HSC affirmed the dismissal.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Justice Wilson’s Dissent.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> Justice Wilson dissented
on the HSC’s analysis about HRS § 291C-12. He wrote that the prosecution’s failure
to include the traffic provision in the indictment violated Due Process. Justice
Wilson wrote that the majority has nothing supporting its holding that the
traffic provision is an attendant circumstance in some, but not every instance.
“Every stop shall be made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary.” HRS
§ 291C-12(a). For Justice Wilson the word “every” clearly signals that the
provision applies to every violation of HRS § 291C-12(a). Justice Wilson
reminded the majority that the court “must presume that the legislature meant
what it said and is further barred from rejecting otherwise unambiguous
statutory language.” <i>State v. Demello</i>, 136 Hawai'i 193, 195, 361 P.3d
420, 422 (2015).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;">Justice Wilson also took issue with an attendant
circumstance that “only sometimes” has to be pleaded and proven. It questioned if
the prosecution elected the theory of a complete failure to stop, would it no
longer be a defense to stop relatively close to the scene in time and space?
Justice Wilson wrote that the majority did not establish a clear line of
demarcation. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt;"> </span></p>
<span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">He did, however, concur
with the majority in the footnote about the different kinds of defects and the
need to stick to the four corners of the charging instrument when the alleged
defect is a failure to include the essential elements of the offense. Justice
McKenna joined.</span>B. Lowenthalhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13293689883439389796noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-844955418635981150.post-20635909387565836262022-11-26T08:28:00.001-10:002022-11-26T08:28:11.670-10:00When you’re ineffective in perfecting the appeal, there is still judicial review<p> <b style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Suitt v. State </span></i></b><b style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">(HSC November 22, 2022)</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Background.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> Bryan Suitt pleaded no contest to murder in the
second degree and was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of
parole. The Hawai'i Paroling Authority set his minimum term at 45 years. He did
not appeal the conviction. He filed a petition to set aside the conviction pursuant
to Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 40 and updated it three times
for a total of 45 claims, including a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel and due process violations at the HPA minimum term hearing.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The circuit court, with the Hon. Judge Karen T.
Nakasone presiding, found most of the claims patently frivolous and dismissed
them without a hearing. It did set an evidentiary hearing on the claims relating
to the HPA and appointed counsel.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">On April 13, 2020, the circuit court amended its
order to address more claims added by Suitt. It denied the new claims and in a
footnote stated that if the HPA held a new minimum term hearing, its remaining
claims set for hearing would be moot. Suitt’s lawyer told Suitt that the circuit
court denied all of the claims except for the ones about the minimum term
hearing and that if he wanted to appeal, he could. Suitt did and asked his
lawyer to appeal “any and all grounds the court denied.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Suitt’s attorney filed a notice of appeal from the
April 13 order that day. The conversation with Suitt was later memorialized in
a letter. In the meantime, the HPA scheduled a new minimum term hearing and
mooted the claims. The circuit court issued a new order on May 20, 2020 and
dismissed the petition. Suitt did not appeal from the May 20, 2020 order.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Suitt’s lawyer did not file briefs in the April
13, 2020 order or ask for an extension. The ICA warned that the failure to
timely file briefs could result in dismissal of the appeal. Suitt filed a
motion for temporary remand so he could withdraw as counsel and sought an
extension of time. The ICA granted the motion, remanded the case back to the circuit
court, and a new lawyer was appointed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The ICA dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate
jurisdiction on the grounds that the April 13, 2020 order was not a final
order. Suitt petitioned certiorari from the dismissal order.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The first order was not the final one . . . </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Defendants may appeal from
judgments in post-conviction proceedings. HRPP Rule 40(h). An appeal must comply
with the Hawai'i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 4(b), which requires
a final order or judgment. <i>State v. Baranco</i>, 77 Hawai'i 351, 353, 884
P.2d 729, 731 (1994); <i>State v. Nicol</i>, 140 Hawai'i 482, 489, 403 P.3d
259, 266 (2017).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">An order is a final order when it ends “the
proceedings, leaving nothing further to be accomplished.” <i>Familian Northwest,
Inc. v. Cent. Pac. Boilder & Piping, Ltd.</i>, 68 Haw. 368, 370, 714 P.2d
936, 937 (1986); <i>State v. Kalani</i>, 87 Hawai'i 260, 261, 953 P.2d 1358,
1359 (1998). The order cannot be considered final when “the matter is retained
for further action.” <i>Familian Northwest</i>, 68 Haw. at 370, 714 P.2d at
937.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC agreed with the ICA that the April 13,
2020 order was not a final order because it did not end the proceedings. An
evidentiary hearing was still scheduled on some of Suitt’s grounds for relief. The
May 20, 2020 order dismissing the remaining claims was the final one that full resolved
his claims.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">And the HRAP 4(b)(4) exception did not apply . . .
</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">An
exception to the final order rule arises when a notice of appeal is premature.
That happens with the notice of appeal is “filed after the announcement of a
decision, sentence or order but before entry of the judgment or order[.]” HRAP
Rule 4(b)(4). When that happens, the notice of appeal is deemed timely filed.
The classic example occurs when the judge on the bench gives its oral order and
an notice of appeal is entered before the written order is issued. <i>See,
e.g., Shimabuku v. Montgomery Elevator Co., </i>79 Hawai'i 352, 356, 903 P.2d
48, 52 (1995). The HSC explained this exception is designed to prevent “technicality
from displacing substance.” Once the final order is “clearly communicated by
the court, parties should not be penalized for appealing before that order is
formally entered.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Despite the big hint to the HPA in the footnote,
that is not what happened in the April 13, order. Just because the HPA could
have mooted the remaining claims by setting a hearing, it did not have to do
it. The HRAP 4(b)(4) exception does not apply and so the order was not final.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">. . . but there’s still appellate jurisdiction. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">While the HSC did agree
that the April 13, 2020 order was not a final one, it did find a different
exception conferring appellate jurisdiction. Untimely appeals may be heard when
counsel has acted inexcusably or was ineffective in perfecting the appeal. <i>Grattafiori
v. State</i>, 79 Hawai'i 10, 14, 897 P.2d 937, 941 (1995). This is because the
right to counsel—once conferred by statute on appeal—is a constitutional one. <i>Maddox
v. State</i>, 141 Hawai'i 196, 203, 407 P.3d 152, 159 (2017). It means that counsel
has the “duty to diligently fulfill the procedural requirements of appeal if
the defendant elects to appeal.” <i>Id.</i> When counsel’s failings deprive the
defendant of appellate review, the defendant “need not demonstrate any
additional possibility of impairment to establish that counsel was ineffective.”
<i>Id.</i> at 206, 407 P.3d at 162.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">Here, Suitt made it clear
to his lawyer that he wanted to appeal the dismissal of all of his Rule 40
claims. He told his lawyer over the phone and then put it in writing in a
letter. The HSC held that Suitt’s lawyer failed to perfect his appeal by
appealing from the wrong order. That should not prevent Suitt from getting
judicial review of the dismissal of his claims. And so the ICA vacated the
dismissal order and sent it back to the ICA to address the merits of the
appeal.</span>B. Lowenthalhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13293689883439389796noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-844955418635981150.post-9095763287873375272022-11-19T12:59:00.000-10:002022-11-19T12:59:04.203-10:00Courts can hold defendants in jail and without bail after dismissing the case<p> <b style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Deangelo v. Souza </span></i></b><b style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">(HSC November 17, 2022)</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Background.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> Scott Deangelo arrested without a warrant for
second-degree murder. The district court made a judicial determination of
probable cause the next day. The prosecution filed a complaint alleging murder and
held a preliminary hearing. At the hearing, the district court found probable
cause based on the evidence presented and committed the case to the circuit
court. The prosecution did not present evidence before a grand jury and no true
bill of indictment issued.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Instead, the prosecution filed a complaint in the
circuit court. Deangelo pleaded not guilty and filed a motion to dismiss on the
grounds that because he was not indicted, the prosecution violated HRS § 801-1.
While that motion was pending, the HSC issued its decision in <i>State v.
Obrero</i>, 151 Hawai'i 472, 517 P.3d 755 (2022). The prosecution conceded the
violation and requested that Deangelo remain in custody without bail so it
could indict him. The circuit court, with the Hon. Judge Kevin A. Souza
presiding, granted the motion to dismiss, dismissed the case without prejudice
and held Deangelo in jail without bail for 90 days. The prosecution indicted
Deangelo 11 days after the dismissal. Deangelo petitioned to the HSC for
immediate review to consider the circuit court’s power to hold him without bail
after dismissing the case. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">HRPP Rule 12(g) allows the court to hold defendants
in custody after granting their motions to dismiss.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> The HSC examined HRPP
Rule 12(g):<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">If the court grants a
motion based on a defect in the institution of the prosecution or in the
charge, it may also order that the defendant be held in custody or that the
defendant’s bail be continued for a specified time ending the filing of a new
charge. Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to affect provisions of any statute
relating to periods of limitations.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Deangelo raised two challenges. First, he argued
that the rule is unconstitutional because it empowered the circuit court to
hold him without bail after dismissing the case and terminating the prior
finding of probable cause. Second, even if the rule was constitutional, post-dismissal
custody must be limited to 48 hours.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The rule is constitutional here . . . </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Deangelo argued that
defendants once arrested without a warrant have a constitutional right to have
a court determine probable cause within 48 hours of the arrest. <i>Gerstein v.
Pugh</i>, 420 U.S. 103, 126 (1975); <i>County of Riverside v. McLaughlin</i>,
500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991). When the court dismissed the case, it terminated the judicial
determination of probable cause. <i>See State v. Kalani</i>, 87 Hawai'i 260,
261, 953 P.2d 1358, 1359 (1998). That, according to Deangelo, meant the rule
cannot empower courts to hold defendants in custody after the case has been
dismissed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC disagreed. HRPP Rule 12(g) “creates a
limited exception to the procedure that a dismissal completely terminates the
original case.” According to the HSC, the rule “resets the proceedings to where
they were before the defective charge or indictment was made.” For Deangelo,
that meant after the preliminary hearing. The preliminary hearing “determin[es]
whether there is probable cause to warrant holding the accused for action by
the grand jury.” <i>Engstrom v. Naauao</i>, 51 Haw. 318, 320, 459 P.2d 376, 377
(1969). The HSC noted that it takes time for grand juries to convene and the preliminary
hearing ensures that “a defendant is not unreasonably held before indictment.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">. . . because the “defect” was a procedural one.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> The HSC stressed that
HRPP Rule 12(g) is “limited to defects in the charging process. The rule cannot
abridge a substantive right.” For example, if the dismissal was based on
falsely sworn statements by the police in the judicial determination of probable
cause, the post-dismissal seizure would be unreasonable. <i>See e.g. Manuel v.
City of Joliet, Ill</i>, 137 S.Ct. 911, 918-919 (2017). That is not the case
here. The defect prompting dismissal was unlawful under HRS § 801-1.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Does HRPP Rule 12(g) apply to dismissals based on
defective pleadings? </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The
HSC noted that HRPP Rule 12(g) is limited to defects in the charging process
and it cannot abridge substantive rights. It was also clear that a violation of
HRS § 801-1 and <i>Obrero</i> are not violations of substantive rights but
procedural defects.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">What about a dismissal based on the failure to
plead essential elements? That violates due process. <i>State v. Nesmith</i>,
127 Hawai'i 48, 276 P.3d 617 (2012). And due process is a substantive right,
right? And what about a violation of Article I, Section 14? <i>See State v.
Jardine</i>, 151 Hawai'i 96, 508 P.3d 1182 (2022). It is unclear if HRPP Rule
12(g) applies to a dismissal based on constitutional violations.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">How long can the court hold the defendant after
dismissal? </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The
HSC also rejected Deangelo’s argument that post-dismissal custody must be limited
to 48 hours. HRPP Rule 12(g) requires the court to provide a “specified” time,
but does not limit the number of days. The federal courts and courts in other
states have a similar rule. Some have specific time limitations ranging from
one to 60 days. <i>See </i>Ky. R. Cirm. P. RCr. 8.24(2) (60 days). The HSC held
that the rule does not contemplate a universal time limit and “setting one
would undermine the trial court’s ability to tailor its order to the
circumstances.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC interpreted the rule to require a “reasonable”
time frame:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">We hold only that the time
specified must be reasonable in light of all the circumstances. Relevant
circumstances may include the status of the case (is the case at the discovery and
pretrial motions stage or is trial imminent?), the unprecedented exigencies of
the Covid-19 pandemic, the inability of the State to convene grand juries
during a particular time, the nature and seriousness of the defendant’s alleged
crime(s), the extent to which the defendant poses a flight risk and a danger to
the community, and the defendant’s ability to afford bail.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC held that the circuit court in this case adequately
examined these factors and since Deangelo was indicted before the dismissal
order expired, it did not examine if 90 days was an abuse of discretion.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">A 60-day pass?</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;"> Having adopted a rule of reasonableness
based on the relevant circumstances, the HSC “emphasize[d]” that no state rule
allows custody to go beyond 60 days. It also did “not foresee any circumstances
that will justify custody longer than 60 days under a 12(g) order.” It also
expected that once grand juries are convening more frequently, “this time will
continue to decrease as defendants are lawfully charged.”</span>B. Lowenthalhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13293689883439389796noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-844955418635981150.post-17207479698597443762022-11-06T14:13:00.005-10:002022-11-06T14:13:53.409-10:00The new application of the old prosecutorial-misconduct standard (and prosecutors can’t call defendants liars anymore)<p> <b style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">State v. Hirata </span></i></b><b style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">(HSC October 31, 2022)</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Background.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> Chanse Hirata was charged with continuous sexual
assault of a minor under the age of 14. HRS § 707-733.6. At trial, the
prosecutor, Honolulu DPA Kristen Yamamoto, told the jury in her opening
statement that there was no DNA evidence, no surveillance videos, and no
eyewitnesses “But you will hear from the one person that lived through all of
this[,]” the complaining witness.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The complaining witness, her parents, two police
officers, a doctor who examined the complaining witness, and an expert in the
“dynamics of child sexual abuse” testified for the prosecution. The defense
called Hirata, his parents, and his girlfriend.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The trial court, with the Hon. Judge Catherine Remigio
presiding, instructed the jury on credibility with Hawai'i Standard Jury
Instructions Criminal (HAWJIC) 3.09:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">It is your exclusive right
to determine and to what extent a witness should be believed and to give weight
to his or her testimony accordingly. In evaluating the weight and credibility
of a witness’s testimony, you may consider the witness’s appearance and demeanor;
the witness’s manner of testifying; the witness’s intelligence; the witness’s
candor or frankness, or lack thereof; the witness’s interest, if any, in the
result of this case; the witness’s relation, if any, to a party; the witness’s
temper, felling, or bias, if any has been shown; the witness’s means and
opportunity of acquiring information; the probability or improbability of the
witness’s testimony; the extent to which the witness is supported or
contradicted by other evidence; the extent to which the witness has made
contradictory statements, whether in trial or at other times; and all other
circumstances surrounding the witness and bearing upon his or her credibility.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The family court also gave the standard
instruction to treat the Defendant like any other testifying witness. HAWJIC
Inst. No. 3.15.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">In her closing argument, the prosecutor emphasized
that this case came down to the complainant’s credibility. She argued that
Hirata and his witnesses could not believed because they have “a motive to
lie.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">[T]he defendant also
testified, and the jury instructions say that when a defendant testifies, his
credibility is to be tested in the same manner as any other witness. . . .<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">So is the defense’s story
believable? We look at the same factors. They have bias. They have a motive to
lie.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">In another part of her closing, the prosecutor
argued that the complainant was credible because she was brave and got
emotional.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">So let’s go through the
factors of [CW]’s credibility. Her appearance, demeanor, her manner of
testifying. She came here last week. You saw her. She’s 11 years old. She was
nervous and understandably so. And she tried to be brave up there on the stand.
She answered all of my questions. She answered all of the defense attorney’s
questions. Almost three hours up there.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">And then at the end of
almost those three hours, she couldn’t be brave anymore, and you saw her when
she got emotional. She broke when the defense attorney continued to call—to
question her credibility and if she was making this up, and her answer to you
as this really happened. It’s consistent with a child who is traumatized.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Hirata did not object and no curative instruction
was given. The jury found Hirata guilty as charged. He was sentenced to 20
years imprisonment and appealed to the ICA, which found that the prosecutor’s
argument was misconduct, but harmless misconduct and affirmed. Hirata
petitioned to the HSC.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Reshuffling the deck when it comes to plain error
and prosecutorial misconduct. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The defense did not object to the two comments at
issue in this appeal—the prosecutor’s statement about the CW testifying like “a
child who is traumatized” and calling the defendant a liar. Because there was
no objection, the plain error standard of review applies. Plain errors
“seriously effect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings, to serve the ends of justice, and to prevent the denial of
fundamental rights.” <i>State v. Williams</i>, 146 Hawai'i 62, 72, 456 P.3d
135, 145 (2020).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC noted that prosecutorial misconduct claims
are claims alleging violations of the right to a fair trial, which is indeed a
fundamental right. <i>State v. Williams</i>, 149 Hawai'i 381, 392, 491 p.3d
592, 603 (2021); <i>State v. Yoshino</i>, 50 Haw. 287, 290, 439 P.2d 666,
668-669 (1968). The HSC also observed that when it comes to prosecutorial
misconduct at least, there is no difference between “plain error” and “harmless
error.” <i>See State v. Riveira</i>, 149 Hawai'i 427, 431 n. 10, 494 P.3d 1160,
1164 n. 10 (2021).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The three-factored prosecutorial misconduct
standard does not change with or without an objection at trial. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC presented the same
three-factors in determining prosecutorial misconduct regardless of any
objection below:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">In prosecutorial
misconduct cases, then, once the defense establishes misconduct—objection or no
objection—appellate review is the same: “After considering the nature of the
prosecuting attorney’s conduct, promptness or lack of a curative instruction,
and strength or weakness of the evidence against the defendant, a reviewing
court will vacate a conviction if there is a reasonable possibility that the
conduct might have affected the trial’s outcome.” <i>Id.</i> at 431, 494 P.3d
1164.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The “motive to lie” comment was prosecutorial
misconduct.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">
The HSC began with the prosecutor’s assertion that Hirata as the defendant had
a “motive to lie” when he testified. The HSC held that this comment was
prosecutorial misconduct. Prosecutors rely on “arguments that are uncoupled
from evidence showing the defendant has a particular interest in the outcome
separate from the generic interest shared by all defendants in criminal cases.”
<i>State v. Salvea</i>, 147 Hawai'i 564, 585 n. 29, 465 P.3d 1011, 1032 n. 29
(2020). Prosecutors “cannot ask the jury to infer a defendant’s lack of
credibility based solely on the fact that [they are the] defendant.” <i>State
v. Basham</i>, 132 Hawai'i 97, 117, 319 P.3d 1105, 1125 (2014).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Prosecutors can’t use the word “lie” or its “derivatives”
in closing. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The
HSC in a footnote pointed out that the prosecutor’s use of the word “lie” is
misconduct. “The word’s strongly pejorative tone conveys the speaker’s
subjective disapproval that the witness would taint the judicial process with
dishonesty.” <i>State v. Austin</i>, 143 Hawai'i 18, 51, 422 P.3d 18, 51 (2018)
(Pollock, J. concurring in part). The HSC warned prosecutors to “scrub <i>lie </i> and its derivatives from their closing
argument vocabulary.” On top of that, it did not matter that the prosecutor
said motive to lie as oppose to lie. This distinction still implied the opinion
had lied. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The problem with HAWJIC Inst. No. 3.09 after the
defendant testifies.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">
The HSC also pointed out a problem with the standard instruction. The instruction
identifies factors jurors can use to assess any witness’s credibility—including
the “interest, if any, in the result of the case.” <i>Id.</i> That would include the
defendant. In this case, the prosecutor committed misconduct by telling the
jury Hirata had a motive to lie because he was the party in this case. The instruction
amplifies the problem. The HSC directed trial courts to strike the clause in
certain cases:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">Given the risk that
HAWJIC 3.09 poses to defendants’ due process right to a fair trial, we direct
trial courts to excise HAWJIC 3.09’s ‘interest, if any, in this result of this
case’ clause when a defendant testifies and there’s no specific evidence to
support a credibility attack other than the universal interest in the result of
the case shared by all defendants.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Arguing that the complaining witness was “consistent
with a child who is traumatized” is also misconduct. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC also held that the
comment that the complaining witness’s testimony was “consistent with a child
who is traumatized” constituted prosecutorial misconduct. According to the HSC,
prosecutors have “a duty to seek justice, to play fair and square.” They cannot
express personal beliefs about the evidence. <i>See, e.g., State v. Marsh</i>,
68 Haw. 659, 660, 728 P.2d 1301, 1302 (1986). They cannot introduce new
information and evidence during the closing argument. <i>State v. Basham</i>,
132 Hawai'i at 113, 319 P.3d at 1121. And so “expressions of personal opinion
by the prosecutor are a form of unsworn, unchecked testimony and tent to
exploit the influence of the prosecutor’s office and undermine the objective
detachment that should separate an attorney from the cause being argued.” <i>State
v. Salavea</i>, 142 Hawai'i at 582, 465 P.3d at 1029.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">In this case, the prosecutor told the jury that
the complaining witness’s testimony was “consistent with a child who is
traumatized” without presenting any evidence that this is consistent with a
traumatized child. No witnesses testified about her mental health or
psychological condition. This comment amounted to the prosecutor’s personal
belief on the witness’s credibility and is unsupported by any evidence
presented at trial. It also invited the jury to infer that the prosecutor had
undisclosed information about her mental health that could corroborate her
claim.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The second prong—promptness of or lack of curative
instruction—does not seem to matter. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC noted that in this case there was no
curative instruction and the prong itself “pales in comparison to that of the
first and third factors[.]” The HSC explained that “curative instructions are
not particularly effective.” <i>See State v. Riveria</i>, 149 Hawai'i at 433,
494 P.3d at 1166 (“Court instructions often serve as an unsatisfactory,
ineffectual fix when prejudicial matters surface at trial”). The HSC also noted
curative instructions are almost never given without an objection that factor
would make it “easier in a plain error prosecutorial misconduct case” like this
one. <i>Id.</i> It would, according to the HSC, “disincentivize” the defense
from objecting. While “a strongly-worded admonition immediately following minor
prosecutorial misconduct may mitigate the effect” of the misconduct, the first
and third factors are primary<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The third prong—the strength or weakness of the
case—pointed away from harmlessness. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The third prong requires the court to assess the
strength or weakness of the evidence against the defendant. <i>Id.</i> at 431,
494 P.3d at 1164. If there is a reasonable possibility that the misconduct affected
the outcome of the trial, it cannot be deemed harmless. <i>Id.</i> The HSC
expanded on what that means:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Typically, a trial ends one of three ways: with a guilty
verdict, a not guilty verdict, or a hung jury mistrial. So a prosecutor’s
improper remarks affect the trial’s outcome if there’s a reasonable possibility
that at least one juror might have been affected by the misconduct: it just
takes one unconvinced juror to hang a jury. The reasonably possibility
standard, then, is satisfied if there’s a showing that it’s reasonably possible
that, absent the misconduct, a single juror would have voted differently.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The HSC noted that this case hinged on credibility
of either the defendant or the complaining witness. The evidence was far from
overwhelming and attacking credibility is seldom harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
<i>State v. Underwood</i>, 142 Hawai'i 317, 329, 418 P.3d 658, 670 (2018). The
HSC held that neither comment was harmless and remanded the case for a new
trial.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Chief Justice Recktenwald’s Dissent. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">The Chief Justice dissented
because while he agreed that the prosecutor’s comment about Hirata having a “motive
to lie,” the single reference had minimal impact on the outcome of the trial.
The CJ also distinguished between the argument that a person has the motive to
lie as opposed to calling the person a liar and relied on cases from other
jurisdictions to support the distinction. <i>See State v. King</i>, 288 Kan.
333, 352-353, 204 P.3d 585, 598 (Kan. 2009). Moreover, the CJ took issue with the
majority’s direction to have trial courts excise the clause from the HAWJIC
instruction. For him “[w]e should refer this issue to our Standing Committee on
Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions, which can consider other possible revisions
to the instructions, evaluate approaches taken by other jurisdictions, and
importantly, guard against unforeseen consequences.”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 10.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt;"> </span></p>
<span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 115%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-bidi; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">He also disagreed that the
prosecutor’s argument that the complaining witness testified like a “child who is
traumatized” was misconduct. The prosecution had an expert witness testify
about the general dynamics of child abuse such as tunnel memory, delayed
reporting, and failure to recall the exact number of instances of abuse. That allowed
a fair basis for the prosecutor’s comment. Justice Nakayama joined.</span>B. Lowenthalhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13293689883439389796noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-844955418635981150.post-64345388746150648342022-10-19T12:41:00.001-10:002022-10-19T12:42:59.847-10:00False accusations of sexual assault are (still) not covered by Rape Shield Law<p> <b style="text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;">In
re: GH </span></i></b><b style="text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;">(HSC October
10, 2022)</span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;">Background.</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;"> The
prosecution filed multiple petitions in the family court against the Minor,
G.H., averring sexual assault in the first and third degrees. The prosecution also
moved to preclude the defense from presenting evidence about complainant’s past
sexual history. The defense did not file a memorandum in opposition and did not
file notice of the intention to use evidence of prior sexual conduct pursuant
to HRE Rule 412. At the hearing on the motion, the Minor represented that he
would not offer evidence of past sexual conduct, but would present evidence
that the complainant had made accusations of sexual abuse against others in the
past.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;">At trial, the complainant testified that she was sexually assaulted
when she was 9 years old. She testified that the Minor was a friend of their neighbor
who came over to the house and slept over. One night, Minor assaulted her and
said if she told anyone, something would happen to her. She eventually
disclosed the incident to a hospital employee.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;">On cross-examination, Minor confronted the complainant about whether
she accused her sister’s boyfriend of sexually assaulting her. The complainant
denied it. Minor asked about other accusations she made against her father and
her cousin. The prosecution objected and the family court sustained it. Minor
argued he was trying to elicit evidence of false accusations. The family court
opted to give Minor “some leeway” and the complainant denied making false
accusations.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;">Minor attempted to adduce extrinsic evidence of the complainant’s
false assault allegations by calling a relative and asking the relative about
it. The prosecution objected and the family court sustained it. The family court
ruled the testimony was covered by HRE Rule 412 and there was no notice
pursuant to the rule. The family court concluded that the Minor violate the law
and sent Minor to the Hawai'i Youth Correctional Facility until he turned 19.
Minor appealed to the ICA. The ICA affirmed. Minor then petitioned for a writ
of certiorari to the HSC.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;">The HSC still reviewed the untimely certiorari application.
</span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;">Eight
months after the ICA issued its judgment on appeal, Minor petitioned for review
by the HSC. A party has 30 days after issuance of the judgment on appeal or
dismissal order to file an application for writ of certiorari. HRS § 602-59(a).
A party can extend the deadline another 30 days when it is timely made. HRS §
602-59(c). That did not happen here.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;">The HSC has the power to review an untimely certiorari
application “and proceed to review its merits when it is plain from the record that
defense counsel failed to comply with the procedural requirements for filing
the application.” <i>State v. Uchima</i>, 147 Hawai'i 64, 82, 464 P.3d 852, 870
(2020). That is because the Hawai'i Constitution “guarantees a defendant in a
criminal case the right to the effective assistance of counsel on certiorari
review in the same manner that it does during all other critical stages of the
criminal proceedings.” <i>Id.</i> at 76, 464 P.3d at 864.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;">Counsel for Minor admitted in its untimely filing that it was
untimely. Counsel therefore admitted to being ineffective. The right to
effective assistance of counsel extends to family court proceedings and the
adjudication of juveniles. <i>In re Doe</i>, 107 Hawai'i 12, 16, 108 P.3d 966,
970 (2005). The HSC, therefore, applied the ruling in <i>Uchima</i> here and
granted judicial review on its merits.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;">Evidence that the complainant falsely accused
others of sexual assault is not covered by HRE Rule 412. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;">HRE Rule
412 is extensive and has a hefty notice requirement. It prohibits evidence of a
complainant’s “past sexual behavior” in criminal cases where the defendant is
charged with sexual assault.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;">“Past sexual behavior” is defined as “sexual behavior other than
the sexual behavior with respect to which a sexual offense or sexual harassment
is alleged.” HRE Rule 412(h). The word “behavior” pertains to past sexual
conduct. <i>State v. Kelekolio</i>, 74 Haw. 479, 521 n. 19, 849 P.2d 58, 77 n.
19 (1993). Conduct means “a mode of action” or “something done.” <i>Id.</i> And
so false allegations of sexual activity are not a form of “action” and “past
sexual behavior.” <i>Id.</i> at 521, 849 P.2d at 77.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;">The issue arose in <i>State v. West</i>, 95 Hawai'i 452, 24
P.3d 648 (2001). There, the HSC formulated a test to determine when HRE Rule
412 comes into play for false accusations of sexual conduct:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;">[W]here a
defendant seeks to admit allegedly false statements made by a complainant
regarding an unrelated sexual assault, the trial court must make a preliminary determination
based on a preponderance of the evidence that the statements are false. Correlatively,
where the trial court is unable to determine by a preponderance of the evidence
that the statement is false, the defendant has failed to meet [their] burden,
and the evidence may be properly excluded.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;">Id.</span></i><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;"> at 460, 24 P.3d at 656.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;">Clarifying <i>West</i>. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;">The HSC
re-examined <i>West</i>. Requiring trial courts to determine if the defendant
can prove truth or falsity of an accusation prior to trial warranted it. Here
is the new clarification:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;">If a defendant
seeks to admit a complaining witness’s false allegations of sexual assault,
then admissibility is not subject to HRE Rule 412 or <i>West</i>. Defendants
seeking to admit such evidence must make it clear the evidence is being
proffered for its falsity. We do not address the applicability of other rules
of evidence, including HRE Rule 403 (2016). A court must also, however,
consider the constitutional rights of the defendant[, that is, confrontation,
cross-examination, and the right to present a complete defense.]<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 1.0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>When a defendant seeks to admit
evidence of sexual assault allegations based on their truth or where truth or
falsity is unclear, the admission of such evidence is subject to HRE Rule 412.
However, we abrogate <i>West</i>’s requirement that the trial court make a
preliminary determination based on a preponderance of the evidence that the statements
are false before allowing admission.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;">And so the family court here erred in precluding the defense
from presenting evidence of false accusations made by the complainant.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-margin-bottom-alt: 8.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: 0in; text-align: justify;"><b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;">Even if HRE Rule 412 did apply the notice
requirements get diluted because of the accused’s constitutional rights. </span></b><span style="font-family: "Georgia",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;">The notice
requirements in HRE Rule 412(c)(1) require disclosure of the proffered evidence
at least fifteen days before trial. The HSC held that this notice requirement has
been limited by <i>State v. Pond</i>, 118 Hawai'i 452, 193 P.3d 368 (2008), where
the HSC noted that strict compliance with notice requirements must give way when
they implicate constitutional rights. <i>Id.</i> at 464-465, 193 P.3d at
380-381. Here, the prosecution was not surprised by the evidence proffered by
the Minor. In fact, it was the prosecution that brought it up with its own
motions. The HSC, therefore, held that even if HRE Rule 412 did apply, the
family court erred in excluding the evidence based solely on noncompliance with
the notice requirements.<o:p></o:p></span></p>B. Lowenthalhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13293689883439389796noreply@blogger.com1